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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether an individual can and/or should be 
allowed to consent to objectifying treatment.  This necessitated the determination of the 
meaning of dignity, the meaning of freedom and the relationship between dignity and 
freedom.  It was found that both the right not to be objectified and the right to consent to 
objectification could be found within human dignity.  This is due to the broad definition of 
dignity in terms of which dignity has two, sometimes contradicting, components. One 
component safeguards autonomy and the right to choose, which supports consent to 
objectification, whereas the other promotes individual self-worth by prohibiting objectifying 
treatment.    
By investigating the meaning of freedom it was found that freedom as a constitutional value, 
and possibly also a free-standing constitutional right, could incorporate the right to consent to 
objectifying treatment. 
Three possible solutions to this tension between human dignity and freedom were identified 
and critically analysed.  The first was that an individual cannot and should not be allowed to 
consent to objectification.  This solution is primarily based on the notion that dignity is 
supreme to freedom and that freedom should yield to communitarian dignity.  Furthermore, it 
is contended that consent to objectification is often invalid due to economic coercion and 
undue influence.   
The second possible solution was that, although an individual might not be able to validly 
consent to objectifying treatment, such consent should still be allowed under certain 
circumstances.  The example of invalid consent due to economic coercion introduced in the 
previous solution was examined in relation to prostitution.  The contention regarding this 
approach is that, since our government is unable to fulfil the socio-economic needs of those 
who consent due to economic coercion, such consent should be allowed and strictly 
regulated.  
The third possible approach was that circumstances do exist in which individuals can give 
valid consent to objectification and that in these circumstances they should be allowed to do 
so.  In this solution the grounds of the first approach is criticised by contending, for example, 
that dignity is not supreme to freedom, that a plural society should allow these type of 
choices and that consent to objectification is already allowed in some instances. 
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The results of this study were that, although there are situations in which genuine consent is 
not possible, it can be given under certain circumstances.  An individual who cannot give 
genuine consent to objectification should not be allowed to do so, unless transitional 
measures dictate otherwise.  However, an individual who is capable of giving valid consent to 
objectification should be allowed to do so.  Finally, regardless of whether such consent is 
genuine or not, strict regulation thereof is required. 
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Opsomming 
Die doel van hierdie studie was om vas te stel of 'n individu kan toestem en/of toegelaat 
behoort te word om toe te stem tot objektiverende behandeling. Dit genoodsaak dat die 
betekenis van menswaardigheid en vryheid, asook verhouding tussen hierdie twee begrippe 
vasgestel word.  Daar is bevind dat beide die reg om nie te geobjektifeer te word nie en die 
reg om toe te stem tot objektivering gevind kan word binne die begrip van menswaardigheid. 
Hierdie is te danke aan die breë definisie van menswaardigheid in terme waarvan 
menswaardigheid uit twee, soms weersprekende, komponente bestaan. Een komponent 
beskerm outonomie en die reg om te kies, wat toestemming tot objektivering ondersteun, 
terwyl die ander komponent individuele waarde bevorder deurdat dit objektiverende 
behandeling verbied. 
Tydens die ondersoek aangaande die betekenis van vryheid is bevind dat vryheid as 'n 
grondwetlike waarde, en moontlik ook 'n vrystaande grondwetlike reg, die reg om toe te stem 
tot objektiverende behandeling kan inkorporeer. 
Drie moontlike oplossings vir hierdie spanning tussen menswaardigheid en vryheid is 
geïdentifiseer en krities ontleed. Die eerste is dat 'n individu nie kan toestem en ook nie 
toegelaat behoort te word om toe te stem tot objektivering nie. Hierdie oplossing is 
hoofsaaklik gebaseer op die veronderstelling dat vryheid onderworpe is aan menswaardigheid 
en dat individuele vryheid moet toegee tot die menswaardigheid van die gemeenskap. Verder 
word dit beweer dat toestemming tot objektivering dikwels ongeldig is as gevolg van die 
ekonomiese dwang en onbehoorlike beïnvloeding. 
Die tweede moontlike oplossing was dat, alhoewel 'n individu nie noodwendig instaat is om 
geldige toestemming tot objektiverende behandeling te verskaf nie, sodanige toestemming 
onder sekere omstandighede steeds toegelaat behoort te word. Die voorbeeld van ongeldig 
toestemming as gevolg van ekonomiese dwang wat in die vorige oplossing bekendgestel is, is 
ondersoek aan die hand van prostitusie. Die bewering ingevolge hierdie benadering is dat, 
aangesien ons regering is nie in staat is om die sosio-ekonomiese behoeftes van diegene wat 
toestem tot objektivering as gevolg van ekonomiese dwang te vervul nie, sodanige 
toestemming toegelaat en streng gereguleer behoort te word. 
Die derde moontlike benadering is dat daar wel omstandighede bestaan waar individue 
geldige toestemming kan gee tot objektivering en dat hulle in hierdie omstandighede 
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toegelaat behoort te word om dit te gee. In terme van hierdie oplossing word die gronde 
waarop die eerste benadering gebaseer is gekritiseer, deur byvoorbeeld te argumenteer dat 
menswaardigheid nie verhewe is bo vryheid nie, dat in ons huidige diverse samelewing sulke 
soort keuses aanvaar behoort te word en dat toestemming tot objektivering reeds in sommige 
geval toegelaat word. 
Die resultate van hierdie studie was dat, alhoewel daar omstandighede bestaan waaronder 
geldige toestemming nie moontlik is nie, dit wel onder sekere omstandighede gegee kan 
word. 'n Individu wat nie daartoe instaat is om geldige toestemming tot objektivering te gee 
nie, behoort nie toegelaat word om dit te doen nie, tensy oorgangsmaatreëls anders bepaal. 
Waar 'n individu egter in staat is om geldige toestemming tot die objektivering te gee, 
behoort dit toegelaat word. Ten slotte is streng regulering van toestemming tot objektiverende 
behandeling nodig ongeag of sodanige toestemming geldig is of nie. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 1 Background  
In the past human dignity was largely confined to philosophical and religious thought.  It was 
only in the 1940s that systematic reference started to be made to human dignity in 
constitutional and human rights texts.
1
  There was a growing need to develop this concept in 
the legal context, due to the evils perpetrated against humanity during the Second World War, 
as well as during the Apartheid regime in South Africa.
2
  Human dignity has been gradually 
incorporated into human rights texts across the globe.  Today human dignity is central to 
many countries’ constitutions.3  South Africa’s own constitution boasts dignity as a founding 
value.
4
   
Although human dignity is now part of our legal structures, the analysis of dignity as a legal 
and constitutional concept is in its “relative infancy”.5  South Africa’s dignity jurisprudence 
is one of the most developed in the world, but courts and academic writers still struggle to 
give meaning to the concept of human dignity.  This gives rise to numerous difficulties and 
                                                     
1
 Dicke K “The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” in 
Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 111 111-120.   
2
 On how Germany and South Africa adopted a “never again” approach, see O’Regan C “From Form to 
Substance: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Laurie Ackermann” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du 
Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 6; Woolman S “Dignity” in 
Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
2ed (2005) 36-1 36-4, 36-7.  Eckert describes how the French Revolution led to the idea of inherent dignity and 
how the concept of human dignity was strengthened as a result of World War II. Eckert J “Legal Roots of 
Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human 
Rights Discourse (2002) 41 45, 52.  See also Du Plessis L “Affirmation and Celebration of the ‘Religious 
Other’ in South Africa’s Constitutional Jurisprudence on Religious and Related Rights: Memorial 
Constitutionalism in Action?” (2008) African Human Rights Law Journal 376 138, 139; Barnard-Naude AJ, 
Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) “Introduction” in Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 
vii vii, viii. 
3
 See McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European 
Journal of International Law 655 664-675; Eckert J “Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law” in 
Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 41 52,53; 
Frowein JA “Human Dignity in International Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human 
Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 121 122-124, Starck C “The Religious and Philosophical 
Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern Constitutions” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The 
Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 179 179,180, for examples of human dignity in 
human rights texts. 
4
 S 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; hereinafter referred to as ‘the Constitution’, ‘our 
Constitution’, ‘the Final Constitution’ or ‘the South African Constitution’. 
5
 McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” 19 (2008) The European Journal 
of International Law 655 711; Eckert J “Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & 
Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 41 42. 
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inconsistencies.
6
  Human dignity has been manipulated into a variety of meanings and has 
often been employed on both sides of a dispute.
7
  This is perhaps not surprising, as dignity 
has come to be regarded as a supreme value and an objective legal norm.
8
 
One of the dangers of viewing dignity as a supreme value is that it can be used to support a 
paternalistic role for the state.  The state has the power to make any laws as long as it can 
argue that it serves to protect human dignity.  This kind of paternalism often inhibits the 
individual and personal freedom of citizens.
9
 
As a result, human dignity is often seen in opposition to freedom.  In the view of some 
writers this is problematic, since human dignity and freedom are interrelated and freedom 
should be enhanced by human dignity.
10
  On the other hand, it has been argued that individual 
freedom may be constrained to protect the human dignity of others.
11
  This raises a 
fundamental question, namely whether one has the freedom to consent to objectifying 
treatment which infringes one’s dignity. Conversely, does the state have a legitimate interest 
                                                     
6
 Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-1. For discussions on the idea of dignity as seemingly 
meaningless, see Eckert J “Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The 
Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 41 42; Starck C “The Religious and 
Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern Constitutions” in Kretzmer D & Klein E 
(eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 179 185; Waldron J “Dignity of 
Groups” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal 
Order (2008) 66 66,67; Liebenberg S “The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-economic Rights” 
(2005) SAJHR 1 2,3; McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The 
European Journal of International Law 655 655, 661, 697, 698, 702, 713.  
7
 Davis D “Equality: The Majesty of Legoland Jurisprudence” (1999) SALJ 398 413; McCrudden C “Human 
Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 
655, 698, 702.  McCrudden provides the example of the assisted suicide case Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1.  
See also Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) 
Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 130. 
8
 Chaskalson A “Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of 
Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 133 136; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) para 28, hereinafter referred to as ‘NCGLE’. 
9
 Eckert demonstrates how dignity can be a tool in the hands of the state.  Eckert J “Legal Roots of Human 
Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights 
Discourse (2002) 41 69.  See also Starck C “The Religious and Philosophical Background of Human Dignity 
and its Place in Modern Constitutions” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in 
Human Rights Discourse (2002) 179 189, 192 for more on the role of the state. 
10
 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 (2) SA 621 (CC) para 
49; hereinafter referred to as “Ferreira”.  See also Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, 
Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-67. 
11
 Starck C “The Religious and Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern 
Constitutions” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse 
(2002) 179 189. 
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in banning activities such as prostitution or dwarf tossing that arguably infringe the dignity of 
participants?
12
 These questions have not been answered satisfactorily in the literature. 
Three possible approaches have transpired from legal writing.  The first is that consent to 
objectifying treatment should not be allowed under any circumstances.  The second is that 
where the state cannot fulfil the economic needs of the poor, the latter cannot be prohibited 
from consenting to objectifying treatment in exchange for remuneration to fulfil those needs 
themselves.  The third approach is that people can and should be allowed to consent to 
objectifying treatment.
13
 These three approaches will be critically analyzed in Chapters 4 to 
6, with a view of determining whether consent to objectification should be allowed. These 
chapters will be preceded by a more general discussion of the foundations, meaning and 
status of human dignity (Chapter 2) and freedom, as well as the relationship between the two 
values (Chapter 3).  
1 2 Methodology 
An academic literature study will be used in Chapters 2 and 3 to try to define human dignity 
and freedom.  The actual manner in which the courts have engaged with these concepts will 
also be considered.  It will be necessary to use a comparative study in order to interpret 
human dignity and freedom and their relationship with one another.  Various countries will 
be analyzed, but I will concentrate on German and United States law.  A religious, 
philosophical and historical inquiry will also be required to fully understand these two 
concepts, especially with regard to human dignity.  The philosophical study will mainly focus 
on the ideas of the philosopher, Immanuel Kant, as he is seen as “the father of the modern 
                                                     
12
 For dwarf-tossing as example, see McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 656; Klein E “Human Dignity in German Law” 
in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 145 145-159; 
Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 194.  For the example of 
prostitution, see Fritz N “Crossing Jordan: Constitutional Space for (UN) Civil Sex?” (2004) SAJHR 230 230-
248. 
13
 The SALRC suggests similar approaches to prostitution, namely: criminalisation, partial criminalisation, 
regulation and non-criminalisation.  The foremost difference between these approaches and the approaches 
discussed in this thesis is that in the thesis the second and third approaches are combined.  Another difference is 
that in this thesis no definite distinction is made between legalisation and decriminalisation.  The focus is rather 
on whether something should be allowed at all.  For this reason both the second and third approach in this thesis 
recommend the regulation of objectifying treatment, unlike the SALRC project, where legalisation does not 
necessarily involve regulation.  South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution 
Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) xii 173 186. 
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concept of human dignity”.14  Case law will be considered when determining whether a 
residual right to freedom exists. 
I will make use of a comparative analysis to examine the three possible approaches pertaining 
to consent to objectification in Chapters 4 to 6.  German law in particular will be examined in 
connection with whether human dignity is a supreme value.  The key focus will be on Dutch 
law in support of the contention that South Africa should allow consent to objectifying 
treatment.  I will also use a philosophical study throughout these chapters, the focal point 
again being on the views of the philosopher, Immanuel Kant.  An academic literature analysis 
as well as a study of case law will be undertaken.   
1 3 Outline 
1 3 1 Chapter 2: Human dignity 
In this chapter I will try to give meaning to the concept of human dignity. This will require an 
enquiry into whether it is possible to define human dignity.  Dignity has repeatedly been 
criticised as being void of any specific meaning.
15
  As a result it has been said that dignity is 
open to manipulation and therefore has no practical value.
16
  The use of a functional 
interpretation of dignity will be examined and put forward as the best solution to this 
impediment. 
The possibility of using foreign law to help define and interpret the concept of human dignity 
will be considered. Arguments for and against looking at other jurisdictions will be 
assessed.
17
   I will briefly discuss the idea of a universal definition of human dignity and the 
merits of this idea.  My argument in this regard will be that foreign jurisdictions should be 
used to assist in the definition and interpretation of human dignity but that one must be wary 
of the potential perils involved. 
From dignity jurisprudence three strategies for defining human dignity transpire.  These 
strategies are religion based, philosophical and historical.
18
   Each of these strategies will be 
                                                     
14
 McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of 
International Law 655 659.  McCrudden quotes from Bognetti G “The Concept of Human Dignity in European 
and U.S. Constitutionalism” in Nolte G (ed) European and US Constitutionalism, Science and Technique of 
Democracy 37 (2005) 75 79. 
15
 661. 
16
 655. 
17
 724.  McCrudden criticises the reliance on foreign jurisdictions for defining dignity.   
18
 658.   
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explained.  I will show how these strategies do not necessarily contradict each other, but 
should rather be seen to complement one another. 
The two basic components of human dignity, autonomy and inherent worth, will be 
examined.  It will be demonstrated that the right not to be objectified can be allocated within 
the inherent worth component of human dignity, whereas the right to choose or consent to 
different things, can be perceived as part of autonomy.  I will assess the different arguments 
pertaining to whether human dignity should be interpreted as being communitarian or 
individualistic by nature.  The idea of group dignity will briefly be referred to. 
As mentioned above, dignity can be defined in terms of its functions.
19
  In the remainder of 
the chapter these functions will be illustrated. 
1 3 2 Chapter 3: Freedom in relation to human dignity 
This chapter will commence with an attempt at defining the concept of freedom.  This will 
entail a study of the religious, philosophical and historical foundations of freedom.   The 
manifestation of freedom in South African common law, in terms of Classical Liberal theory, 
will be examined.  Subsequently, this manifestation will be compared with the current 
manifestation of freedom in the South African Constitution.  Freedom is specifically 
entrenched in the Constitution as a value. In addition, there is also a possibility that freedom 
may be recognised as a freestanding right in itself or as part of human dignity.
20
  Important 
South African case law will be consulted in order to determine whether there is space for 
such a freestanding residual right to freedom in South Africa.
21
  The idea of a residual 
freedom right that is located within the ‘autonomy’ part of human dignity will also be 
considered. 
Similar to dignity, freedom can also perform a number of different functions.  These 
functions will be examined.  The fact that these two concepts perform such similar functions 
often results in a desire to use them either to enhance or limit one another.  I will look at 
whether rights and values are commensurable and whether one of these concepts is superior 
to the other.  Three different perspectives: that human dignity can limit freedom, enhance 
freedom or be enhanced by freedom, will be explored. 
                                                     
19
 Dicke K “The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” in 
Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 111 118. 
20
 Ss1, 7, 36, 39, 165, 181 and 196. 
21
 The fundamental case in this regard being Ferreira. 
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1 3 3 Chapter 4: Individuals should not consent to objectifying treatment 
In the following three chapters I will examine three radically different approaches to 
objectifying treatment.  The idea is firstly to provide a full independent analysis of each 
radical approach and then attempt to integrate them in the concluding chapter. 
The first approach will be explored in Chapter 4.  The focus here will be on the inherent 
worth component of human dignity.  In terms of this approach dignity is often considered to 
be a supreme value that cannot be lost.
22
  The effect of this understanding is that dignity 
always triumphs over freedom. 
Communitarian notions of human dignity support the perception that dignity can be used to 
limit individual autonomy.  These understandings of dignity will also be used to illustrate the 
conviction that freedom should yield to the public policy and the popular moral views of 
society. The idea that consent to objectification in certain seemingly inconsequential cases 
should not be allowed because it will cause a slippery slope and open the flood gates to worse 
violations of human dignity, will briefly be referred to. 
An essential consideration is whether freedom itself would in fact allow consent to 
objectification, were it to trump dignity.  The argument that no residual right to freedom 
exists and that constitutional freedom, unlike Classical Liberal freedom, does not allow for 
such consent will be examined.  Furthermore, the popular contention will be introduced that, 
regardless of whether a freedom right broad enough to allow such consent can be found 
within the Constitution, such consent is often invalid due to factors such as coercion or undue 
influence. 
1 3 4 Chapter 5: Objectifying treatment should be allowed despite invalid consent 
The argument that will be put forth in this chapter links up with the final idea in the previous 
chapter, namely that there are circumstances in which people cannot give substantive consent.  
I will develop this approach within the context of prostitution.  The factors that constrain 
substantive consent will be identified, but the main focus will be on economic duress.  It will 
be asserted that some people only agree to objectification because they need the money.   
                                                     
22
 On dignity as a supreme value, see Wood AW “Human Dignity, Right and the Realm of Ends” in Barnard-
Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 47 49.  
For the Kantian idea that dignity cannot be lost, see Wood AW “Humanity as an End in Itself” in Guyer P (ed) 
Critical Essays on Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1998) 165 165, 170.  See also NCGLE 
para 28. 
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On the one hand, I will introduce the idea that such coercion should not be allowed and that 
the only way to prevent this coercion is to address the cause thereof.  This requires the state 
to fulfil its duty of providing basic socio-economic necessities to its citizens.
23
  I will 
elaborate on the fact that fulfilling these needs forms part of the state’s duty to protect human 
dignity.  On the other hand, the argument that people only turn to objectification in order to 
fulfil their own needs because our government does not have the resources to satisfy these 
needs, will be examined.  I will then present the contention that people cannot be prohibited 
from consenting to objectification for purely economic purposes, if the state cannot serve 
their needs. 
The idea of applying transitional measures until such time as the state may be able to fulfil 
this duty will be explained.  This includes allowing and regulating consent to objectifying 
treatment.
24
  I will subsequently look at how this alternative to prohibiting invalid consent 
might even be considered to enhance constitutional freedom.  
1 3 5 Chapter 6: Valid consent to objectifying treatment should be allowed 
In this chapter the third approach will be outlined, in terms of which individuals can in some 
situations give substantive consent to objectifying treatment and should not in these 
circumstances be proscribed from doing so.  
Firstly, the counterarguments to the notion of a supreme dignity will be considered in an 
attempt at demonstrating that dignity should not automatically trump freedom, but may be 
limited and waived to the same extent that freedom can.  Thereafter I will refer to the 
plurality of society and the fact that each person’s morals and preferences differ.  In view of 
this, it could be argued that some people may not regard treatment that is viewed as 
objectifying as inconsistent with their human dignity and may in fact prefer such treatment.  
The assertion that dignity should not be informed by the moral convictions of the majority 
will also be explored in this regard. 
For consent to be allowed it should be valid.  The requirements for valid consent will be 
identified and discussed in the context of privacy, the common law consent defence, 
contractual autonomy and the idea that one’s choices should not harm others.  I will also 
consider the theory that allowing consent to objectification might be beneficial.  The related 
                                                     
23
 This constitutional duty is entrenched in ss26 and 27 of the Constitution. 
24
 The transitional measures of allowing and regulating objectification are discussed in South African Law 
Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 13-14. 
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concepts of responsibility, property and a broad definition of freedom will briefly be referred 
to. 
There are numerous circumstances in which consent to objectification is allowed in our 
society. These circumstances will be identified and integrated into the argument that consent 
should be allowed. 
1 3 6 Chapter 7: Can and/or should a person be allowed to consent to objectifying treatment? 
In conclusion I will attempt to answer the question of whether the individual can and/or 
should be allowed to consent to objectifying treatment.  The three approaches that will be 
evaluated in Chapters 4 to 6 signify three distinctive viewpoints.  It is important to integrate 
them in order to provide an answer. 
Two contrasting situations will be identified.  The first occurs when a person gives invalid 
consent to objectification.  An example of such consent is where a prostitute consents to 
prostitution due to economic coercion.  The second situation occurs when a person gives 
valid consent and truly desires the treatment. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HUMAN DIGNITY 
2 1 Can dignity be defined? 
The term dignity is found in several human rights texts.
25
  It has become a standard procedure 
to include it in international and regional human rights conventions, as well as national and 
sub-national constitutions.  It is therefore crucial to determine the meaning of the concept.  
Understanding dignity will assist in clarifying the relationship between the state and 
individual, as well as influence the way people understand and practise civil liberties.
26
 
Unfortunately, there is widespread disagreement over the definition of human dignity.
27
  As 
explained in Chapter 1, this is due in part to the fact that the constitutional protection of 
dignity and the analysis thereof in a judicial context are still in its “relative infancy”.28   
Some writers claim that it is too difficult to determine the meaning of human dignity due to 
the lack of common understanding as to what the term entails.
29
  They argue that a concept 
can have no practical value if its content is contested to such an extent.  Indeed some even 
                                                     
25
 Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 172; Waldron J “Dignity of 
Groups” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal 
Order (2008) 66 66.   For examples of human dignity in human rights texts, see McCrudden C “Human Dignity 
and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 664-672; 
Eckert J “Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of 
Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 41 41-42, 51-52; Frowein JA “Human Dignity in 
International Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse 
(2002) 121 122-124; Starck C “The Religious and Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in 
Modern Constitutions” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights 
Discourse (2002) 179 179-180.  
26
 Starck C “The Religious and Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern 
Constitutions” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse 
(2002) 179 179-180. 
27
 See Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 171, 179, 182, 217; Waldron 
J “Dignity of Groups” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-
Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 66 67-68; Liebenberg S “The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-
economic Rights” (2005) SAJHR 1 2-3; Eckert J “Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer 
D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 41 42. 
28
 See 1 1.  See also McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The 
European Journal of International Law 655 711-712; Eckert J “Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law” 
in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 41. 
29
 McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of 
International Law 655 655; Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D 
&Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112-130.  See also NCGLE 
para 28. 
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claim that dignity has no real meaning.
30
  In their view, instruments incorporating human 
dignity refrain from defining it, since it is merely a decorative concept.
31
 
Due to its contested and open-textured meaning, dignity has occasionally been invoked on 
both sides of a dispute.  As discussed in Chapter 1, this results in the idea that dignity can be 
manipulated into a variety of meanings.
32
  The complaint that dignity is used like a ‘magic 
wand’ to get the upper hand in ideological and political battles has also been raised.33 
In order to transform this perception it is necessary to find a way of defining human dignity.  
Three solutions have been suggested.  The first one is to define dignity negatively, by way of 
examples. This solution identifies violations of human dignity by referring to instances in the 
past where it was deemed to have been violated, such as the death penalty and the 
criminalisation of sodomy.
34
  The problem with this approach is that new or more subtle 
incursions of human dignity will be excluded.
35
    
The second solution suggests determining a minimum core for human dignity, regardless of 
whether some specifics are still contested.
36
  One can attempt to determine such a minimum 
                                                     
30
 McCrudden writes about Arthur Schopenhauer’s 1837 critique of Kant in which Schopenhauer condemns the 
use of ‘human dignity’ as contentless.  McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 661. Similarly, Wood concedes that dignity, as 
spoken of today, is often regarded as an “empty” concept.  Wood AW “Human Dignity, Right and the Realm of 
Ends” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal 
Order (2008) 47 48. 
31Dicke indicates that instruments refrain from giving a substantial definition for human dignity.   Dicke K “The 
Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” in Kretzmer D & Klein E 
(eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 111 118. See also Waldron J “Dignity 
of Groups” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal 
Order (2008) 66 66. 
32
 1 1.  On the idea that dignity is used on both sides of an argument, see McCrudden C “Human Dignity and 
Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 698, 702.  For 
discussions on how dignity is open to manipulation, see Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” 
(2009) Stell LR 171 171-172, 213.  Kretzmer argues that if dignity means everything it may also mean nothing.  
Kretzmer D “Human Dignity in Israeli Jurisprudence” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human 
Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 161 174.  See also Davis D “Equality: The Majesty of Legoland 
Jurisprudence” (1999) SALJ 398 413. 
33
 See Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 195.  Kretzmer contends that 
dignity should not be used as a magic wand or catchall right.  Kretzmer D “Human Dignity in Israeli 
Jurisprudence” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse 
(2002) 161 174. 
34
 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) para 26; S v 
Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 26. 
35
 Botha refers to Dreier H Grundgesetz Kommentar Bd I 2ed (2004) 166-167.  Botha H “Human Dignity in 
Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 182.  For examples from the Bavarian Constitutional Court of 
what is generally recognised as violations of dignity, see Klein E “Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer 
D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 145 151. 
36
 Eckert J “Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of 
Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 41 42; McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial 
Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 679. 
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core by examining the religious, philosophical and historical foundations of dignity.  
However critics have argued that it is impossible to establish a minimum core definition of 
human dignity. 
The third proposition is to give what Dicke calls a “functional interpretation” to the concept 
of human dignity.
37
  This interpretation requires agreement on the effect or function of 
applying the concept in practice, despite a lack of agreement on the theory.  McCrudden 
refers to these kinds of agreements as ‘incompletely theorized’ agreements.38  The functions 
of human dignity are discussed later in this chapter.
39
 
It seems that a combination of the three suggestions would be the optimum solution.  This 
will include an attempt at determining a minimum core definition of human dignity, while 
keeping in mind past instances of its violation and, where theory is inadequate, to at least try 
to establish the effect or function of human dignity. 
2 2 The use of foreign jurisdictions and a universal definition of dignity 
This poses the question, how do we establish the minimum core and the functions of human 
dignity? 
Foreign case law and academic literature can assist in defining and interpreting human 
dignity.  In South Africa German judicial decisions can be especially valuable.  Ackermann J 
acknowledges this in Du Plessis v De Klerk.
40
 There are several reasons for this assertion.
41
   
The German Basic Law and the South African Constitution were both drafted with a “never 
again” attitude, following gross violations of human dignity.42 Both of these countries have a 
                                                     
37
 Dicke K “The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” in 
Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 111 118. 
38
 McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of 
International Law 655 697.  McCrudden introduces this idea of “incompletely theorized” agreements, but then 
goes on to criticise it.   
39
 See 2 5. 
40
 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) para 92; hereinafter referred to as ‘Du Plessis v De Klerk’. 
41
 Botha and O’Regan list some of these reasons.  Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) 
Stell LR 171 173; O’Regan C “From Form to Substance: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Laurie 
Ackermann” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid 
Legal Order (2008) 6. 
42
 Botha states this with reference to Du Plessis v De Klerk para 92.  Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative 
Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 173.  O’Regan notes this “never again” attitude of both these countries.  
O’Regan C “From Form to Substance: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Laurie Ackermann” in Barnard-
Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 6.  The 
German Constitution of 1949 is called the Grundgesetz (translated as the German Basic Law and hereinafter 
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constitutional normative value system and have adopted the idea that law cannot be 
understood separate from values and morals.
43
  The dignity jurisprudence of Germany is 
more developed than that of other countries, which makes it a very authoritative source when 
interpreting human dignity.
44
 
Section 39(1)(c) of the South African Constitution determines that a court may consider 
foreign law when interpreting the bill of rights.  There have, however, been a number of 
debates regarding whether courts should refer to other jurisdictions when dealing with human 
dignity.  There are valid arguments for both sides of the debate.  Botha lists a number of 
advantages for the use of foreign case law.  He refers to the fact that, similar to the South 
African and German Constitutions, many countries have incorporated human dignity as a 
central part of their constitutions following severe violations to human dignity, for example 
discrimination, dictatorship and fascism. As a result the constitutional provisions that 
entrench human dignity in these countries’ constitutions resemble one another.45  Considering 
the similarities between these provisions, one might benefit greatly from consulting other 
jurisdictions on their interpretation of the concept.  
Another argument in favour of referring to foreign law is based on the theory that the South 
African Constitutional Court’s understanding of human dignity has been influenced to some 
extent by foreign case law and literature.  This is especially asserted in the context of dignity 
as the most fundamental norm; which some consider a German idea.
46
  Where a country’s 
understanding of a certain concept is influenced by another country, it cannot be prejudicial 
to consult that country when further interpreting and developing the idea.  
Another advantage, which is attributed to the use of foreign jurisdictions in defining and 
interpreting human dignity, is that it shows the similarities that South African dignity 
jurisprudence share with that of other countries.  This serves as a confirmation of our 
convictions.
47
  Moreover it highlights the differences in the dignity jurisprudence of different 
countries, identifying other interpretive possibilities.  It can also give an indication of whether 
                                                                                                                                                                     
referred to as such).  Art 1 of the Basic Law entrenches human dignity as follows: “The dignity of man is 
inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty of all state authority.”   
43
 O’Regan C “From Form to Substance: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Laurie Ackermann” in Barnard-
Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 6. 
44
 Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 173. 
45
 172.   
46
 172.  This will be discussed in 2 5 in greater detail. The idea is also mentioned that this is first and foremost a 
Kantian idea, rather than one derived from German constitutional jurisprudence. 
47
 172-173. 
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any problems encountered in the interpretation of dignity are due to formulation and 
interpretation, or whether they are inherent to the concept of human dignity.
48
 
Another popular argument in favour of consulting the jurisprudence of foreign jurisdictions 
relates to the theory of a universal definition of human dignity.  It was developed from the 
understanding that the idea of inherent human dignity is derived from natural law.
49
  Natural 
law is deemed to be a higher law and therefore more enduring.
50
  This corresponds with the 
legitimising function ascribed to human dignity.
51
  It is put forth that natural law transcends 
national boundaries, resulting in one universal conception of human dignity.  The idea that 
human dignity is an ethical conception also enhances the idea of a universal definition of 
thereof.
52
 
This approach is nevertheless criticised extensively.  McCrudden addresses this criticism.
53
  
The main critique against a universal idea of human dignity is that a common conception of 
human dignity is impossible, since foreign jurisdictions differ too much.
54
  The individual 
characteristics of each country play an undeniable role in defining and interpreting dignity.  
These characteristics relate to the ideology, religion, culture and language of each country.
55
  
McCrudden concludes that any commonality between countries regarding the concept of 
human dignity dissolves under closer examination.
56
  He ascribes the courts’ unwillingness to 
admit that they apply a customised interpretation of dignity, to their fear of detracting from 
dignity’s legitimising function.57  It has however been argued that even though interpretation 
                                                     
48
 173. 
49
 McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of 
International Law 655 696. For the notion that inherent dignity transcends national boundaries, see Botha H 
“Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 200. 
50
 For the idea that dignity is part of a more enduring higher law, see Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative 
Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 177. 
51
 McCrudden writes that if it is acknowledged that dignity is applied differently in different countries dignity 
will lose its legitimising function.  McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” 
(2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 710. 
52
 Barrett J “Dignatio and the Human Body” (2005) SAJHR 525 529, 533. 
53
 McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of 
International Law 655 694-710. 
54
 697-710. McCrudden provides an extensive explanation of all the “differences in the conceptions of dignity in 
judicial interpretation”. 
55
 710, 712. 
56
 710. 
57
 710.  McCrudden however refers to a case in which a court has acknowledged that dignity is interpreted 
differently in different jurisdictions.  In the Omega-case the ECJ implies that Germany attaches more weight to 
human dignity than the US; Omega Spielhallen und Automatenaufstellungs- GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der 
Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR 1-9 609 paras 34-37. 
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and actualisation occur within a certain jurisdiction, it does not undermine the universality of 
human dignity.
58
   
It is therefore evident that consulting the jurisprudence of foreign jurisdictions when defining 
and interpreting human dignity can be highly advantageous.  At the same time it is necessary 
to acknowledge the tension between upholding a universal notion of human dignity and 
respecting the plurality of different jurisdictions.
59
  In order to ensure the independence of a 
court, the jurisprudence of other jurisdictions should not dictate its decisions, but merely 
assist therein.
60
  Courts should refer to other jurisdictions while keeping in mind the possible 
perilous consequences. 
2 3 The foundations of human dignity 
Another important step in the effort to define human dignity is to explore its foundations and 
roots.  Only when one understands where dignity comes from, can one get a better idea of its 
contemporary meaning(s). 
Dignity has three integrated foundations namely religion, history and philosophy.
61
  It is 
stated that they are integrated, for, while three distinct foundations can be identified, they all 
form part of each other.  Just as religion and philosophy are part of the history and 
background of human dignity, religious influences are incorporated into its philosophy.
62
   
The idea of human dignity can be traced back to ancient times and was originally regarded 
strictly as a religious and philosophical ideal.  Despite the absence of a substantive link 
                                                     
58
 See Barrett J “Dignatio and the Human Body” (2005) SAJHR 525 532.  See also, South African Law Reform 
Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 226, on the obligation 
to take into account South Africa’s “particular socio-economic circumstances and its cultural, moral and 
religious diversity”. 
59
 McCrudden refers to this inherent tension.  McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of 
Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 694.  See also, South African Law 
Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 110. 
60
 695.  McCrudden acknowledges this possible consequence.  He refers to the US Supreme Court case of Roper 
v Simmons 543 US 511 (2005), para 1216. In this case O’Connor J finds that a court will keep its independence 
when consulting other jurisdictions, as long as it does not allow the foreign jurisdictions to dictate its decision.  
61
 McCrudden identifies these three foundations as strategies to interpret human dignity.  McCrudden C “Human 
Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 
658-663. Botha also refers to the philosophical and religious roots of human dignity.  Botha H “Human Dignity 
in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 179. 
62
 See Starck C “The Religious and Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern 
Constitutions” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse 
(2002) 179 180. 
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between human dignity and human rights until the modern era, human dignity was mentioned 
in ancient Roman law.
63
   
We find this ancient idea of human dignity in the Roman law concept of dignitas hominis.  
This notion of human dignity was not inherent to all people, but was awarded according to 
rank.
64
  Both states and institutions could attain dignitas hominis, as the concept was not 
limited to human beings.
65
  Roman Dutch law adopted this idea of dignitas and the idea was 
consequently incorporated into South African private law.  South African private law still 
contains this concept, yet it is rarely equated with the dignity that is entrenched in the 
Constitution.
66
 
Although there are some scattered Roman law writings on a kind of inherent human dignity, 
the first substantive reference to it can be found in religious writings.
67
 In both the Christian 
and Jewish faith people are considered to have equal inherent worth because they are created 
in the image of God.
68
  Inherent worth implies inherent human dignity.  According to these 
religions human dignity is only inherent in human beings.  The beliefs that only human 
beings were created in the image of God and that God granted only people the ability to 
reason, were support for this claim that human dignity is only inherent in people.
69
 
                                                     
63
 See Dicke K “The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” in 
Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 111 112; Eckert 
J “Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human 
Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 41 43. 
64
 McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of 
International Law 655 656-657. Eckert J “Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & 
Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 41 44. 
65
 McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of 
International Law 655 657. 
66
 For the idea that constitutional dignity encompasses dignitas, see Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) 
SA 401 (CC) paras 27-28. See also, McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 657.  For an extensive explanation of the 
common law dignitas, see Barrett J “Dignatio and the Human Body” (2005) SAJHR 525 528-529. 
67
 McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of 
International Law 655 657.    
68
 Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 189; Eckert J “Legal Roots of 
Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human 
Rights Discourse (2002) 41 43.  Starck refers to Bible verses which confirm this, i.e.: Gen. 1:26-27, Eph. 4:24.   
Starck C “The Religious and Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern 
Constitutions” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse 
(2002) 179 180. For the notion that Humanists adopted this belief, see McCrudden C “Human Dignity and 
Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 568. 
69
 Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 189; Eckert J “Legal Roots of 
Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human 
Rights Discourse (2002) 41 44. 
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The Christian and Jewish concepts of inherent human dignity formed the basis of the 
philosophical ideas that followed.
70
 This is evident from natural law writings.
71
  Natural law 
writers endorse the perception of inherent human dignity.  It has however been argued that 
the natural law definition of human dignity is a bit more restricted than the theological 
concept.
72
 
Philosophers from the Renaissance, like the Humanists, tried to reconcile classical ideas and 
theological tradition.
73
  They too believed that people derive their inner worth from the fact 
that they are created in the image of God.
74
  These Humanists also regarded reason as a gift 
from God.  This gift, that gives man the ability to choose who he wants to be, was considered 
to be the foundation of human dignity.
75
 
During the Enlightenment philosophers focused on the Christian idea that all human beings 
have equal inherent human dignity because they have the ability to reason and make 
autonomous decisions.
76
  Immanuel Kant was the most prominent philosopher of the 
Enlightenment and, as stated above, is often regarded as the “father of the modern concept of 
human dignity”.77  According to one of his formulations of the Categorical Imperative, 
people are not mere means to an end but are ends in themselves and should be treated 
accordingly.
78
  The basis for the categorical imperative is that people have inner worth and 
                                                     
70
 Starck C “The Religious and Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern 
Constitutions” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse 
(2002) 179 180-181. 
71
 Dicke K “The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” in 
Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 111 113. 
72
 For more on this subject, see Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 189. 
73
 See McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European 
Journal of International Law 655 658.  
74
 Eckert J “Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of 
Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 41 44; McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial 
Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 658. 
75
 See McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European 
Journal of International Law 655 659. 
76
 659. 
77
 See 1 2.  This quote is taken from McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 659.  McCrudden quotes from Bognetti G “The 
Concept of Human Dignity in European and U.S. Constitutionalism” in Nolte G (ed) European and US 
Constitutionalism, Science and Technique of Democracy 37 (2005) 75 79.  See also Liebenberg S “The Value of 
Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-economic Rights” (2005) SAJHR 1 2; Wood AW “Human Dignity, Right 
and the Realm of Ends” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-
Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 47 48.  Cornell explains how Ackermann J uses Kantian language to define 
human dignity.  Cornell D “Bridging the Span Toward Justice: Laurie Ackermann and the Ongoing 
Architectonic of Dignity Jurisprudence” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom 
and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 18 30. 
78
 Wood AW “What is Kantian Ethics?” in Wood AW (trans&ed) Kant I: Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 
Morals (2002) 157 163.  Wood defines an end as “anything we act for the sake of”, in Wood AW “Human 
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should be free to make autonomous decisions.
79
  The idea that people have inner worth 
implies that they should not be used as mere means to an end.  Similarly, the notion that 
people should be free to choose their own ends, support the philosophy that they are ends in 
themselves.  Socio-economic rights are often linked to the Categorical Imperative, given the 
argument that a person who lacks the basic necessities to live, is unable to freely choose his 
own ends.  It is also held that such a person is more at risk of being reduced to a mere object 
(or end).
80
 
At first glance Kant’s Categorical Imperative seems very individualistic.81  A closer 
examination reveals a much more communitarian quality to Kant’s philosophy, which can be 
explained by the fact that Kant was influenced by the ideas of Jean Jacques Rousseau.
82
  Kant 
describes a Kingdom of Ends where people are all legislative members in a realm of ends and 
are required to harmonise their ends.  This kingdom is subject to moral and practical reason.
83
 
Although other influential philosophies and outlooks ensued from the Kantian philosophy, 
Kant’s ideas are considered the basic philosophical orientation.84  A philosophical outlook 
that should nonetheless be mentioned, due to its particular significance in South African 
tradition, is that of ubuntu.  Ubuntu is an ideal that is part of the living customary law of 
South Africa and has made a substantial contribution to South African jurisprudence.
85
 It 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Dignity, Right and the Realm of Ends” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom 
and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 47 52. 
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 Eckert J “Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of 
Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 41 46; Cornell D “Bridging the Span Toward Justice: Laurie 
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Laurie Ackermann and the Ongoing Architectonic of Dignity Jurisprudence” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & 
Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 18 30. 
83
 For a further explanation of the Kingdom of Ends, see Wood AW “Human Dignity, Right and the Realm of 
Ends” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal 
Order (2008) 47-65; Cornell D “Bridging the Span Toward Justice: Laurie Ackermann and the Ongoing 
Architectonic of Dignity Jurisprudence” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom 
and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 18 30;  Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in 
Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and The Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 
112 133.  On the idea that the Kingdom of Ends relates to Kant’s notion of moral autonomy in which people 
are free, but are at the same time bound to the duties of moral law, see Starck C “The Religious and 
Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern Constitutions” in Kretzmer D & Klein E 
(eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 179 182. 
84
 Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 207. 
85
 Cornell D “Bridging the Span Toward Justice: Laurie Ackermann and the Ongoing Architectonic of Dignity 
Jurisprudence” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid 
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essentially means that a person is a person through other people.
86
  In a dignity context this 
can be interpreted as support for communitarian dignity, i.e. that a person can only have 
human dignity within a society that recognises it.
87
  
As explained in Chapter 1, it was only during the 1940s that these above mentioned religious 
and philosophical ideas of dignity were translated into legal language.
88
  The total disregard 
for human dignity in the past led to a refusal to turn away from the suffering of humanity and 
prompted authorities all over the world to formulate a concept of law that is inseparable from 
morals and values, with human dignity at its core.
89
  The philosophical and religious idea of 
human dignity was incorporated into constitutions and conventions worldwide.
90
  South 
Africa likewise incorporated the idea of human dignity into its latest constitution after the 
violations against humanity during the Apartheid regime.
91
 
The concept of human dignity has since developed into one of the main building blocks of 
modern constitutionalism.  What started out as merely a confirmation of the inherent self-
worth of each human being and a refusal to turn away from suffering developed into a rich 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Legal Order (2008) 18 19, 22.  For criticism against ubuntu, see Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative 
Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 205. 
86
 Wood formulates this definition with reference to the Constitutional Court judgment of S v Makwanyane 1995 
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112. 
89
 Woolman writes about this refusal in Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, 
Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 – 36-2.  O’Regan refers to 
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Jurisprudence of Laurie Ackermann” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and 
the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 6-16. 
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 See the literature referred to n3.  Examples of conventions and other international texts that have incorporated 
dignity are: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948); the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination GA Res 2106 (XX), Annex, 
20 UN GAOR Supp (No 14) at 47, UN Doc A/6014 (1966), 660 UNTS 195;the Convention against torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA Res 39/46, Annex, 39 UN GAOR Supp 
(No 51), at 197, UN Doc A/39/51 (1984). 
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 This is emphasised in Makwanyane paras 144, 329.  These paragraphs are referred to in Chaskalson A 
“Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in 
Human Rights Discourse (2002) 133 137; Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell 
LR 171 197; Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) 
“Introduction” Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) vii viii.  Cornell writes that our 
constitution is “emblematic to the very revolution that took place”.  Cornell D “Bridging the Span Toward 
Justice: Laurie Ackermann and the Ongoing Architectonic of Dignity Jurisprudence” in Barnard-Naude AJ, 
Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 18 20.  See also 
Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 – 36-4.  
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complex concept that protects each person while at the same time giving them the freedom to 
live autonomous lives.
92
 
2 4 The minimum core of dignity 
2 4 1 Introduction 
From the historical, religious and philosophical roots emerge the components and 
characteristics of human dignity that constitute its minimum core.  The two main components 
that become evident from the foundations of human dignity are: inherent worth and 
autonomy.  This means that every single person has inborn human dignity, which in turn 
entails that all people have equal self-worth and the freedom to make their own choices. 
To begin with, it is important to determine what is meant by inherent human dignity.  It 
essentially means that nothing can add or subtract from it.
93
  This implies two things.  Firstly, 
nothing can add to human dignity because it exists regardless of its recognition.
94
  Dignity is 
not awarded through legal operation; each person possesses it from birth, irrespective of their 
ability or potential.
95
  
Secondly, the fact that nothing can subtract from human dignity means that dignity can never 
be lost.  It is not lost by undignified behaviour and is even said to be inalienable, irreducible, 
unwaivable and inviolable.
96
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(eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 47 49. 
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 See Dicke K “The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” in 
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 Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 189.  See also Barrett J “Dignatio 
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143.  See also Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 194 197 209; Klein E 
“Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human 
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primarily rely on Kantian ideas.  See for example Barrett J “Dignatio and the Human Body” (2005) SAJHR 525 
530; Wood AW “Human Dignity, Right and the Realm of Ends” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F 
(eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 47 49; Botha H “Human Dignity in 
Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 194, 197; Waldron J “Dignity of Groups” in Barnard-Naude AJ, 
Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 66 69; and Starck C 
“The Religious and Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern Constitutions” in 
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Whether dignity is in fact inviolable is much debated.  The German Basic Law states that 
human dignity is inviolable, whereas the South African Constitution has no similar 
provision.
97
  It is argued that dignity can be violated under the South African Constitution, as 
it is subject to the limitation clause.
98
  For this discussion it will be sufficient to say that 
regardless of whether dignity can be violated, it can never be taken away.
99
 
Kant provides a useful description of the inherent nature of human dignity.  He contrasts 
dignity with price by saying that everything has either dignity or value.  Something that has 
value can be replaced by or exchanged for something with an equal value.  However, 
something that is above value and therefore does not admit to an equivalent has dignity.
100
 
The two main parts of this inherent human dignity are interlinked and therefore overlap in 
many regards.  It is nevertheless necessary to analyse them separately, in order to determine 
their differences and similarities. 
2 4 2 Inherent worth 
If all people have inherent worth regardless of their actions, capabilities or potential, then it is 
logical to assume that all people have equal worth.
101
  Equal worth means that, regardless of 
our differences, everyone is equally important.  This imposes the duty on all people to avoid 
discrimination and instead acknowledge and respect differences.
102
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 179 180.  
Whether human dignity can in reality be waived is discussed later in 4 1 2 and 6 1 2. 
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 German Basic Law article 1(1). 
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197-198. 
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Human Rights Discourse (2002) 145 148; Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell 
LR 171 194, 197. 
100
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To treat people as though they have equal worth means to refrain from degrading, inhuman 
and humiliating treatment by protecting the bodily and psychological integrity of each 
person.
103
 
This imposes both a command and a prohibition.  There is a command to ensure that people 
are not degraded, humiliated or treated inhumanly; a command to ensure the protection of 
each person’s bodily and psychological integrity.  This command therefore simultaneously 
places a prohibition on each person from degrading, humiliating or treating another person 
inhumanly. 
The fulfilment of socio-economic rights plays a significant role in complying with the alleged 
command.  In other words, human dignity demands the fulfilment of the socio-economic 
needs of everyone.  A number of writers have criticised this theory.  Their primary concern is 
that it might imply that people who lack certain basic conditions lack human dignity.
104
  A 
counterargument for this criticism is that, while no person can ever lack dignity, they can lack 
the opportunity to live in dignity and in conditions that enable them to develop their talents 
and capabilities.
105
  Unfulfilled socio-economic needs deprive them of this opportunity. 
The socio-economic necessities, which dignity demands, therefore include all the essentials 
necessary to ensure that each person can live a dignified life.
106
  Not only does this involve 
fulfilling the basic needs for survival, but also ensuring conditions that enable a person to 
develop his abilities and potential.
107
  Take for example the socio-economic right to engage in 
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productive work.  The fulfilment of this right is often associated with the dignity of each 
person, irrespective of whether it is required to survive.  Productive work gives a person a 
sense of self-worth since it causes society to regard him as useful.
108
  It also gives him the 
money needed to develop his skills and realise his preferred way of being.
109
 
Human dignity therefore places a duty on the state to fulfil the socio-economic needs of 
citizens.
110
  In South Africa this duty is recognised in the Constitution and Constitutional 
Court regards human dignity as the central value informing the interpretation of socio-
economic rights.
111
  There is however criticism that the socio-economic rights jurisprudence 
of South African courts is nonetheless insufficient in promoting human dignity.
112
 
What is often overlooked is that it is not just the state that has this duty to ensure the 
fulfilment of socio-economic rights for citizens.  Each and every individual has a moral duty 
to assist each other in realising these needs.
113
  Liebenberg writes that when one person in a 
community lacks basic socio-economic needs it reflects the failure of that society to value 
human dignity and demeans the society as a whole.
114
 
The command to provide people with socio-economic goods is however not enough to 
prevent degrading, humiliating and inhuman treatment.  A prohibition from treating a person 
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Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 180, 209. 
114
 See Liebenberg S “The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-economic Rights” (2005) SAJHR 1 5.  
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in such a manner is also necessary.  This is where the so-called “object formula” comes into 
play.
115
 
The object formula is regarded as one of the most influential and appealing definitions of 
human dignity to date.
116
  Dürig relies on the Kantian Categorical Imperative when defining 
this formula.
117
  He defines objectification as reducing a person to an object or a mere means 
to an end.  This includes degrading someone to a thing “which can, in its entirety, be grasped, 
disposed of, registered, brainwashed, replaced, used and expelled.”118  The result of this kind 
of treatment is a violation of the self-worth of a person, since it calls his worth into 
question.
119
  People are denied the ability to choose their way of life and their environment.
120
  
This is at odds with what dignity requires, which is the treatment of individuals as subjects 
capable of self-determination.
121
 
There are various case law examples of objectification.  The bizarre pub sport of dwarf 
tossing is identified as objectifying treatment in the Wackenheim case.
122
  Here the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee found that the fact that dwarfs were thrown around like 
objects violated their human dignity.  In Coetzee v Comitis
123
 it was decided that a sports 
player is treated as an object if, even after the termination of his contract, he is forced to pay a 
transfer fee when he transfers to another club.
124
  Capital punishment is yet another example.  
In Makwanyane capital punishment was held to objectify offenders.
125
  Offenders were used 
as a mechanism of crime control without the possibility of rehabilitation.
126
  Sexual 
exploitation can also be seen as objectifying treatment.
127
  Women (and sometimes men) who 
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participate in prostitution, peepshows, pornography or prostitution are said to be objectified 
by viewers and clients.
128
 
There has however been much criticism against this definition of human dignity.  Critics 
doubt the capacity of the object formula to constrain judicial decision-making.  Some critics 
argue that the formula is too vague, which causes it to be over-inclusive, identifying some 
situations as violations of human dignity that simply cannot constitute a violation.  Another 
critique is that this formulation of dignity does not respect autonomy.  It focuses only on one 
aspect of human dignity and does not provide for the fact that a person may choose his 
objectifying situation.
129
  The difficulty with this is that autonomy can also be regarded as 
part of the concept of human dignity. 
One possible solution is to dilute the formula; this can however be very problematic.
130
  In 
the German case of BVerf GE 30, 1 (1970) the court rationalised that people are often treated 
as mere objects and that all instances of objectification cannot possibly constitute 
violations.
131
  The court therefore tried to create a solution for the problem by adding a 
condition to the object formula.  The condition provides that an instance of objectification 
will only constitute a violation of human dignity if the treatment is contemptuous.
132
  This 
condition therefore requires a subjective intention to devalue.  The problem with this dilution 
is that the prerequisite of a subjective intention is a completely arbitrary diminution of human 
dignity.   Human dignity is effectively reduced to utterly degrading treatment.
133
 
Regardless of how the object formula has been applied in the past and the criticism it has 
received, it remains a significant component of the definition of human dignity. 
                                                     
128
 South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 
(2009) 178,179.  A peepshow refers to the situation in which a “woman exposes her naked body to spectators 
sitting in one-person cabins placed around the stage [which only] become[s] visible after payment.” See, 
BVerfGE 64, 274 (1981) 277-279, as translated in Michalowski S & Woods L German Constitutional Law: the 
Protection of Civil Liberties (1999) 105. 
129
 Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 184-185.  
130
 See Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 185-186; Klein E “Human 
Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights 
Discourse (2002) 145 150-151. 
131
 Botha analyses this case.  Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 185-
186.  See also Klein E “Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human 
Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 145 150. 
132
 Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 186; Klein E “Human Dignity in 
German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse 
(2002) 145 151. 
133
 Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 186. 
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2 4 3 Autonomy 
As mentioned above, the other core component of human dignity is autonomy.  This part of 
human dignity is most associated with Kantian philosophy.
134
  Kant’s Categorical Imperative 
establishes autonomy as a part of human dignity.  According to Kant each person is an end in 
itself with his own unique set of ends that should be respected.  This idea of autonomy as a 
component of dignity was adopted in modern dignity jurisprudence all over the world; the 
landmark South African judgment in this regard being that of Ackermann J in Ferreira.
135
    
Autonomy is a form of freedom.  It means that people have control over their own lives.  
They are free to live according to their own ideas of what is important and what will make 
them happy.
136
  People are free to develop their own potential, talents and abilities.
137
  It 
allows people to choose their own aspirations and decide how to fulfil them.
138
  They can 
forge their own identities and personalities.
139
   
Autonomy, as guaranteed by dignity, is therefore equated with the freedom of choice.
140
 It 
ultimately means to be able to make choices over one’s own life, body, education, work, 
                                                     
134
 McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal 
of International Law 655 659-660.  
135
 For examples of this concept as incorporated in dignity jurisprudence, see McCrudden C “Human Dignity 
and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 
655 659, 685, 700; Eckert J “Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) 
The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 41 51;  Chaskalson A “Human Dignity as a 
Constitutional Value” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights 
Discourse (2002) 133 134; Kretzmer D “Human Dignity in Israeli Jurisprudence” in Kretzmer D & Klein E 
(eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 161 167; Wood AW “Human Dignity, 
Right and the Realm of Ends” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the 
Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 47 52; Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude 
AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and The Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 131; Barrett 
J “Dignatio and the Human Body” (2005) SAJHR 525 537. 
136
 See Barrett J “Dignatio and the Human Body” (2005) SAJHR 525 530; McCrudden C “Human Dignity and 
Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 689.  See also 
Klein E “Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in 
Human Rights Discourse (2002) 145 149. 
137
 See O’Regan C “From form to substance: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Laurie Ackermann” in 
Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 
6 15.  O’Regan J refers to para 49 of Ackermann J’s landmark decision in Ferreira.  See also Barrett J 
“Dignatio and the Human Body” (2005) SAJHR 525 535; Eckert J “Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German 
Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 41 52; 
Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-2. 
138
 Kretzmer D “Human Dignity in Israeli Jurisprudence” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human 
Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 161 167. 
139
 Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 203-204, 208.   
140
 Bhana D & Pieterse M “Towards a Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and 
Afrox Revisited” (2005) SALJ 865 880-881.  See also Barrett J “Dignatio and the Human Body” (2005) SAJHR 
525 535. 
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health and sexuality.
141
  That people should be able to decide over their personal and intimate 
affairs is not often contested, it is only when their choices start affecting the public that 
controversy on whether the choices should be allowed arises.
142
  This controversy will be 
discussed later.
143
   
This kind of autonomy, that dignity incorporates, does however hold certain responsibilities 
and limitations.
144
  There will always be some amount of power and compulsion over 
people’s lives and no person will ever be allowed total freedom.145  The Kantian philosophy 
that an individual can only truly be free if he lives according to moral law is often regarded as 
an example of such responsibilities and limitations. 
2 4 4 Communitarian vs. individual dignity 
One of the limits to a person’s autonomy is that of other people’s autonomy.  This has 
sparked a heated debate on whether dignity should be interpreted as a communitarian or 
individualistic concept.  Some writers have argued in favour of a more individualist idea of 
human dignity and even the courts have been criticised for being overly individualistic.
146
  
These writers contend that human rights become nonsensical when given a communitarian 
interpretation.
147
  They find support for their views in the Kantian Categorical Imperative.
148
  
                                                     
141
 Barrett views these as crucial matters over which each person should be able to decide himself.  Barrett J 
“Dignatio and the Human Body” (2005) SAJHR 525 535, 536. 
142
 See McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European 
Journal of International Law 655 688-689.  It seems from McCrudden’s writings and references to American 
case law, that intimate and personal decisions are more readily allowed.  Botha refers to Häberle P 
“Menchenwürde als Grundlage der Staatlicher Gemeinschaft” in Inesee J & Kirchhof P Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutchland 3ed (2004) 317 351-352.   He explains Häberle’s view that dignity 
is not exclusively concerned with private autonomy but also with public autonomy.  Botha H “Human Dignity 
in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 193.  On bodily autonomy in the context of prostitution, see 
South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 
(2009) 192. 
143
 See, 4 2, where individual freedom is balanced against the dignity of the community. 
144
 Barrett acknowledges this responsibility with regard to autonomy over one’s body.  Barrett J “Dignatio and 
the Human Body” (2005) SAJHR 525 536. 
145
 This inevitable power over people’s lives is acknowledged in Barrett J “Dignatio and the Human Body” 
(2005) SAJHR 525 536; BVerfGE 30, 1 (1970) as discussed in Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative 
Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 185-186.  For the idea that people will never be allowed to do whatever they 
want see 2 4 4.  Kretzmer quotes former president of the Israeli court, Shamgar J, as saying that a person should 
not be enslaved by arbitrary compulsion.  This suggests that even though there may exist some sort of inevitable 
compulsion over a person’s life, it may never be arbitrary.  Kretzmer D “Human Dignity in Israeli 
Jurisprudence” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse 
(2002) 161 167. 
146
 Botha refers to this criticism.  Botha H “Equality, Dignity, and the Politics of Interpretation” (2004) 
SAPR/PL 724 725.   
147
 See Waldron J “Dignity of Groups” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom 
and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 66 82.   Waldron quotes from Ignatieff M Human Rights as Politics 
and Idolatry (2001) 67. 
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According to Kant dignity is vested in each individual.  From this they deduce that no person 
may be reduced to a mere means to an end; not even for the ends of his community.
149
 
The counterargument is that this individualist concept of human dignity, ignores the context 
in which Kant’s philosophy was written.  Although in Kantian thought dignity vests in each 
individual person, this school of thought has a communitarian background.  As mentioned 
above it is often overlooked that Kant writes about dignity within a realm or Kingdom of 
Ends.
150
  This Kingdom signifies the community within which a person finds himself.  In this 
Kingdom each person has his own ends, yet he is forbidden to adopt an end that is in conflict 
with the ends of another.
151
  The catch is that no one can be forced to choose an end that is in 
harmony with the rest of the Kingdom, because the key attribute of an end is that it is an act 
of freedom.
152
   This concept does however limit autonomy and furnishes the Kantian 
philosophy with a communitarian backdrop. 
The followers of the communitarian approach to dignity view dignity as a relational value.
153
  
People are interdependent and bound to a community.
154
  Within this community everyone 
has equal worth and no person’s end is therefore more important than another.155  Their rights 
and freedoms are limited by the rights and freedoms of others, as well as the right of future 
generations to a dignified living.
156
  Communitarian dignity is therefore more concerned with 
                                                                                                                                                                     
148
 Wood acknowledges that Kantian philosophy is often regarded as individualistic.  Wood AW “Human 
Dignity, Right and the Realm of Ends” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom 
and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 47 60. 
149
 Starck C “The Religious and Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern 
Constitutions” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse 
(2002) 179 186; Starck calls this a humanistic approach. 
150
 See 2 3.  See also Wood AW “Human Dignity, Right and the Realm of Ends” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell 
D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 47 60.  Wood identifies this 
misunderstanding.  He also gives an in depth explanation of the realm of ends. 
151
 58. 
152
 59.  Wood provides a more extensive explanation of this idea. 
153
 Liebenberg S “The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-economic Rights” (2005) SAJHR 1 3. 
154
 Liebenberg S “The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-economic Rights” (2005) SAJHR 1 3; 
Starck C “The Religious and Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern 
Constitutions” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse 
(2002) 179 180; Klein E “Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of 
Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 145 150.  Klein refers to the German Federal Constitutional 
Court’s judgment of BVerfGE 4, 7, 15 (1954) in which the image of man is developed.  This image of man has 
the above-mentioned characteristics. 
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 Starck C “The Religious and Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern 
Constitutions” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse 
(2002) 179 181.  Starck ascribes the idea that people have equal worth to the belief that they are all created in 
the image of God “in equal measure”. 
156
  See Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 187. 
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equality and community than freedom and autonomy.
157
  The dignity interests of the 
individual are trumped by those of the community and people are only free to develop 
themselves within the societal framework.
158
   Woolman refers to two High Court judgments 
in support of this statement, S v Dube
159
 and MEC for Health, Mpumalanga v M-Net,
160
 in 
which the community’s right to receive information trumped the individuals’ right to 
withhold it.
161
   
It has even been put forth that dignity is grounded on social recognition.
162
  Some believe that 
a person is only a person through other people and that a person derives self-worth from how 
he is treated and from how he treats others.
163
  These ideas have however been widely 
criticised and can only be accepted insofar as they are consistent with the notion of inherent 
dignity.
164
 
Botha observes that South Africa’s Constitutional Court is presumably attempting to create a 
midway between the two extremities by “avoiding the radical individualist conception of a 
self that is unencumbered by social ties and relations, and a thick, essentialist view of a self 
that is incapable of escaping the strictures imposed by culture and religion”.165 
                                                     
157
 McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal 
of International Law 655 660. 
158
 This is has been decided in various countries.  Woolman writes about South African cases in which the 
dignity interests of the community have trumped those of individuals.  Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, 
Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-
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framework.  Kretzmer D “Human Dignity in Israeli Jurisprudence” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept 
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 2002 (6) SA 714 (T). 
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 Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-15 n4. 
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 For a discussion on this approach, see Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 
171 189-191. 
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 This is the definition of ubuntu.  Wood formulates this definition with reference to Makwanyane paras 225-
227, 263, 308 & 311.  Wood AW “Human Dignity, Right and the Realm of Ends” in Barnard-Naude AJ, 
Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 47 60.  See also 
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2 4 5 Group dignity 
Each person has inherent human dignity whether it is interpreted as individualistic or 
communitarian.  The question is then, assuming that the individual possesses dignity, what 
about the group that he belongs to?  Does a kind of ‘group dignity’ exist?  In an article on 
group dignity Waldron writes that dignity is not necessarily inherent to groups, but vests in 
the groups because of the inherent dignity of each individual member.
166
  This leads to the 
argument that it is not necessary to assert group dignity because each member is able to assert 
individual inherent dignity.  However it does become necessary to assert group dignity when 
a person’s dignity is violated by others due to contempt for the group he belongs to.167  
Violations of this kind usually include stigmatisation or demeaning stereotyping.
168
 
When dignity is attributed to a group it affects the way other people view the members of that 
group.
169
  This is evident from the decriminalisation of sodomy.  When sodomy was seen as a 
sin and a crime members of that group, i.e. homosexuals, were stigmatised.
170
  After the ban 
on sodomy was lifted people stopped discriminating against the group and started respecting 
its members. 
However, there are risks involved in attributing dignity to groups.  Talk of inherent group 
dignity can be abused.
171
  It can be used to dismiss claims for individual dignity.  The 
American case of Alden v Maine
172
 is a good example.  Here the applicant’s complaint was 
dismissed in favour of the group dignity of the state government.  Another risk lies in the fact 
that some structured groups have internal hierarchies.  Attributing dignity to such a group 
might endorse these internal ranks, counteracting the constitutional concept of inherent and 
                                                     
166
 Waldron J “Dignity of Groups” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and 
the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 66 75. 
167
 82. 
168
 Botha identifies these types of dignity violations of social groups.  Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative 
Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 207. 
169
 Waldron J “Dignity of Groups” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and 
the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 66 79. 
170
 NCGLE paras 28, 109.  For the criminalisation of sodomy as a violation of the dignity of a particular social 
group, see Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 207. 
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 Waldron J “Dignity of Groups” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and 
the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 66 83. 
172
 527 US 706 (1999).  This case is used as an example of the above mentioned risk in Waldron J “Dignity of 
Groups” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal 
Order (2008) 66 78. 
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equal dignity to all persons.
173
  When referring to group dignity it is therefore crucial to 
acknowledge and avoid these risks. 
2 5 Functions of human dignity 
By establishing the components and characteristics of human dignity a minimum core 
emerges.  This is the first step in defining human dignity.  The next step, as identified above, 
is to determine the functions of human dignity, which can be used to inform dignity in the 
absence of agreement as to its theoretical aspects.
174
 
It is often said that the South African Constitution, like the German Basic Law, represents an 
objective, normative value system.
175
  This means that human dignity does not merely 
represent a subjective individual right, but also embodies an objective norm or an objective 
normative value.
176
  Dignity is entrenched as a right in section 10 of the Bill of Rights: 
“Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected.”177 
The first reference to dignity as a value is found in section 1 of the Constitution: 
“The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the 
following values: (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of 
human rights and freedoms.” 
Thereafter various sections refer to dignity as a value.
178
  However, the South African 
Constitution is not the only instrument in which dignity is portrayed as both a right and a 
                                                     
173
 Waldron J “Dignity of Groups” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and 
the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 66 86-90.  Waldron gives an extensive explanation of how this risk can 
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174
 See 2 1. 
175
 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para 54; hereinafter referred to as 
‘Carmichele’. 
176
 Para53. 
177
 The Bill of Rights is entrenched in Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
178
 Ss7, 36, 39, 165, 181 and 196.  These sections are identified in Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux 
T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-
1. 
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value.  National constitutions and international documents worldwide have similarly 
entrenched dignity.
179
 
Dignity as a subjective individual right can function independently.
180
  It is however seldom 
applied this way.
181
  In Dawood it was decided that a court should not employ dignity as a 
first order right where the “primary constitutional breach occasioned may be of a more 
specific right”.182  There have nevertheless been times were the courts did not follow this 
approach.
183
  In these cases the right to dignity was found to be violated along with other 
fundamental rights.
184
 
Dignity is more often applied as an objective norm or an objective normative value.
185
  As a 
value, it provides a basis for human rights.
186
  Dignity is deemed to be the source of all 
human rights and the main argument in favour thereof.
187
  It gives weight and content to other 
                                                     
179
 In some more expressly than others.  The German Basic Law, for example, does not expressly refer to dignity 
as a right, however the majority assumes that dignity also constitutes an individual right.  See Botha H “Human 
Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 180. 
180
 Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-21. 
181
 Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-19; Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative 
Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 198. 
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 Dawood; Shalabi; Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) para 35.   Woolman analyses 
this case.  Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) 
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183
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184
 Botha refers to such cases in Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 199.  
He writes that this particularly happens in cases where there has been an equality violation. He also provides the 
following examples: NCGLE; Bhe v Magistrate of Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission v 
President of the RSA 2005 (1) SA 563 (CC); Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality 
Project v Minister of Home affairs 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC).  
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 Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-22 – 36-24.  Woolman lists reasons for the courts’ 
preference for employing dignity as a value instead of a right.  It is open to debate whether dignity as an 
objective norm is synonymous to dignity as a value.  Followers of the idea that dignity alone can be regarded as 
an objective norm, advocate that this description of dignity makes it supreme to other values.  See Botha H 
“Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 180.  On the contrary it can be argued that all 
values are objective norms, since they are all equal. 
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 S7 of the Constitution; McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) 
The European Journal of International Law 655 680; Waldron J “Dignity of Groups” in Barnard-Naude AJ, 
Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 66 66.  See also 
Chaskalson A “Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of 
Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 133 136. 
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 McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal 
of International Law 655 680; Makwanyane para 144 as referred to in Chaskalson A “Human Dignity as a 
Constitutional Value” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights 
Discourse (2002) 133 136.  See also Dicke K “The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights 
Discourse (2002) 111 119. 
Stellenbosch University   http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 44 
rights and assists in their interpretation.
188
  Common law is also interpreted and developed in 
relation to human dignity.
189
  Limits to rights and values are set by dignity.
190
  Due to its 
objective normative element dignity is often used to mediate value conflicts and conflicts 
between fundamental human rights.
191
   
This raises the question of whether dignity is supreme and/or absolute.
192
  From the above-
mentioned functions of human dignity this would seem to be the case.  However there has not 
been agreement on this subject and each country’s views on the matter differ substantially.  
Their divergence is primarily attributed to the fact that the formulation of the dignity 
guarantee, as well as the way it is entrenched, differs in each individual constitution.   
For example, art 1(1) of the German Basic Law reads that “[h]uman dignity shall be 
inviolable.”  In addition, art 1(1) cannot be limited by legislation and is shielded from 
constitutional amendment.
193
  This formulation and entrenchment have resulted in the idea 
that the German concept of human dignity is absolute.
194
 
Considering the extent to which the formulation and entrenchment of human dignity in the 
constitutions of other countries differ from the German Basic Law, a different interpretation 
as to the status thereof seems in order.  Take, for example, the South African Constitution.  
Unlike the German Basic Law the South African Constitution allows for the limitation and 
amendment of human dignity.  All the sections, in which dignity is entrenched, may be 
amended.  As a right, dignity is also subject to limitation.
195
  This suggests that neither as a 
right nor as a value can human dignity be interpreted as absolute.  The fact that human 
dignity, both as a right and as a value, is entrenched no different to any other rights or values 
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 S39 of the Constitution; McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) 
The European Journal of International Law 655 716 681.  McCrudden refers to Dawood para 35.  For a more 
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 S39; Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 200. 
190
 S36 of the Constitution; Dawood para 35 as referred to in Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, 
Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-19.  
See also McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European 
Journal of International Law 655 680. 
191
 Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 215-216.  Botha also lists the 
criticism against doing this.  See also, Ackermann LWH “Equality and the South African Constitution: The Role 
of Dignity” (2000) Heidelberg Journal of International Law 537 551-552. 
192
 I.e. whether dignity can be subject to balancing or limitation. 
193
 Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 178; Art 79(3) of the Basic Law. 
194
 Despite this strong entrenchment of dignity, Botha explores a number of situations in which German courts 
have allowed the balancing of dignity against other rights or values, i.e. when it is necessary to infringe on 
someone’s dignity in order to protect innocent victims.  For more examples, see Botha H “Human Dignity in 
Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 194-196. 
195
 Ss36 & 74 of the Constitution.   
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in the South African Constitution also suggests that the South African Constitution does not 
provide for a supreme reading of human dignity. 
There are however objections to this standpoint.
196
  First of all it is contended that the textual 
and structural features of the South African Constitution do not allow for this 
interpretation.
197
  Secondly, it is indicated that the South African courts do not interpret 
dignity as equal to other rights or values.
198
  Thirdly, the fact that our constitution entrenches 
inherent dignity conveys the idea that dignity is inviolable.
199
  Lastly, since it features 
prominently throughout the Constitution, more importance is often conferred upon dignity.
200
 
The strongest of these arguments is that, despite any logic to the contrary, South African 
courts do for some reason interpret dignity as a supreme right and value.  As a result dignity 
is used to interpret constitutional provisions and to mediate right or value conflicts, thereby 
limiting such rights and values.
201
  South African courts are renowned for their dignity-based 
jurisprudence and have proclaimed the centrality of human dignity to the Constitution.
202
  A 
reason for this might be that, to some extent, courts often rely on foreign jurisprudence where 
universally acknowledged concepts are concerned.
203
  This suggests that countries may quite 
possibly adopt the German interpretation of human dignity as an inviolable concept, despite 
the varying formulations of dignity in their constitutions.  This is because the German dignity 
jurisprudence is far more developed than that of other countries, which makes it a very 
authoritative source when interpreting human dignity.
204
   
Another possible explanation for the fact that so many countries seem to adopt the German 
interpretation is that this German concept of inviolable human dignity is consistent with the 
Kantian idea of an inalienable human dignity.
205
  This suggests that the similarities between, 
                                                     
196
 Botha lists and explains these arguments.  For a more extensive explanation, see Botha H “Human Dignity in 
Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 196-198. 
197
 196. 
198
 197. 
199
 197-198. 
200
 198. 
201
 172; McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European 
Journal of International Law 655 718. 
202
 172. 
203
 See for example, McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The 
European Journal of International Law 655 695. 
204
 Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 173.  See also Du Plessis v De 
Klerk para 106. 
205
 Roux T “The Dignity of Comparative Constitutional Law” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F 
(eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 185.  For this Kantian idea see Kant I 
Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals as discussed in Barrett J “Dignatio and the Human Body” (2005) 
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for example, the interpretation of human dignity of South Africa and Germany might be 
purely coincidental.   
South Africa was initially criticised for its dignity-based jurisprudence, yet the criticisms 
have mostly subsided due to the beneficial results of this approach.
206
   
From the above it is evident that various countries do to some extent regard human dignity as 
supreme and/or absolute. This means that dignity cannot easily be limited or balanced against 
other rights or values.
207
  
2 6 Conclusion 
Despite the considerable amount of criticism it is possible to define dignity to some extent.  
Understanding the foundation and history of the concept and consulting the jurisprudence of 
foreign jurisdictions can help with piecing together a minimum core.  It can also reveal the 
functions of dignity and provide examples of confirmed past violations.  The two main 
components of human dignity are inherent worth and autonomy.  In this chapter it has been 
demonstrated how the right not to be objectified can be located within the inherent worth 
component of human dignity, whereas the right to choose or consent to different situations, 
relates to its autonomy component. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
SAJHR 525 530; Wood AW “Human Dignity, Right and the Realm of Ends” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & 
Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 47 49. 
206
 See Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 213-214. 
207
 The method of balancing is explained in Makwanyane para 104.  In NCGLE para 33 Ackermann J selectively 
quotes from this paragraph to summarises the method as follows “the ‘. . . weighing up of competing values, and 
ultimately an assessment based on proportionality . . . which calls for the balancing of different interests.’” 
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CHAPTER 3 
FREEDOM IN RELATION TO HUMAN DIGNITY 
3 1 Defining freedom  
3 1 1 How to define freedom 
Freedom is notoriously difficult to define, much like human dignity.
208
 In his landmark 
decision on freedom Ackermann J concedes that the only way to genuinely define freedom is 
on an ad hoc basis.
209
  For purposes of this analysis it is however compulsory to assign some 
sort of general definition to the concept. 
As with human dignity, this can only be achieved when the foundations and background of 
freedom are explored, as well as the interpretation thereof in foreign jurisprudence.  In his 
own attempt to define freedom, Ackermann J acknowledges the importance of foreign 
jurisprudence.  He emphasises that section 35(1) of the Interim Constitution encourages 
this.
210
  The same principles that apply when defining dignity also apply here.  Ackermann J 
recognises these principles when he pronounces that, regardless of whether the formulation of 
freedom varies in different constitutions, the fundamental legal norms are becoming quite 
universal.  It is not necessary to rely directly on foreign jurisdictions, “but to identify the 
underlying reasoning with a view to establish the norms that apply in other open and 
democratic societies based on freedom…”211    
3 1 2 The foundations of freedom  
The three integrated foundations of human dignity: religion, history and philosophy also 
support freedom.  However, in the case of freedom, philosophy is particularly influential, as it 
overshadows, yet simultaneously incorporates the other two foundations. 
As mentioned before, in both the Christian and Jewish faiths it is believed that God created 
people in His image and granted them the ability to reason.
212
  This ability to reason is 
                                                     
208
 Barnard-Naude AJ “Beyond the Brother: Radical Freedom” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F 
(eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 273 273. 
209
 Ferreira para 45. 
210
 Act 200 of 1993; hereinafter referred to as “the Interim Constitution”.  Now s39(1) of the Final 
 Constitution. 
211
 Ferreira para 72. 
212
 See n27.  According to Starck the belief that people are created in the image of God “provides the basis for 
their freedom”.  Starck C “The Religious and Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in 
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therefore inherent to all people and confers upon them the capacity to choose who they want 
to be.
213
   
These beliefs are used in support of both freedom and dignity and indicate the connection 
between the two concepts. Philosophies based on these religious ideas confirm this 
connection.
214
 It was mentioned earlier that the Humanists of the Renaissance deemed this 
ability to choose, which seems to resemble ideas of autonomy and freedom, to be the 
foundation of human dignity.
215
 
It has also been mentioned that philosophers from the Enlightenment era focused on the idea 
that all human beings have equal inherent human dignity because they have the ability to 
reason and make autonomous decisions.
216
  While this once more emphasises the connection 
between freedom and human dignity, it also explains why one of the most prominent 
philosophers from that era, Immanuel Kant, focused considerably on autonomy and 
freedom.
217
 
In fact, Immanuel Kant and Isaiah Berlin are two of the most cited philosophers in legal 
freedom discourse.  Kantian philosophy is of critical importance when defining freedom, 
whereas Berlin is especially renowned for his concepts of negative and positive liberty.  
While these philosophers often complement each other, they also differ in some respects.  To 
avoid unnecessary detail or repetition I will explain their alternate perspectives when and 
where they are applicable throughout this chapter. 
It is important to explore how these religious and philosophical ideas were incorporated into 
South African law.  Before the end of Apartheid freedom was mainly found in the South 
African common law. The common law conception of freedom was heavily influenced by 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Modern Constitutions” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights 
Discourse (2002) 179 181. 
213
 See McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European 
Journal of International Law 655 659.  On inherent freedom, see Davis D “Equality: The Majesty of Legoland 
Jurisprudence” (1999) SALJ 398 398. 
214
 Starck refers to the fact that various philosophies were based on these religious ideas.  Starck C “The 
Religious and Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern Constitutions” in Kretzmer 
D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 179 180-181. 
215
 See McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European 
Journal of International Law 655 659. 
216
 659.  This idea also has religious roots, e.g. Christian theology. 
217
 659-650. 
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Classical Liberal theory.
218
  However, the state’s denial of freedom to black people called for 
the constitutional entrenchment of freedom.
219
 When defining constitutional freedom it 
should therefore be taken into account that freedom was incorporated into the Constitution in 
aspiration to a post-Apartheid order.  According to Barnard-Naude this indicates that “the 
success of [South Africa’s] future will be determined (measured) by its ability to overcome 
its history, [i.e.] by the extent to which it is able to realise the freedom of its citizens…”220 
3 2 The manifestations of freedom 
3 2 1 The manifestation of freedom in South African common law 
The Classical Liberal theory can be traced back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
221
  
In the common law of South Africa this theory is particularly associated with the rules of 
property and contract.  It denotes a private sphere of freedom, in which autonomous choices 
are entirely free from public interference.
222
  This theory is founded upon natural law and 
natural liberty.  One of its primary functions is the endorsement of the sanctity of contract 
and the strict enforcement of all transactions.
223 
 
 
It has been conceded that, to some extent, all concepts of freedom draw from this classical 
theory, yet in legal jurisprudence it receives remarkably more criticism than praise.
224
  Most 
of the criticism is directed at the potentially catastrophic results of its application. The most 
renowned example of this is the 1905 United States Supreme Court judgment of Lochner v 
New York.
225
  The Supreme Court struck down laws that provided maximum work hours, 
                                                     
218
 Liebenberg S “The Value of Freedom in Interpreting Socio-economic Rights” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell 
D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 149 174.  Liebenberg 
confirms that the Classical Liberal theory is found in common law. 
219
 In Makwanyane para 156, Ackermann J explains that the constitutional values, such as freedom, were 
entrenched in the Constitution “in reaction to our past”.  In Ferreira para 51, Ackermann J refers back to this 
decision of O’Regan J.  He emphasises the fact that Apartheid caused a denial of freedom and that this denial 
should be eradicated. 
220
 Barnard-Naude AJ “Beyond the Brother: Radical Freedom” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F 
(eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 273 275. 
221
 Bhana D & Pieterse M “Towards a Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and 
Afrox Revisited” (2005) SALJ 865 866. 
222
 Liebenberg S “The Value of Freedom in Interpreting Socio-economic Rights” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell 
D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 149 161, 174.  See also, 
South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 
(2009) 192. 
223
 Liebenberg S “The Value of Freedom in Interpreting Socio-economic Rights” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell 
D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 149 174. 
224
 Bhana argues that all concepts of freedom draw on this theory.  Bhana D & Pieterse M “Towards a 
Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and Afrox Revisited” (2005) SALJ 865 877. 
225
 198 US 45 (1905); hereinafter referred to as “Lochner”. 
Stellenbosch University   http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 50 
because it allegedly violated contractual autonomy.
226
 The outcome of such an 
implementation of the theory, as Liebenberg puts it, is “the relative insulation of private law 
relationships from scrutiny and evaluation in terms of their impact on people’s freedom to 
avoid oppressive and demeaning relationships”.227 According to critics the theory therefore 
endorses oppressive and demeaning relationships and contracts, since it ignores the realities 
of unequal relationships.  
Hence, it is suggested that this theory be replaced by constitutional freedom.  The South 
African concept of constitutional freedom is held to be “significantly narrower” than the 
Classical Liberal theory.
228
  This might be because it is restricted by its interaction with the 
other constitutional values and rights.
229
 Consequently the manifestation of freedom in the 
South African Constitution has a significant impact on the definition of freedom.   
3 2 2 The manifestation of freedom in the South African Constitution 
3 2 2 1 Freedom in itself vs. Freedom within human dignity 
For this reason, when attempting to define freedom it is important to determine how it is 
incorporated into the Constitution.  As Ackermann J points out, the language employed to 
formulate the concept and its context within the Constitution are vital interpretive tools.
230
  In 
the previous chapter the idea of freedom as a component of human dignity was explored.
231
  
This implies that, wherever dignity is found in the Constitution, freedom is automatically 
incorporated.  Freedom is nevertheless also expressly mentioned in several constitutional 
provisions, where it performs similar functions to that of human dignity.
232
   
3 2 2 2 Functions of freedom in itself 
Dignity is not the only value upon which the South African Constitution is founded.  
Freedom and equality represent the other two constitutional values.
233
  As values, freedom 
                                                     
226
 Ackermann J provides this case summary in Ferreira para 65. 
227
 Liebenberg S “The Value of Freedom in Interpreting Socio-economic Rights” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell 
D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 149 162. 
228
 Bhana D & Pieterse M “Towards a Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and 
Afrox Revisited” (2005) SALJ 865 878-879. 
229
 879. 
230
 He refers to instances in which Constitutional Court judges have endorsed the use of these interpretive tools, 
in Ferreira para 46. 
231
 See 2 4 1 above. 
232
 These sections are: ss1, 7, 12, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 36, 39, 165, 181 and 196. 
233
 The following sections of the Constitution entrench freedom and equality as values: ss1, 7, 36, 39, 165, 181 
and 196.  These sections are identified in Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, 
Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-1. 
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and dignity perform roughly the same functions.  Freedom also provides a basis for human 
rights.
234
  It gives weight and content to other rights and assists in their interpretation.
235
  
Freedom can likewise set limits to these rights.
236
   Furthermore, the common law is 
interpreted and developed with reference to the value of freedom.
237
   
The only function solely attributed to dignity is its role as mediator in value conflicts.
238
  By 
ascribing this function to it dignity appears superior in any value conflicts.  The merits of this 
idea that dignity is supreme to freedom and of the court’s dignity-based jurisprudence will be 
explored later in this chapter.
239
  
Unlike dignity, freedom is not entrenched as a freestanding constitutional right in the Bill of 
Rights.  There are however seven freedom rights: 
▪ Section 12: The right to freedom & security of the person 
▪ Section 15: The right to freedom of religion, belief & opinion 
▪ Section 16: The right to freedom of expression 
▪ Section 17: Freedom of assembly, demonstration, picketing and petition. 
▪ Section 18: The right to freedom of association 
▪ Section 21: The right to freedom of movement & residence 
▪ Section 22: The right to freedom of trade, occupation & profession 
There have been numerous debates over whether a freestanding right to freedom can be read 
into the Constitution.  This issue was the subject of extensive judicial debate in Ferreira.   
                                                     
234
 S7 of the Constitution.  Liebenberg supports this notion when she refers to Sen’s idea that freedom lies at the 
heart of the Bill of Rights.  Liebenberg S “The Value of Freedom in Interpreting Socio-economic Rights” in 
Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 
149 163.  See also Sen A “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights” Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (2004) 
315 328-329; Waldron J “Dignity of Groups” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, 
Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 66 66. 
235
 S39 of the Constitution. 
236
 S36. 
237
 S39. 
238
 McCrudden explains this use of dignity as an objective principle against which conflicting values are 
measured.  He refers to Port Elizabeth Municipality, as an example of where this has been done by South 
African courts. McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The 
European Journal of International Law 655 718. See also, Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative 
Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 215. 
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 See 3 4 2 1. 
Stellenbosch University   http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 52 
3 2 2 3 Residual right to freedom 
Ackermann J provides six arguments in favour of a freestanding right to freedom.  I will not 
necessarily discuss them in the same order in which he does, but in the order I deem fit for 
purposes of this chapter. 
Firstly, Ackermann J relies on section 11(1) of the Interim Constitution.
240
  This subsection 
reads: 
“(1) Every person shall have the right to freedom and security of the person, which shall 
include the right not to be detained without trial.”241 
He uses this subsection as the basis of his contention for a freestanding freedom right, by 
reading “the right to freedom” disjunctively from the right to “security of the person”.  He 
relies on the legislative history of section 11(1) to justify this.  Prior to the Sixth Report of the 
Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights During the Transition these rights did exist 
separately and were only combined in this report.
242
  According to Ackermann J, this 
suggests that the right to freedom should be read as independent from, but related to, the rest 
of the section.
243
   
Secondly, Ackermann J regards the other sections in the Bill of Rights.
244
  He does this 
because, in his majority judgment, Chaskalson P asserts that section 11(1) must be read in the 
context of the Bill of Rights as a whole.
245
  Ackermann J contends that since certain freedom 
rights are specifically and separately protected in the Constitution, section 11(1) evidently 
refers to a residual right to freedom.
246
   This right should be interpreted broadly to cover 
limitations of freedom that cannot be challenged under the other specific freedom rights in 
the Constitution.
247
  In his interpretation of this paragraph in Ackermann J’s judgment, Du 
                                                     
240
 S12(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the final Constitution). 
241
 S11(1) of the Interim Constitution.  Hereinafter any reference to s11(1) will be in terms of the Interim 
Constitution, which is now s12 of the Final Constitution, unless otherwise stated. 
242
 1993.  These reports paved the way for the Interim Constitution. 
243
 Ferreira para 46. 
244
 Paras 56 and 57. 
245
 Para 170. 
246
 Para 57. 
247
 Para 67. 
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Bois construes Ackermann J’s reasoning as a claim in favour of a general right to freedom of 
action or a “right to the mundane”.248 
The third, fourth and fifth arguments, which Ackermann J raises, provide justification for the 
broad interpretation of this residual right and the application of the “generous” and “full 
benefit” interpretive approach used in S v Zuma and Others.249  In his third argument 
Ackermann J links freedom to human dignity, stating that they serve the same goal.
250
  This 
goal is the development of each person’s unique talents.  Freedom is therefore part of dignity 
and indispensable to the protection thereof.  Du Bois suggests that Ackermann J connects 
these two concepts because human dignity has been acknowledged as a prominent 
constitutional right, which is defined quite broadly.  By saying that these two concepts serve 
roughly the same goal and are dependent upon one another, Ackermann J implies that 
freedom is just as important as dignity.
251
 Freedom should therefore also be defined “as 
widely as possible”.252 
In Ackermann J’s fourth argument he turns to section 35(1) of the Interim Constitution.253  
This section deals with the interpretation of the Bill of Rights.  It reads: 
“(1) In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall promote the values 
which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and shall, 
where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the protection of 
the rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable foreign case 
law.” 
Ackermann J addresses the notion of an “open” society that is based on “freedom”.  He 
proposes that in such an open society individual freedom should be defined broadly.  The 
support for his argument lies in his definition of an open society.  According to Ackermann J:  
                                                     
248
 Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) 
Dignity, Freedom and The Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 131-132.  Du Bois states that the examples 
that Ackermann J provides in para 67 of Ferreira support this idea. 
249
 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) paras 14-15; hereinafter referred to as ‘Zuma’.  Ackermann J refers to this case in 
Ferreira para 58. 
250
 Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) 
Dignity, Freedom and The Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 127.  This is Du Bois’ interpretation of 
Ackermann J’s words in Ferreira para 49. 
251
 Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) 
Dignity, Freedom and The Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 127. 
252
 Ferreira para 49.  Ackermann J continues to say that the right should be “consonant with a similar breadth of 
freedom for others”. 
253
 Now s39(1) of the Final Constitution.   
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“[An open society is] a society in which persons are free to seek out their own ultimate 
fulfilment, to fulfill their own humanness and to question all received wisdom without 
limitations placed on them by the State. The ‘open society’ suggests that individuals are 
free, individually and in association with others, to pursue broadly their own personal 
development and fulfilment and their own conception of the ‘good life’.”254 
It is clear that this definition of an open society corresponds greatly with his ideas of 
freedom, as set out in the previous argument.  By employing these corresponding definitions 
Ackermann J indicates that a broad definition of freedom is indispensable to the concept of 
an open society. 
The fifth critical argument Ackermann J raises in favour of a broad residual right to freedom 
is that our Constitution does not warrant the internal limitation of section 11(1).  He employs 
a teleological approach when he considers the purpose of the Constitution as a whole, in 
order to interpret section 11(1).  Part of this purpose, he contends, is to eradicate the 
limitations on personal freedom during Apartheid.
255
  During this time the majority of South 
Africans, especially black people, were denied the freedom to choose and develop their own 
identities, which amounted to a “denial of the freedom to be fully human.”256  Due to this, 
courts should be very stringent with regard to the limitation of freedom.
257
   
This does not mean that Ackermann J endorses an unlimited right to freedom.
258
  As Sachs J 
correctly observes, that would be entirely unrealistic.
259
  The paradox of unlimited freedom 
suggests that unlimited freedom defeats itself.  People are allowed to infringe upon each 
other’s freedom if their freedom is not protected and limited by the state.260  This idea, that 
freedom cannot exist where people may infringe upon each other’s freedom, corresponds 
with the Kantian Doctrine of Right, as well as the Kantian Kingdom of Ends.  The Doctrine 
of Right asserts that a person has freedom “insofar as it is compatible with the freedom of 
everyone else in accordance with a universal law”.261  Therefore, rules that secure peace and 
                                                     
254
 Ferreira para 50. 
255
 Para 51.  Ackermann J applies O’Regan J’s findings regarding human dignity in Makwanyane para 329, to 
personal freedom. 
256
 Ferreira para 51. 
257
 Para 51.   
258
 Ackermann J emphasises this in para 59.   
259
 Para 250. 
260
 Ackermann J provides this explanation by quoting Popper in n56 of Ferreira para 52.  See Popper K The 
Open Society and its Enemies 2 4ed (1962) 124-125.     
261Per Ackermann J’s quotation of Kant in Ferreira para 52. Du Bois identifies this idea of freedom as the 
Kantian Doctrine of Right.  Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D 
&Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and The Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 133, 135, 141. He also 
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regulate human interaction are necessary for the enjoyment of freedom and are accordingly 
not considered an infringement thereon.
262
 
For this reason, Ackermann J clearly states that he does not propose that the state should 
never limit freedom, but merely demands that such limitation always be in line with the 
limitation clause.
263
  This clause forces the state to justify any limitation to freedom by 
proving that it is “reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality”, which in turn mitigates the risk of arbitrary limitation to personal 
freedom.
264
  
This corresponds with Ackermann J’s submission that when a constitution contains a 
limitation clause all rights subject thereto should be interpreted broadly.  It is only in the 
absence of such a clause that the court is forced to internally limit the right.
265
   
In terms of the above three arguments a narrow interpretation of the right to freedom would 
therefore be unfounded, as it is not demanded by the text, context or object of the right or any 
neutral principle.
266
 Furthermore, a broad freedom right will not give rise to decisions 
analogous to Lochner, as the limitation clause would justify reasonable limitations, thus 
preventing courts from falling into the Lochner trap.
267
 
Section 36 of the Constitution therefore recognises that freedom can be limited by way of 
balancing.  Berlin writes that where two rights are in conflict, a person’s ability to reason is 
applied in order to rationally choose the least obstructive solution.  Freedom may therefore be 
limited in favour of another constitutional right.
268
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
explains that choices or ‘ends’ comply with universal law when they comply with moral law. Kant’s Kingdom 
of Ends is explained and discussed in 2 3 & 4 2 2.  
262
 In Cornell D “Bridging the Span Toward Justice: Laurie Ackermann and the Ongoing Architectonic of 
Dignity Jurisprudence” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-
Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 18 28, Cornell argues this by quoting Sachs J in his decision in Ferreira para 
250. Du Bois also identifies this idea of freedom as the Kantian Doctrine of Right.  Du Bois F “Freedom and the 
Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and The Post-
Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 136-140. 
263
 Ferreira para 52.  This limitation clause, which Ackermann J refers to, is found within s33 of the Interim 
Constitution and s36 of the Final Constitution.  
264
 The Final Constitution adds “human dignity” as an additional value to freedom and equality.  I will not 
provide a detailed analysis of the “necessary” condition in s33 of the Interim constitution, as it is not applicable 
anymore. 
265
 Ackermann J refers to Zuma para 21, where the Court called this “single” and “two-stage” limitation is 
described. Ferreira para 82; see also para 58. 
266
 Ferreira para 68. 
267
 Paras 20-21.  In addition to this, Ackermann J gives two other reasons for his contention that Lochner will 
not be repeated. 
268
 Para 53.  Ackermann J quotes from Berlin I “Introduction” in Four Essays on Liberty (1969) i ii. 
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In Ackermann J’s final argument he consults foreign law.269  He specifically selects three 
countries that have all recognised a freestanding right to freedom, albeit in different ways.  
The most important of these is Canada.
270
  The Canadian Supreme Court has read a residual 
right to freedom into their Constitution by reading it disjunctively from the rest of a section, 
in a similar fashion Ackermann J himself does with section 11(1).
271
 
Despite these six contentions the majority in Ferreira rejects Ackermann J’s appeal for a 
freestanding residual right to freedom.  They offer several reasons.
272
  This includes that 
‘creating’ an individual right to freedom is the duty of the legislative authority and it is 
therefore against the doctrine of the separation of powers for courts to perform this 
function.
273
  Chaskalson P further argues that a broad definition of the right would open the 
floodgates of litigation.
274
   
He also considers the context of the section.  The limitation clause in the Interim Constitution 
differs from the one in the Final Constitution.  According to Chaskalson P, the formulation of 
the limitation clause in the Interim Constitution is inconsistent with the idea of a residual 
freedom right. In terms of this clause the limitation of some rights had to be reasonable, 
whereas the limitation of other rights had to be necessary as well.  Rights in the latter 
category were therefore deemed to be of a higher order.  From this he infers that, since 
section 11(1) fell within this category, it indicates that section 11(1) should have a strict 
interpretation.
275
  He explains that:  
“It would in my view be highly anomalous to give to unenumerated rights forming a 
‘residue’ in section 11(1) a higher status, subject to closer scrutiny, than a right so 
important to freedom as privacy, which is subject only to the ‘reasonable’ test.”276  
 
                                                     
269
 He consults foreign law in Ferreira paras 73-87. 
270
 The other two countries are USA (the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 1791) and 
Germany (art 2 of the Basic Law).  
271
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I Of The Constitution Act, 1982; Thompson Newspapers Ltd 
et al v Director of Investigation and Research et al (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 161.  
272
 Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) 
Dignity, Freedom and The Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 114. 
273
 Ferreira paras 182-183. 
274
 Paras 182-183. 
275
 Para 173. 
276
 Para 174. 
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Another objection to Ackermann J’s judgment is that it would lead to a repeat of the Lochner 
decision.
277
  This is because Ackermann J supports a far more Classical Libertarian 
interpretation of constitutional freedom than the “significantly narrower” interpretation that is 
supposedly prescribed.
278
  
As Michelman points out, this rejection of a freestanding right to freedom has become settled 
law.
279
  What is the verdict on a separate freedom right then?  Those in favour of such a right 
take two different standpoints.   
The one school of thought believes that the court should revise its position on the matter.  Du 
Bois follows this school of thought.  He lists the above objections and then continues to 
illustrate their invalidity within the framework of the Final Constitution.  He rejects the 
objection regarding the separation of powers as “secondary” and denounces the concern over 
opening the floodgates, saying that the enforcement of a constitutional right cannot be denied 
simply because it is too burdensome.  The textual changes in the Final Constitution invalidate 
the objection concerning the limitation clause of the Interim Constitution.
280
   
Du Bois calls the last objection the “key misgiving of the majority”.281  The majority rejects 
Ackermann J’s concept of a separate and broad right to freedom for fear that it will result in a 
repeat of the Lochner decision.  They fear a kind of isolated, individual, general right to 
freedom of action that would be inconsistent with the Constitution’s redistributive aspirations 
and message of socio-economic solidarity.  This will however not be the case.  Ackermann J 
specifically states that the freedom he proposes is not “premised on the concept of the 
individual as being in heroic and atomistic isolation from the rest of humanity, or the 
environment”.282  He continues by saying that, despite the recognition of a broad residual 
                                                     
277
 Para 182. 
278
 Davis D & Woolman S “The Last Laugh: Du Plessis v De Klerk, Classical Liberalism, Creole Liberalism and 
the Application of Fundamental Rights under the Interim and Final Constitution” (1996) SAJHR 361 383. 
279
 Michelman F “Freedom by any Other Name? A Comparative Note on Losing Battles While Winning Wars” 
in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order 
(2008) 91 91. 
280
 Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) 
Dignity, Freedom and The Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 114-115.  S36 of the Final Constitution does 
not distinguish between certain categories of rights.  Any limitation on fundamental rights should be reasonable 
and justifiable.   
281
 Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) 
Dignity, Freedom and The Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 113. 
282
 Ferreira para 52. For Du Bois’ discussion hereof, see Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in 
Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and The Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 
112 113-114.   
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freedom right in the Constitution, the state will still be allowed to intervene in terms of the 
limitation clause.
283
  
Another argument in favor of the court revisiting its stance toward a separate right to freedom 
concerns Chaskalson P’s concession in Ferreira: 
“If despite the detailed provisions of Chapter 3 a freedom of a fundamental nature which 
calls for protection is identified, and if it cannot find adequate protection under any of the 
other provisions in Chapter 3, there may be a reason to look to section 11(1) to protect 
such a right.”284 
This may be interpreted to imply that in the future a separate, residual right to freedom might 
be recognised under section 11(1).  Chaskalson P’s hesitance to recognise this right prior to 
the commencement of the final Constitution is understandable.  It can be argued that the 
textual changes brought about by the final Constitution, call for the court to revise its position 
and acknowledge such a broad right to freedom. 
The court’s continued hesitance in this regard is nonetheless evident from O’Regan J and 
Sachs J’s decision in Jordan: 
“[W]e do not believe that it is useful for the purposes of constitutional analysis to posit an 
independent right to autonomy.  [It is not] appropriate to base our constitutional analysis 
on a right not expressly included within the Constitution.”285  
Nevertheless, they continue to find something similar to an “independent right to autonomy” 
within the right to human dignity.
286
  This constitutes the second standpoint of those in favour 
of a residual right to freedom.  According to this school of thought, even though a separate 
right to freedom cannot be founded within section 11(1) it can be derived from the right to 
human dignity. 
                                                     
283
 Ferreira para 66. 
284
 Para 184. 
285
 Jordan para 53 as referred to in Michelman F “Freedom by any Other Name? A Comparative Note on Losing 
Battles While Winning Wars” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the 
Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 91 107. 
286
 In association with the right to privacy.  
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3 2 2 4 Freedom within human dignity 
Michelman calls the above the Constitutional Court’s “freedom-serving gloss on dignity”.287  
This approach has led to the court’s application of the right to human dignity, in matters 
where other countries would more likely draw on a right to freedom.
288
  Michelman 
furthermore refers to the tendency of the court to involve the right to privacy in matters where 
freedom is found within human dignity.  The rationale behind this is that freedom is more 
readily tolerated within the private sphere.  Privacy therefore includes and endorses a right to 
make private or personal decisions.
289
  
The problem, it seems, with finding freedom within dignity and privacy, rather than within 
the right to freedom itself, is that the ensuing right seems more limited.  Autonomy is only 
awarded for choices that are personal and life shaping.
290
  Cornell explains that dignity is not 
associated with freedom as such, but with the free choices that are in line with moral and 
ethical law and adds value to our society.
291
 
In conclusion, there are various ways in which freedom manifests in the Constitution.  
Freedom as a right and a value is found within human dignity, yet is also a value in itself.  
Furthermore, freedom features in numerous specific rights, one of which might be interpreted 
to include a residual right to freedom.  After identifying the manifestation of freedom in the 
Constitution, it becomes crucial to define this constitutional freedom. 
                                                     
287
 Michelman F “Freedom by any Other Name? A Comparative Note on Losing Battles While Winning Wars” 
in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order 
(2008) 91 92. 
288
 100.  Michelman discusses Dawood as an example of how the right to freedom is found within human 
dignity.  He also explains that, were this case heard in the US, the matter would have been decided in terms of 
the right to freedom. 
289
 See Michelman F “Freedom by any Other Name? A Comparative Note on Losing Battles While Winning 
Wars” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal 
Order (2008) 91 101-104.   See also the two cases Michelman uses as examples, i.e. NCGLE and Jordan. 
290
 Michelman F “Freedom by any Other Name? A Comparative Note on Losing Battles While Winning Wars” 
in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order 
(2008) 91 105-106. 
291
 Cornell D “A Call for a Nuanced Constitutional Jurisprudence: Ubuntu, Dignity and Reconciliation” (2004) 
19 SAPR/PL 666 667. 
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3 3 The definition of constitutional freedom 
It is important to keep in mind that constitutional freedom is not synonymous with common 
law freedom.  It has been stressed that constitutional freedom is significantly narrower than 
freedom within the Classical Liberal theory.
292
   
Ackermann J’s definition of freedom can be used as a starting point for defining freedom, 
since it is often consulted during attempts at defining the concept.  He refers to the two 
freedom philosophers, Kant and Berlin, who were identified above.
293
  Both of these 
philosophers write about freedom in a negative and a positive sense.  However, their 
interpretations of these conceptions differ somewhat.
294
   
Berlin defines negative freedom as freedom from the external interference of other 
persons.
295
 Positive freedom, to him, is more complex.  It is the freedom from the control or 
interference of anyone or anything.  This is much wider than freedom in the negative sense, 
as it also includes freedom from the interference or control of, for example, nature or one’s 
own “unbridled passions”.  To be free from oneself suggests that a person has two levels of 
being.  The first level represents the more carnal self; the self which cannot refrain from 
acting on its own desires or passions.  The higher level, in turn, represents a higher self.  This 
higher self aims at becoming the best version of itself and has the ability to control the lower 
self in order to achieve this.  One can, therefore, only be free in the positive sense if the 
higher self is in control. 
This complete freedom and control over one’s own life may also contain socio-economic 
elements.  When a person’s basic needs are not fulfilled he cannot be truly in control of his 
life and have positive freedom.  However, the criticism against this conception of positive 
freedom is that whatever resources are provided to those in need, will necessarily have to be 
taken from others.  This ‘confiscation’ from others can be perceived as an external 
                                                     
292
 Bhana D & Pieterse M “Towards a Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and 
Afrox Revisited” (2005) SALJ 865 878-879. 
293
 See 3 1 2. 
294
 Cornell D “Bridging the Span Toward Justice: Laurie Ackermann and the Ongoing Architectonic of Dignity 
Jurisprudence” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid 
Legal Order (2008) 18 24. 
295
 Berlin I “Two Concepts of Liberty” in Harris H (ed) Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty (2002) 
166 169. 
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interference by another person.  As a result, ensuring the positive freedom of one person can 
cause infringement upon the negative freedom of another.
296
 
Kant’s negative freedom is essentially equivalent to Berlin’s positive freedom.297      He calls 
his idea of positive freedom “causality through norms”.  This concept of freedom is quite 
complex.  A person is positively free when there is no constraints upon him and he is capable 
of acting in accordance with what he ‘ought to do’, i.e. free to act according to moral law.  
This is achieved when persons live according to the Categorical Imperative, in terms of 
which their freedom is internally limited by the freedom of others.  Although they are not 
forced to limit their own freedom in favour of others, they choose to do so because they 
freely adhere to moral law and ethical duties.
298
   
This positive idea of freedom can be read into Berlin’s conception of freedom, as it implies 
that one can only be truly free from all persons and things if one’s higher self is in control 
and chooses to adhere to moral law and ethical duties.   
In Ferreira, Ackermann J claims to rely on Berlin’s negative concept of freedom.299 
However, he refers to the Kantian notion of freedom which, as stated above, does not entirely 
correspond with Berlin’s negative freedom.  Several writers have in fact criticised this 
reliance on Berlin, saying that it is inconsistent with his subsequent comprehensive 
explanation of freedom.
300
  Ackermann J follows the broad and general approach when 
interpreting freedom and supports state intervention.
301
  His idea of freedom includes the 
right to self-determination, which supports the positive idea of self-control.
302
  The question 
is: why would Ackermann J claim to rely on Berlin’s negative freedom and should this be 
understood as the ultimate definition of constitutional freedom? 
                                                     
296
 179. 
297
 Cornell explains Kant’s negative freedom, in Cornell D “Bridging the Span Toward Justice: Laurie 
Ackermann and the Ongoing Architectonic of Dignity Jurisprudence” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du 
Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 18 24-25. 
298
 25. 
299
 Ferreira paras 52-54. 
300
 See for example, Liebenberg S “The Value of Freedom in Interpreting Socio-economic Rights” in Barnard-
Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 149 159.  
Barnard-Naude AJ “Beyond the Brother: Radical Freedom” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) 
Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 273 274. 
301
 Ferreira para 52.  Barnard-Naude points this out in Barnard-Naude AJ “Beyond the Brother: Radical 
Freedom” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal 
Order (2008) 273 274. 
302
 Or Berlin’s positive freedom. Liebenberg uses paras 49-50 of Ackermann J’s decision in Ferreira to indicate 
that this right to self-determination is found within Ackermann J’s right to freedom.  Liebenberg S “The Value 
of Freedom in Interpreting Socio-economic Rights” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, 
Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 149 158.  
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There are two possible explanations for Ackermann J’s reliance on Berlin’s negative 
freedom.  The first is that he chooses this definition based on the timing of the case.
303
  
Support for this argument is found in Ackermann J’s words: “I would at this stage define 
freedom negatively”.304  It implies that at a later stage it might be justified to define freedom 
positively.  His hesitance to define freedom positively can be attributed to the fact that the 
case was decided under the Interim Constitution.  At that stage the scope of the Bill of Rights 
and the state’s positive duty to provide for the material needs of individuals were still fairly 
uncertain.
305
 
The second possible explanation for preferring Berlin’s negative freedom relates to his fear of 
paternalism.
306
  He refers to Berlin’s idea that freedom should not be confused with the 
conditions of its exercise, subsequently saying that a right to negative freedom does not 
guarantee a right to the conditions which allow for its exercise.
307
  A right to the conditions 
for the exercise of freedom creates tension between the individual and the collective.
308
  The 
provision of material needs (i.e. the conditions for the exercise of freedom) requires a 
redistribution of resources through which the state intervenes in the lives of individuals.
309
  
This could have paternalistic consequences, wherein the conditions for freedom are provided 
yet freedom itself is withheld.
310
  
It has been argued several times that constitutional freedom should comprise of more than 
simply negative freedom.  Freedom needs to be defined positively; or more in line with 
Kantian freedom.  For freedom to have substantive meaning it needs to include the conditions 
for its exercise.
311
  As Liebenberg notes: 
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 Du Bois raises this argument in Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, 
Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and The Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 115. 
304
 Ferreira para 54; emphasis added. 
305
 Du Bois raises this argument in Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, 
Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and The Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 115. 
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 Liebenberg argues this in Liebenberg S “The Value of Freedom in Interpreting Socio-economic Rights” in 
Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 
149 160-161. 
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 Ferreira para 52. 
308
 Liebenberg S “The Value of Freedom in Interpreting Socio-economic Rights” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell 
D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 149 161. 
309
 On the contention that a large-scale redistribution is necessary, see Radin MJ “Market-inalienability” (1987) 
Harvard Law Review 1849 1910, 1911; South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult 
Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 26, 31, 150, 161. 
310
 Ferreira para 52.  Ackermann J quotes from Berlin I “Introduction” in Four Essays on Liberty (1969) i iiii-
iv, to support this argument.   
311
 Liebenberg S “The Value of Freedom in Interpreting Socio-economic Rights” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell 
D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 149 159, 160, 164.  
Liebenberg states that “a lack of access to the particular economic or social resources... [might] restrict the 
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“We don’t need rights that falsely presuppose our autonomy and independence, but rights 
that frankly acknowledge our … reality.”312 
The inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Constitution supports this idea of positive 
constitutional freedom.
313
 
A problem with defining freedom positively, especially with regard to its Kantian 
interpretation, is that the state can only go so far to protect and ensure this kind of freedom.  
It is hardly possible, for instance, for the state to ensure that people have control over their 
own passions and desires.  Even more complex is the fact that the Kantian idea of ultimate 
freedom, where all persons harmonise their ends and live according to the moral law and 
ethical duties, is only possible if persons do so freely.  
Subsequently, this definition of positive freedom will always remain a mere ideal.  However, 
laws can ensure external freedom and can indicate the morally correct choices.
314
  Cornell 
focuses on this idea of ensuring external freedom to allow morally correct choices.  She refers 
to an ideal society, similar to the Kingdom of Ends, to which each individual should aspire.  
In order to aspire to such a society external freedom to self-legislate is crucial.  Yet it is 
dignity that points us towards this ideal society, since dignity ties together this external 
freedom and the “ideal realm of self-legislation” in which choices are made in accordance 
with moral law.
315
  According to this idea it could be said that within constitutional freedom 
external freedom is limited by dignity.
316
 
In conclusion it might therefore “at this stage” be necessary to define constitutional freedom 
positively. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
development of people’s capacity for self-determination [forcing’ them into unequal and oppressive 
relationships because of economic need.” Substantive freedom can even justify that the disadvantaged are 
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Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 273 274. 
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D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 149 162.  Du Bois F 
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and The Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 118. 
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Dignity, Freedom and The Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 129. 
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 Cornell D “A Call for a Nuanced Constitutional Jurisprudence: Ubuntu, Dignity and Reconciliation” (2004) 
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3 4 Freedom in relation to human dignity 
3 4 1 Are rights and values commensurable? 
In order to explore the relationship between freedom and human dignity it is crucial to 
determine whether rights and values are commensurable.  This is because the question of 
whether these concepts can limit one another or whether one is supreme to the other plays a 
significant role in determining their relationship.  The answer to this question depends on the 
commensurability of rights and values in general.
317
  
The act of balancing rights and values requires an objective principle against which the 
conflicting rights and values can be measured.  When rights are balanced, values constitute 
these objective principles, since a value is considered to have more weight than a right.
318
  
However, such a principle is lacking in case of a conflict of values.
319
    
McCrudden identifies three approaches that courts have followed when confronted with 
conflicting values.
320
  The first approach is simply to decide that courts cannot balance these 
values and to refer any such conflicts to the legislature.  He calls the second approach 
“utilitarian balancing” which amounts to choosing an outcome that affords the “greatest good 
for the greatest number”.  The third approach is to employ a proportionality test in situations 
where one value is to be limited in favour of another value.
321
 
Despite these approaches, various countries still opt for the use of an objective principle 
against which conflicting values can be measured.  The most popular principle in this regard 
is that of human dignity.
322
  It is of no surprise then that South African courts, with their 
commitment to dignity-based jurisprudence, have followed suit.
323
   
                                                     
317
 According to McCrudden, the idea of incommensurability was first popularised by Berlin.  McCrudden C 
“Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International 
Law 655 714. 
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 See Chaskalson A “Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept 
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(2002) 161 169. 
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 McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal 
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321
 715.  McCrudden explains the proportionality test. 
322
 716.  Botha criticises the use of dignity as an objective principle in value conflicts.  Botha H “Human Dignity 
in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 201.  See also Ackermann LWH “Equality and the South 
African Constitution: The role of dignity” 2000 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 537 551-552.   
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 McCrudden refers to Port Elizabeth Municipality, in order to illustrate this point.  McCrudden C “Human 
Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 
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Regardless of whether rights or values should be balanced against each other, it is evident 
from the above that in practice courts do in fact engage in this kind of balancing. 
3 4 2 Two perspectives on the relationship between freedom and dignity 
3 4 2 1 One limits the other 
If dignity is used as an objective principle against which values are measured, then it follows 
from this that dignity can be used to limit freedom.  This corresponds with the idea discussed 
in the previous chapter that dignity is sometimes regarded as a supreme right and value.
324
  
Dignity as a supreme value cannot be limited by, or balanced against, other values.
325
 
Due to our dignity-based jurisprudence dignity does actually enjoy more prominence than 
freedom in South Africa.
326
  As a matter of fact, various countries rely on dignity to limit 
individual freedom.
327
   South African courts do not perceive freedom as absolute.  Therefore, 
unlike dignity it is more acceptable to limit freedom in favor of other values.
328
 
There are various examples of how dignity might limit freedom.  Paternalism plays a role in 
this regard.  People are prohibited from exercising their freedom as a protection of their own 
dignity or the dignity of others.  This is the case with the prohibition of prostitution, dwarf 
tossing and sadomasochism; even contractual autonomy is limited to ensure that no one 
contracts against dignity.
329
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Archives of Sexual Behaviour 441 442. 
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There is however criticism against only viewing dignity as inviolable and using dignity as an 
objective principle against which other values can be balanced.  The most significant 
argument against dignity as such an objective principle is that dignity can be manipulated into 
a variety of meanings.  Dignity can therefore be used as a tool in order to get one’s way.330 
Another objection relates to the idea that freedom is inherent to human dignity.  Since 
freedom is part of dignity, it will inevitably always be the value that “best comport[s] with 
human dignity”.331  Consequently freedom as an independent value will never be limited in a 
balance of values where dignity is the objective principle against which the conflicting values 
are measured. A similar argument is that if dignity is regarded as an absolute value, freedom 
should receive a similar status, since freedom is part of dignity. 
The second contention regarding freedom within dignity relates to situations where the value 
of human dignity is found on either side of a dispute.
332
  On the one side of the dispute the 
self-worth aspect of dignity is relied on and on the other side the autonomy component is 
raised. A dispute concerning the permissibility of consent to objectification is of course a 
perfect example.
333
  In such a situation the balancing of dignity is inevitable.
334
  Here the 
superior value of dignity is not balanced against the inferior value of freedom.  Where 
freedom within dignity is balanced against dignity itself, the effect is dignity vs. dignity, 
which is a very complicated situation. 
Botha provides a number of solutions for this predicament, the most relevant one being that 
dignity should not be seen as absolute.
335
  He suggests that courts distinguish between a core 
of absolute dignity and peripheral areas of dignity that can be balanced and limited by other 
values.  Courts should demand a compelling justification of limitations that touch upon core 
areas of dignity, while allowing the legislature greater latitude in relation to limitations of the 
more peripheral areas.  This is however problematic in itself.
336
 
                                                     
330
 See Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-69; Davis D “Equality: The Majesty of Legoland 
Jurisprudence” (1999) SALJ 398 413.  Davis calls dignity “a jurisprudential Legoland – to be used in whatever 
form and shape is required by the demands of the judicial designer.” 
331
 McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal 
of International Law 655 718, with reference to Port Elizabeth Municipality. 
332
 Botha contends that this is more common than previously imagined.  Botha H “Human Dignity in 
Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 195. 
333
 194-195, 211-212. 
334
 194. 
335
 195-196. 
336
 215-216. Botha explains the difficulty. 
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Writers in support of this solution argue that dignity should never have been interpreted as 
absolute or supreme.  They contend that all values are entrenched alike and should receive 
equal prominence.
337
  With regard to freedom specifically, there are various arguments in 
favour of awarding freedom the same, if not more prominence than dignity.
338
  One is that the 
constitutional provisions in support of a supreme dignity confer similar weight upon freedom.  
In fact, freedom features more often and more prominently in our Bill of Rights.  It is argued 
that the supreme status of human dignity simply reflects a choice of the court.
339
  
Consequently the rule should either be that all values are incommensurable or that all values 
are subject to balancing.
340
  The latter would subsequently require a means of balancing 
which does not include the use of dignity as an objective, overriding principle.  
3 4 2 2 One enhances the other 
Values are however not always in conflict and can enhance or reinforce one another.
341
  
Freedom is often seen as the foundation of human dignity.
342
  It is an essential part thereof.  
Accordingly human dignity is recognised and enhanced by the protection of freedom; without 
which it has little value.
343
 
The converse is also true: that dignity enhances freedom.  Just as freedom is sometimes seen 
as the basis of dignity, dignity is often considered the foundation of freedom.
344
   Human 
dignity is critical for the protection of freedom and since freedom is part of dignity, it 
                                                     
337
 Woolman supports this school of thought.  Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, 
Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-29, n1.  He contends 
that, since we have such a diverse and pluralistic society, rights and values should have equal prominence. 
338
This is also in line with Kantian philosophy that requires freedom to be the basis of any Constitution.  
Woolman refers approvingly to this Kantian idea in Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, 
Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-3, n2. 
339
 Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) 
Dignity, Freedom and The Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 112.  The preference of the court is made 
clear in NCGLE para 28. 
340
 Even with regard to dignity, specific circumstances can be identified in which limitation might be beneficial.  
Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 216. 
341
 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal and Others v Pillay and Others 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) para 63, as 
referenced in Du Plessis L “Affirmation and Celebration of the ‘Religious Other’ in South Africa’s 
Constitutional Jurisprudence on Religious and Related Rights: Memorial Constitutionalism in Action?” (2008) 
African Human Rights Law Journal 376 399. 
342
 Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) 
Dignity, Freedom and The Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 132. 
343
 Ferreira para 49. See also Bhana D & Pieterse M “Towards a Reconciliation of Contract Law and 
Constitutional Values: Brisley and Afrox Revisited” (2005) SALJ 865 881. 
344
 Dicke K “The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” in 
Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 111 114; Starck 
C “The Religious and Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern Constitutions” in 
Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 179 182; 
Barrett J “Dignatio and the Human Body” (2005) SAJHR 525 530. 
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flourishes whenever dignity is recognised.
345
   Due to the court’s dignity-based jurisprudence, 
additional protection is afforded to rights that are associated with dignity, such as freedom. 
Although some of these ideas might seem mutually exclusive, this is not the case.  It is 
asserted that dignity can simultaneously limit, enhance and be enhanced by freedom.   The 
relationship between these two concepts is very intricate and complex due to their 
interdependence upon one another. 
3 5 Conclusion 
From the above it is clear that the definitions of freedom and dignity are quite interrelated.  
These two concepts share the same foundation and are often equated with one another.  The 
common law Classical Liberal theory speaks of a more independent freedom, whereas 
constitutional freedom and dignity are regarded as interdependent.   
                                                     
345
 Barrett J “Dignatio and the Human Body” (2005) SAJHR 525 530.  See also Dicke K “The Founding 
Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The 
Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 111 115. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INDIVIDUALS SHOULD NOT CONSENT TO OBJECTIFYING 
TREATMENT 
4 1 Dignity is supreme 
4 1 1 Dignity trumps freedom 
As asserted in Chapter 1, there are three possible approaches to consenting to objectifying 
treatment. The first is that consent should not be allowed under any circumstances.  The 
second is that where the state cannot fulfil the economic needs of the poor, the latter cannot 
be prohibited from consenting to objectifying treatment in exchange for remuneration to fulfil 
those needs themselves.  The third approach is that people can and should be allowed to 
consent to objectifying treatment.
346
  In this chapter I will examine the reasoning behind the 
first approach.  
The primary argument in favour of the first approach is based on the notion that dignity is 
absolute and supreme to other rights and values.
347
 Freedom is not regarded as such.
348
 
Consequently, dignity is considered supreme to freedom.  As a supreme value dignity can 
inform freedom and determine its limits.
349
  Subsequently, dignity always trumps freedom 
whenever these two rights or values are balanced.
350
   
                                                     
346
 1 1.  
347
 De Schutter endorses the idea that some values are more prominent than others.  De Schutter O “Waiver of 
Rights and State Paternalism under the European Convention on Human Rights” (2000) Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly 481 486-488. 
348
 See Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) 
Dignity, Freedom and The Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 112. 
349
 The fact that dignity informs freedom is demonstrated in the context of contractual freedom in Woolman S 
“Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-46; Bhana D & Pieterse M “Towards a Reconciliation of Contract Law and 
Constitutional Values: Brisley and Afrox Revisited” (2005) SALJ 865 868.  De Schutter explains that dignity 
can limit freedom.  De Schutter O “Waiver of Rights and State Paternalism under the European Convention on 
Human Rights” (2000) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 481 496-497.  He also refers to specific cases in 
Germany where dignity has limited the freedom to consent, i.e. in the peepshow case of BVerfGE 30, 1 (1970).  
With regard to dignity limiting the freedom to consent, see Liebenberg S “The Value of Human Dignity in 
Interpreting Socio-economic Rights” (2005) SAJHR 1 3.  For support that dignity can limit freedom within 
contract law, see Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-21; Bhana D & Pieterse M “Towards a 
Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and Afrox Revisited” (2005) SALJ 865 868.  
McCrudden shows that different countries have in fact used dignity to limit freedom.   
350
 See Ackermann LWH “Equality and the South African Constitution: The Role of Dignity” (2000) 
Heidelberg Journal of International Law 537 552.  See also, the very recent case of Print Media South Africa 
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Therefore, whenever tension between dignity and freedom exists due to the individual’s 
consent to objectification, dignity will prevail; thereby invalidating such consent.  There are 
two objections to this argument.  The first is that freedom is part of dignity and dignity can 
therefore not be supreme to it.  In answer to this objection, De Schutter writes that freedom 
shall not be protected as part of an absolute dignity if “public authorities have good reason to 
limit [it]”.351   
The second objection is that there exists a sphere of personal privacy in which an individual 
should be allowed to do as he wishes.
352
  The counterargument to this objection is that an 
individual’s privacy should be respected as a protection of his dignity.353  Dignity violated in 
private can therefore not be justified under private autonomy.
354
   
4 1 2 Dignity cannot be lost 
Barrett states that dignity is “inviolable, irreducible, unalienable [sic], [it] cannot be valued or 
exchanged.”355  Dignity may therefore not be violated or limited by the individual himself or 
anyone else.
356
  As a result a person cannot consent to the violation of his own dignity by 
another, for that would constitute a violation by both the individual himself and the other 
person.
357
  This was decided in the German peepshow case in which women consented to 
objectifying treatment.
358
  Cases involving sadomasochism have followed suit.
359
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another ZAGPJHC 26-10-2011 case no 14343/2010 (unreported) 
where the right to human dignity trumped the right to freedom of expression. 
351
 De Schutter O “Waiver of Rights and State Paternalism under the European Convention on Human Rights” 
(2000) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 481 497. 
352
 This is argued in Jordan para 27. 
353
 Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v UK (1997) 24 EHRR paras 39, 51; hereinafter referred to as “Laskey”. 
354
 Paras 36, 51. 
355
 Barrett J “Dignatio and the Human Body” (2005) SAJHR 525 530. 
356
 For support that a person may not violate his own dignity, see Malby S “Human Dignity and Human 
Reproductive Cloning” (2000) 6:1 Health and Human Rights 103 107.  With regard to the prohibition of 
violations by others, see McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) 
The European Journal of International Law 655 702-703. 
357
 This links to the fact that dignity is not lost through undignified behaviour as discussed later on in this 
section.  The idea that a person cannot consent to prostitution, since it violates human rights is mentioned in 
South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 
(2009) 88.  
358
 BVerfGE 64, 274 (1981) 277-279, as translated in Michalowski S & Woods L German Constitutional Law: 
the Protection of Civil Liberties (1999) 105.   
359
 KA & AD v Belgium (Application Nos 42758/98 and 45558/99) (unreported 17 February 2005) 23. Two 
relevant cases are quoted in Laskey paras 20, 28; namely, R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498 and R v Brown [1993] 
2 All ER 75 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Brown’). 
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Sadomasochism is regarded as a violation of human dignity and can be seen as a form of 
objectification.
360
   
There is however one exception to this rule.  A person may consent to the violation of his 
dignity “if such a violation is based only on the lack of consent”.361  Rape is an example of 
this exception.  Although seen as a violation of human dignity, it is not the sex per se that 
violates the victim's dignity, but the fact that it was never consented to.  The violation is 
therefore solely based on the lack of consent. 
The next question is whether dignity can be waived.  De Schutter defines a waiver as the 
disposal of a right.
362
  It could be argued that waiving one’s right is synonymous to 
consenting to its violation.  In this regard the above principles apply.  However, some writers 
do not equate a waiver of a right with its violation.
363
  They reason that where a right is 
waived there can be no violation of thereof.  When a person therefore waives his right, he 
does not consent to its violation, but consents to its disposal altogether.   
Yet dignity can never be lost, even when violated.  One cannot lose one’s dignity when others 
violate it, through one’s “own undignified behaviour” or when one lacks the basic needs for a 
dignified existence.
364
  Consequently, in terms of this definition of waiver an individual can 
never validly waive the right to human dignity, because the waiving of a right will result in 
the loss thereof, which is impossible.
365
 
                                                     
360
 The harm that is inflicted is against the inherent worth of the individual; the individual is used as an object of 
someone’s (sexual) desires. 
361
 BVerfGE 64, 274 (1981) 277-279, as translated in Michalowski S & Woods L German Constitutional Law: 
the Protection of Civil Liberties (1999) 105. 
362
 De Schutter O “Waiver of Rights and State Paternalism under the European Convention on Human Rights” 
(2000) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 481 481;  Klein E “Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & 
Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 145 148. 
363
 Klein provides a distinction between the two ideas.  Klein E “Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer 
D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 145 148. 
364
 The fact that dignity is not lost when violated by others is explained in the context of the German Basic Law 
in Klein E “Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in 
Human Rights Discourse (2002) 145 148; Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell 
LR 171 194.  With regard to the fact that a person doesn’t lose his dignity through undignified behaviour, see 
Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 194, 197, 209; Klein E “Human 
Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights 
Discourse (2002) 145 148.  Barrett concludes from this that the decision in Makwanyane is therefore correct and 
that of Jordan incorrect.  Barrett J “Dignatio and the Human Body” (2005) SAJHR 525 539.  Liebenberg 
explains that dignity is not lost due to a lack of basic needs.  Liebenberg S “The Value of Human Dignity in 
Interpreting Socio-economic Rights” (2005) SAJHR 1 2. 
365
 See BVerfGE 64, 274 (1981) 277-279, as translated in Michalowski S & Woods L German Constitutional 
Law: the Protection of Civil Liberties (1999) 105; Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” 
(2009) Stell LR 171 194, 197; Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M 
& Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-8; Klein E “Human Dignity in 
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When the concept of commodification is introduced in this context, the situation becomes 
even more complicated.  Commodification according to Marxist political theory occurs 
“when economic value is assigned to something that traditionally would not be considered in 
economic terms.”366  In certain instances commodification has been considered a violation of 
human dignity. 
The commodification of one’s human dignity is an excellent example in this regard.  When a 
person ‘sells’ his human dignity by consenting to objectifying treatment in exchange for 
money, his dignity becomes a commodity.  Examples of this are prostitution and dwarf 
tossing.  It is evident that the same reasoning pertaining to consent to objectification, where 
no monetary reward is involved, shall apply to this situation.  The argument is therefore that a 
person is neither allowed to consent to the violation nor the disposal of his dignity, regardless 
of whether he is compensated.
367
    Dignity cannot be lost, whether it is given away gratis or 
sold.  It is therefore not the commodification or the selling per se that is prohibited in this 
instance, but the waiving of the right.  This is support for the contention that dignity cannot 
be sold. 
There are other instances in which commodification leads to objectification and hence the 
violation of human dignity.  These instances do not involve the waiving or commodification 
of human dignity as such, yet human dignity is violated due to the nature of the commodified 
thing.  In these instances it is the commodification or the selling itself that violates the 
individual’s human dignity.  Unlike the aforementioned example, the gratis giving of the 
things in this category does not constitute a violation of dignity.  Only when a monetary value 
is assigned to something, when that thing is sold, does it amount to a violation of human 
dignity.
368
 Radin depicts the items in this category as “inalienable”.  Inalienable possessions 
are those things that are internal or inherent to all human beings, for example personal 
                                                                                                                                                                     
German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse 
(2002) 145 148, 158.  On the idea that even if some rights can be waived, fundamental rights cannot be waived, 
See De Schutter O “Waiver of Rights and State Paternalism Under the European Convention on Human Rights” 
(2000) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 481 481. 
366
 Gillies I “Real World Toys and Currency Turn the Legal World Upside Down: A Cross-sectional Update on 
Virtual World Legalities” (2008) 12 Int’l J Comm L & Pol’y 120 128 n52. 
367
 See also Wood AW “Human Dignity, Right and the Realm of Ends” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du 
Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 47 49.  Wood refers to the Kantian 
contrast of dignity with price.  Kant writes that dignity cannot be valued or exchanged.  This supports the idea 
that dignity cannot be commodified. 
368
 A person is objectified, dehumanised and degraded; their individual and social potential is stifled.  Radin MJ 
“Market-inalienability” (1987) Harvard Law Review 1849 1871, 1849 1877, 1881.  See also Botha H “Human 
Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 203. 
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attributes or sexual intimacy.
369
  When these things are sold they become “fungible 
objects”.370 She consequently avers that “valuing my bodily integrity in money is not far 
removed from valuing me in money” therefore   alleging that through the objectification of 
the individual’s personal attributes, the individual himself is objectified.371  
Practical examples are prostitution and surrogacy.
372
  The theory is that neither having sexual 
intercourse with someone, nor carrying someone's baby, is objectifying.  Yet, as soon as 
money is involved the sexual encounter loses its private intimacy and the prostitute becomes 
an object, a means to an end.
373
  Similarly, paying someone to carry one’s baby is said to 
erase the altruistic element, transforming a loving, selfless act into a womb for rent.
374
  These 
instances of commodification, although irrelevant to the topic of whether dignity can be sold, 
serve as another example of consent to objectification. 
I return now to the primary focus of this section - the argument that dignity cannot be 
violated, waived, lost or sold.  This type of reasoning suggests that the state has a duty to 
protect human dignity even against the wishes of the individual.
375
  The state should 
accordingly prohibit individuals from violating, waiving, disposing of or selling their own 
dignity. 
4 2 Freedom should yield to communitarian dignity 
4 2 1 Freedom of the individual vs. dignity of the community 
When two individual rights are in conflict it is easy to argue that one right should not carry 
more weight than the other.  It is, however, more complicated if the right of one individual is 
                                                     
369
 On how Kant and Hegel identify inalienable things as internal and inherent, see Radin MJ “Market-
inalienability” (1987) Harvard Law Review 1849 1880, 1891-1892, 1921.  Radin uses “personal attributes” and 
sexuality as examples. 
370
 Radin MJ “Market-inalienability” (1987) Harvard Law Review 1849 1881. 
371
  1881. 
372
 1921. 
373
 For a discussion on how sex for money reinforces the separateness between two people, see Radin MJ 
“Market-inalienability” (1987) Harvard Law Review 1849 1908.  See also Adler L “The Dignity of Sex” (2008) 
17:1 UCLA Women's LJ 1 26; Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 203. 
374
 Radin calls this the “Domino effect”.  Radin MJ “Market-inalienability” (1987) Harvard Law Review 1849 
1913-1914. 
375
 See De Schutter O “Waiver of Rights and State Paternalism under the European Convention on Human 
Rights” (2000) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 481 496-467; Klein E “Human Dignity in German Law” in 
Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 145 158.  De 
Schutter and Klein both discuss the fact that even in Germany, with its explicit right to freedom, the state has a 
duty to protect dignity against the wishes of the individual.  See also Starck C “The Religious and Philosophical 
Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern Constitutions” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The 
Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 179 189; Lochner 53. 
Stellenbosch University   http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 74 
balanced against the rights of a group, such as where the freedom of the individual is in 
conflict with the dignity of the community he is part of. 
This is the case when the individual consents to objectifying treatment.  It is argued that the 
dignity violation reaches beyond the individual’s own interests and affects the dignity of his 
community.
376
  For example, when a dwarf participates in dwarf tossing, it undermines the 
dignity of the dwarf-community, as its other members might not approve thereof.
377
   
One solution to this conflict is that of utilitarian balancing.  As explained in Chapter 2, 
utilitarian balancing requires that the greatest good for the greatest number be attained, the 
result being that the rights of the individual always yield to those of the community.
378
  
Utilitarian balancing is often criticised on the grounds that freedom and dignity are individual 
rights, inherent to each individual and should therefore not have to yield to the rights of a 
group.
379
  
4 2 2 The individual’s notion of dignity vs. the community’s notion of dignity 
The reason for choosing to act contrary to the dignity of one’s community, by consenting to 
objectifying treatment, might be that one does not perceive such treatment to be a violation of 
one’s dignity.  The response to this rationale has most often been that human dignity is an 
objective idea that is violated irrespective of the subjective ideas of the individual.
380
 
However, this argument is only feasible if this objective human dignity can be defined.  Who 
decides what constitutes a violation of human dignity and what sort of treatment a person 
                                                     
376
 This was said in Prince v President, Cape Law Society and Others 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) para 146 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Prince’) with regard to the right to freedom of religion but also applies here.   In the 
context of prostitution it is argued that the dignity violation of the individual “undermines the dignity of 
humanity”; it lowers the moral standards of the community, downgrades neighbourhoods and breaks up family 
structures.  South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, 
Project 107 (2009) 178, 179.  See also McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 705; Radin MJ “Market-inalienability” (1987) 
Harvard Law Review 1849 1864-1866; Weait M “Harm, Consent and the Limits of Privacy” (2005) 13 Feminist 
Legal Studies 97 101-102. 
377
 See Wackenheim 3.  It is explained in this dwarf-tossing case, that “human dignity is a part of public order”.  
378
 3 4 1.  See McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The 
European Journal of International Law 655 715.  See also Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, 
Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-9. 
379
 McCrudden criticises utilitarian balancing in McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of 
Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 715-718.  See also Starck C “The 
Religious and Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern Constitutions” in Kretzmer 
D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 179 186.  Starck 
identifies this kind of criticism as humanistic.  See also Carmichele para 56. 
380
 De Schutter O “Waiver of Rights and State Paternalism under the European Convention on Human Rights” 
(2000) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 481 497.  
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may consent to?  Since dignity is closely associated with moral law, popular moral perception 
has often been consulted to determine these uncertainties.
381
  The idea of a shared public 
morality is presented as justification for defining moral law in terms of popular moral 
ideas.
382
 
Yet, due to the plurality of society, no such shared public morality exists.  Furthermore, since 
people are ends in themselves and should be allowed to form their own ideas on what 
constitutes ‘a good life’, this pluralism should be tolerated, if not celebrated.383  However, it 
is asserted that this does not mean that anything goes and every person can rely on his own 
moral convictions in order to determine what sort of treatment constitutes a violation of his 
own subjective human dignity. 
In order to govern a community effectively the state has to regulate its citizens.
384
  No state 
can have neutral values.
385
  A state needs to govern from a specific moral point of view, i.e. a 
policy.
386
  One argument is that this is influenced by the morality of the majority of its 
citizens.
387
  It is the duty of the state to harmonise the autonomy of the individual with the 
solidarity of society he is bound to and the public interest of his community.
388
  As a result 
some actions that are in conflict with the morality of the majority and its conception of what 
constitutes a violation of human dignity will be excluded.
389
 This corresponds to the idea that 
                                                     
381
 For the idea that dignity is closely related to moral law, see BVerfGE 64, 274 (1981) 277-279, as translated in  
Michalowski S & Woods L German Constitutional Law: the Protection of Civil Liberties (1999) 105; Du Bois F 
“Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom 
and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 133-134, 137.  Du Bois refers to a Kantian idea, which he calls 
the universability test.  This test can be applied in situations where the freedom of the individual is in conflict 
with the dignity of the community.  The individual’s choices are tested against moral law to determine whether 
it complies with “universal legislation”.  This test confirms this strong connection between dignity and morality. 
382
 Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 217 229. 
383
 Jordan para 104. 
384
 Ackermann LWH “Equality and the South African Constitution: The Role of Dignity” (2000) Heidelberg 
Journal of International Law 537 545.  See also Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-
Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 138. 
385
 Jordan para 104. 
386
 See Jordan paras 104, 106; NCGLE para 119.  See also Lochner 66; Weait M “Harm, Consent and the Limits 
of Privacy” (2005) 13 Feminist Legal Studies 97 102; Laskey para 40.  The other argument, which is discussed 
in 6 2 1, is that morality should be based on constitutional values. 
387
 Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 217 229; Woolman 
S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-14.  See also Weait M “Harm, Consent and the Limits of Privacy” (2005) 13 
Feminist Legal Studies 97 97, 102. 
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 Botha explains this in Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 178.  On 
the idea that freedom should be in line with public interest is mentioned, see Weait M “Harm, Consent and the 
Limits of Privacy” (2005) 13 Feminist Legal Studies 97 102; Laskey para 29. 
389
 Du Plessis L “Affirmation and Celebration of the ‘Religious Other’ in South Africa’s Constitutional 
Jurisprudence on Religious and Related Rights: Memorial Constitutionalism in Action?” (2008) African Human 
Rights Law Journal 376 389; Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law 
Reporter 217 229.  These actions are excluded even if they are performed in private, Laskey summary, para 29. 
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a person is free as longs as he complies with moral law; which might be seen as the definition 
of freedom found within human dignity.
390
 
The reality is therefore that each person is a member of society.
391
  In order to protect that 
social framework, freedom may be limited.
392
  This corresponds with the Kantian notion of a 
Kingdom of Ends in which a person is only allowed to set ends which are in harmony with 
the ends of everyone else.   
4 3 Opening the floodgates 
Due to the differing and changing morals of society, some forms of objectifying treatment 
might seem acceptable.  It is not that society does not view the treatment as objectifying; the 
harm caused by the violation just does not seem that serious.  
This sort of reasoning is raised in the sadomasochism case of Laskey. In this case counsel for 
the accused argues that no real harm ensued from the “genital torture” the accused performed 
on each other and the acts should therefore not be punished.
393
  In other words, the triviality 
of the violation does not warrant prohibition.   
Contrary to this, it can be argued that the state cannot allow some forms of objectifying 
treatment or specific cases and degrees of objectification without the risk of an ‘opening of 
the floodgates’ effect.394  Such an allowance would suggest that the state condones 
objectifying treatment, which will in turn lead to a gradual moral decline in society. Dignity 
would lose its supreme status and its inviolability.   
Once the courts allow one form of objectification, a precedent is set.  Those accused of 
objectification, sometimes more harmful than already allowed, will rely on this precedent.  
                                                     
390
 Starck C “The Religious and Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern 
Constitutions” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse 
(2002) 179 188. 
391
 Klein E “Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in 
Human Rights Discourse (2002) 145 150. 
392
 This idea is formulated in Kretzmer D “Human Dignity in Israeli Jurisprudence” in Kretzmer D & Klein E 
(eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 161 170.  See also Klein E “Human 
Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer D & Klein E (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights 
Discourse (2002) 145 150; Davis D & Woolman S “The Last Laugh: Du Plessis v De Klerk, Classical 
Liberalism, Creole Liberalism and the Application of Fundamental Rights under the Interim and Final 
Constitution” (1996) SAJHR 361 363, 391, 396. 
393
 The term “genital torture” is used in para 40. The argument that there was no real harm appears in para 38.  
Laskey involved a group of homosexual men who performed genital torture on one another for sexual pleasure. 
394
 Du Plessis calls this a “slippery slope”.  Du Plessis L “Affirmation and Celebration of the ‘Religious Other’ 
in South Africa’s Constitutional Jurisprudence on Religious and Related Rights: Memorial Constitutionalism in 
Action?” (2008) African Human Rights Law Journal 376 399. 
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The permissible degree of harm will become relative and the boundaries blurred.  It is for this 
reason that the judge in Laskey looks at the potential harm of the objectifying treatment and 
not just the actual harm that ensued from it.
395
  Well aware of the risk of ‘opening of the 
floodgates’ he states, “[t]his House must therefore consider the possibility that these activities 
are practised by others and by others who are not so controlled or responsible as the 
appellants are claiming to be.”396 
Allowing certain forms of commodification can also have this ‘floodgate’ effect.  Radin calls 
this the domino effect.  The domino effect “assumes that the commodified and non-
commodified versions of some interactions cannot coexist”.397  She uses the examples of 
surrogacy and blood donation that are referred to above.
398
  The elements of solidarity and 
interdependence of the altruistic action disappear when money comes into play because this 
‘gift’ of surrogacy or blood is now merely the equivalent of giving a sum of money.399  
Likewise commercialising sex through prostitution and peepshows can detract from the 
intimate and social nature of sex within a loving relationship.
400
   
The counterargument to this caution against ‘opening the floodgates’ is that some forms of 
objectification have in fact already been allowed; such as labour.  The employee is used 
purely as a means to an end, i.e. to earn money.  Yet, although labour has been recognised as 
a form of objectification, it is nevertheless allowed.
401
   
The flaws in the “domino effect”-theory are clear from the example of childcare.  The fact 
that au paring commodifies caring for a child does not detract from the intimate and loving 
nature of caring between a mother and a child.
402
  
4 4 Does freedom itself allow consent? 
4 4 1 There is no residual right to freedom 
Regardless of the three abovementioned grounds in favour of prohibiting consent to 
objectification, a person will only be permitted to consent if freedom itself allows it.  Yet, 
before asking whether the right to freedom allows consent to objectifying treatment, it is 
                                                     
395
 Laskey summary, para 21. 
396
 This quote is taken from para 20.  See also para 21. 
397
 Radin MJ “Market-inalienability” (1987) Harvard Law Review 1849 1913. 
398
 1913.  Radin uses this example of blood donation.  The example of surrogacy is used in 4 1 2. 
399
 1914. 
400
 1913. 
401
 Fritz N “Crossing Jordan: Constitutional Space for (UN) Civil Sex?” (2004) i 230 244. 
402
 244.  Fritz uses the examples of cooking, sewing and painting. 
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critical to determine whether such a right does in fact exist.  As explained in the previous 
chapter, the majority in Ferreira decided against such a right and this is now regarded as 
settled law.
403
   
However, another contention that has already been discussed is that a residual freedom right 
can in fact be found within human dignity.  It can also be argued that although individual 
freedom does not exist as a constitutional right, the right to consent can be found within the 
value of freedom.  As values, both dignity and freedom assist in developing the common law 
and, as has already been explained, consent to objectification can be regarded as a contract.
404
  
Since the law of contract is governed by the common law, which is in turn developed by 
freedom as a value, contractual autonomy might be regarded as a manifestation of this value 
as a kind of residual right to choose.  
4 4 2 Freedom does not allow it 
 If it is accepted that a right to freedom does in fact exist; either as a residual freedom right 
manifesting section 11(1) of the Constitution, a quasi-right found within the value of freedom 
or the right to human dignity; it still needs to be established whether this right would allow 
consent to objectifying treatment.  As concluded in Chapter 3, it is at this stage necessary to 
define freedom positively.
405
  Positive freedom is not simply freedom from outside 
intervention by other people.
406
  To be truly free a person has to live freely according to 
moral law and ethical duties.
407
  It is this kind of freedom that should be guaranteed by our 
Constitution.  Granted that in the Kantian Kingdom of Ends the individual cannot be forced 
to live in accordance with moral law, it should be kept in mind that this Kingdom is merely 
an ideal.
408
  As explained, the realities of our modern world force the state to implement rules 
                                                     
403
 See 3 2 2 3; Michelman F “Freedom by any Other Name? A Comparative Note on Losing Battles While 
Winning Wars” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid 
Legal Order (2008) 91 91. 
404
 S39(2) of the Constitution. 
405
 See 3 3. 
406
 This is negative freedom as defined in Berlin I “Two Concepts of Liberty” in Harris H (ed) Liberty: 
Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty (2002) 166 169. 
407
 See the discussion on this in 3 3. Starck calls this “moral autonomy”.  Starck C “The Religious and 
Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern Constitutions” in Kretzmer D & Klein E 
(eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (2002) 179 182, 183.  See also Du Bois F 
“Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom 
and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 120. 
408
 This idea is first mentioned in 2 4 4. 
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in order to ensure that the choices people make are in accordance with moral law and in this 
way secure freedom.
409
 
People have to live according to moral law, because they are part of society.  This realm of 
ends, in which Kant describes dignity and freedom, is nothing more than an ideal society.
410
  
Ackermann J adopts this idea when he writes that the residual right to freedom “must 
therefore not be thought to be premised on a concept of the individual as being in heroic and 
atomistic isolation from the rest of humanity, or the environment, for that matter.”411  This 
positive freedom emphasises the idea that the right to freedom should not simply be a right to 
do whatever one likes, but should incorporate this reality that all individuals are part of 
society and interdependent.
412
   
Contrary to this, the idea that moral law is now found within constitutional values is 
explained in Chapter 6.
413
  Accordingly, actions that comply with the Constitution, comply 
with moral law and consent may only be limited in terms of the limitation clause.
414
 
It is nevertheless argued that the right to freedom, as recognised within the rights to human 
dignity and privacy, is given a very specific and restricted meaning.  It is therefore necessary 
to examine these cases in order to determine whether constitutional freedom does in fact 
allow consent to objectification.  Freedom within human dignity has been defined as the 
freedom of self-development.
415
  This is the freedom to develop one’s personality and skills, 
to fulfil one’s own humanness.416  In Dawood it is referred to as the freedom to make choices 
                                                     
409
 For more on rules to ensure freedom, see 3 3.  See also Cornell D “Bridging the Span Toward Justice: Laurie 
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411
 Ferreira para 52. 
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economic Rights” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid 
Legal Order (2008) 149 159, 160. Cornell D “Bridging the Span Toward Justice: Laurie Ackermann and the 
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Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 18 28.  Du Bois discusses the idea that no law can ensure 
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&Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 129.  
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 See 6 2 1. 
414
 S36 of the Constitution.  NCGLE para 136. 
415
 Radin MJ “Market-inalienability” (1987) Harvard Law Review 1849 1899. 
416
 Ferreira paras 49 & 50.  This includes the freedom to develop one’s talents. 
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that are “defining, central, life-shaping, [and] significant”.417  These definitions incorporate 
human dignity and are therefore in harmony with the purpose of the Constitution.  In the past 
the absence of freedom for black people was a denial of their right to be fully human.
418
   It is 
therefore illogical to assume that choices that are in conflict with the inherent human worth of 
the individual will be authorised by a constitutional right to freedom, since a principal 
objective of our Constitution is to remedy these wrongs of the past. 
This is the fear in Ferreira; that by allowing a residual right to freedom such choices will be 
allowed.  The court refers specifically to the Lochner-case in which people were permitted to 
make choices to their own disadvantage.  Ackermann J assures the court that a residual right 
to freedom will not lead to a repeat of the Lochner situation.
419
  He reasons that any 
limitations to freedom that might be necessary to prevent a similar outcome will be justified 
by the limitation clause.
420
  Surely the prohibition of consent to objectifying treatment can be 
seen as an attempt to prevent an outcome similar to that of Lochner, especially where unequal 
bargaining power exists.  
On the contrary, even consent to objectifying treatment can be in pursuit of personal 
development and the fulfillment of humanness.    Where a monetary reward is given in 
exchange for consent, the argument is that the money might be necessary in order to achieve 
self-development and fulfillment.    The counter-argument is however that in such cases the 
monetary reward might indicate economic coercion, which leads to invalid consent. 
4 5 Invalid consent 
De Schutter claims, “the fact that [someone] exercised a choice does not indicate a lack of 
compulsion”.421  Even if dignity is not regarded as supreme to freedom and freedom does 
allow consent to objectification, consent thereto should still be genuine for it to constitute an 
act of freedom.  This emphasis on the fact that consent should be given freely is quite 
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 Michelman refers to Dawood in Michelman F “Freedom by any Other Name? A Comparative Note on 
Losing Battles While Winning Wars” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and 
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 Para 65. 
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 De Schutter O “Waiver of Rights and State Paternalism under the European Convention on Human Rights” 
(2000) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 481 493. 
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common in this context, as it is often hard to believe that a person would really desire a 
violation of his dignity.
422
 
De Schutter identifies four conditions for the valid waiver of a right. These conditions can 
also be applied in this context and resemble the conditions for consensus in the South African 
contract law.
423
  As mentioned above, contract law is referred to in this regard since consent 
to objectifying treatment is often likened to a contract between two parties.  The notion of 
contractual freedom is therefore used as a defence in favour of consenting.
424
  The four 
conditions are: consent should be given freely; consent should be unequivocal;
425
 the 
consenting individual should be sufficiently well informed; and consent should not be counter 
to an important public interest. The first three conditions are essential to establishing genuine 
consent.   
In respect of the first condition, consent cannot be given freely where factors such as unequal 
bargaining power, coercion, duress or undue influence are present.
426
  The classic model of a 
contract found in South African common law, is based on the notion of equal bargaining 
power.
427
  However, in South Africa unequal bargaining power often exists.
428
  When the 
constitutional values are applied to the common law, the value of human dignity demands 
that the common law be developed in opposition to unequal bargaining power.
429
  The fact 
that people have power over each other’s lives can therefore not be ignored because when 
this power is abused it leads to undue influence and coercion, which is in conflict with human 
dignity.
430
  Dwarf-tossing and prostitution are examples of situations where unequal 
                                                     
422
 See for example Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 217 
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425
 Be it express or tacit. 
426
 Gavison R “Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction” (1992) 45:1 Stanford Law Review 1 8-9, 17. 
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 Bhana D & Pieterse M “Towards a Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and 
Afrox Revisited” (2005) SALJ 865 883. 
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 884. See also Wood AW “Human Dignity, Right and the Realm of Ends” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & 
Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 47 63. 
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 Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) 
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430
 For the idea that some people have power over others’ lives, see Barrett J “Dignatio and the Human Body” 
(2005) SAJHR 525 535.  Bhana and Pieterse discuss the fact that this leads to coercion in Bhana D & Pieterse M 
“Towards a Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and Afrox Revisited” (2005) 
SALJ 865 884. 
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bargaining power might exist, since the consenter is usually in a weaker financial position in 
such situations.
431
 
The Kantian Kingdom of Ends also prohibits coercion due to unequal bargaining power.
432
  
When the setting of an end is coerced it undermines the idea of freedom.
433
  Economic 
coercion is probably the most prominent form of coercion with respect to consenting to 
objectifying treatment.
434
  The contention is that prostitutes and dwarfs consent to 
objectification for financial support and that no one would consent to prostitution or dwarf-
tossing without monetary compensation.
435
  It is therefore easier for someone who lacks 
financial support to be objectified.
436
 This confirms the notion that permission to such 
consent is at odds with the idea of inherent dignity and worth, regardless of class or socio-
economic status. 
Undue influence, as the other possible consequence of unequal bargaining power, equally 
undermines the first condition of genuine consent; that consent should be given freely.  In 
such cases people are not forced to consent to objectifying treatment, yet they make certain 
choices due to some or other influence.  Again the offer of a monetary reward comes into 
play.  Sometimes a monetary incentive causes someone, who does not need the money for 
survival, to consent to objectification. In these instances the incentive is considered to unduly 
influence, rather than coerce.  An example of this is can be found in Laskey, where 
adolescents were not forced to participate in sadomasochism but were unduly influenced by 
the older men and the monetary reward they offered.
437
  A person might often be unaware of 
the outside influences on their choices.
438
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 With prostitution the unequal power might also be due to the unequal social positions of men and women in 
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Rights Law Reporter 217. 
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The condition that consent should be unequivocal in order to be genuine requires absolute 
certainty that the individual consented to the objectifying treatment.
439
 
The last condition, which is relevant to this discussion, is that the consent should be 
informed.
440
  The individual should be informed about his right not to be subjected to 
objectifying treatment and about the long term consequences of his consent.
441
  This may 
require the presence of a lawyer to explain everything to him before he makes a decision.
442
  
Furthermore, the individual should have the capacity to understand his choice.
443
  In Laskey 
the court expressed doubt as to whether an adolescent has the capacity to make and 
understand the choice to participate in sadomasochism.
444
   
Radin introduces what she calls the “best possible coercion-avoidance mechanism” in order 
to ensure genuine consent.
445
  Her principal focus is on economic coercion, yet her theory can 
be reformulated to apply to all factors that hinder genuine consent.  The theory is that when a 
person consents to objectifying treatment under circumstances that raise suspicion as to 
whether the consent was coerced, such consent should be banned.  The banning is justified by 
the contention that one can never really be certain whether the consent was coerced.  The risk 
of harm to the person who consents and the difficulty of scrutinising every case of consent to 
objectification outweigh the possible harm to those whose consent was in fact not coerced.
446
 
4 6 Conclusion 
The grounds for the approach that the individual cannot and should not consent to 
objectifying treatment have been set out in this chapter.  It has been contended that dignity is 
supreme to freedom and would therefore trump freedom whenever they are in conflict.  As an 
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absolute right, dignity cannot be violated, waived, lost or sold.  Even if dignity and freedom 
were equal the dignity of the community would trump the freedom of the individual.   
It has also been argued that all forms of objectification should be prohibited, as the allowance 
of some, less harmful forms might result in an opening of the floodgates effect.  The idea that 
constitutional freedom itself might not allow objectification and that even if it does, the 
consent might not be genuine has also been introduced. 
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CHAPTER 5 
OBJECTIFYING TREATMENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED DESPITE 
INVALID CONSENT 
5 1 Allowing objectification despite invalid consent 
The second perspective on the tension between dignity and freedom, in terms of consent to 
objectifying treatment, will be considered in this chapter.  Followers of this perspective 
believe that although consent to objectification might not always be valid, circumstances 
often demand that it be allowed nonetheless. 
5 2 Reasons for invalid consent 
In the previous chapter the requirements for valid consent were discussed.
447
  Consequently, 
the grounds for invalid consent, as inferred from these requirements, will be discussed.  Two 
requirements for valid consent are of particular importance here.  They are, consent can only 
be given by an informed individual and consent should be given freely.  The converse of 
these two requirements as grounds for invalid consent should therefore be considered.   
The requirement that consent be given by an informed individual implies that consent will be 
invalid if the individual is uninformed about the consequences of consenting or does not have 
the capacity to understand it.  Consent under such circumstances cannot be valid, since the 
individual might not have consented to the treatment had he been aware of and understood 
the true nature and consequences of such consent.   
Furthermore, while the consenting individual may be informed he might nevertheless be 
coerced or unduly influenced.  The requirement that consent be given freely implies, 
undoubtedly, that coerced or unduly influenced consent will be invalid.  As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the promise of some kind of reward is a very common type of coercion or 
undue influence in this context.
448
  This includes inconspicuous examples such as the mere 
promise of acceptance in the form of adolescent peer pressure or what is called in modern 
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slang, ‘to put out’.  Putting out describes the sexual favours a woman often feels obligated to 
perform when a man buys her dinner or expensive gifts.
449
   
Such rewards in kind are often overlooked, due to the difficulty in discerning whether or not 
the choices were coerced.  Monetary rewards, on the other hand, are more readily 
disapproved of.  As explained in Chapter 4, prostitution, peepshows and dwarf-tossing are 
prominent examples of coercion or undue influence for monetary reward.
450
   
I deal with coercion and undue influence together because their repercussions are similar.  
There is however one big difference between the two concepts, which can be deduced from 
their brief definition in Chapter 4.
451
  The individual is coerced when he has no other choice 
but to consent.
452
  Prostitution is often used as an example in this regard.
453
 Thomson 
explains, “unemployment, discrimination and low-paying jobs force women to turn to 
prostitution to escape poverty”.454  The individual, therefore, consents to the objectifying 
treatment in order to survive.
455
  Capitalism and patriarchy are often blamed for the fact that 
poor women turn to prostitution.  These systems discriminate against women by ensuring that 
vocations designated as “women’s work” are habitually unrecognised and underpaid.  
Consequently, prostitution is the only vocation in which women as a group are paid more 
than men.
456
   The same arguments apply to other forms of economic coercion.  In 
Wackenheim the appellant argued that dwarf-tossing is the only job he was able to secure for 
himself, since dwarfs are not readily employed elsewhere.
457
 
                                                     
449
 Similar rewards in kind in exchange for sexual favours are discussed in S v Jordan and Others 2002 (1) SA 
797 (T) para 800H-I.  In the Constitutional Court judgment judges O’Regan J and Sachs J support this idea that 
rewards in kind is considered less objectionable when they find that the prohibition on prostitution should not be 
applied where the payment was made in kind; Jordan para 48.  This topic is also discussed in 6 4 3. 
450
 See 4 5.  Only the examples of dwarf tossing and prostitution are mentioned here. 
451
 See 4 5. 
452
 This idea that prostitution is the only available option available to some people and that they ‘choose’ the 
vocation due to economic coercion is referred to in South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: 
Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 220. 
453
 See South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 
107 (2009) 134, 169, 172, 179, 197. 
454
 Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 217 235. 
455
 222-223. 
456
 234-235.  This idea that a woman’s choices are dictated by her “gender position in society” is also addressed 
in South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 
(2009) 28 192. 
457
 Wackenheim 3. 
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A person who succumbs to undue influence, unlike one who is coerced, has other alternatives 
but is influenced to make a certain decision.
458
  They consider the monetary reward to be of 
more value than the protection of their human dignity.
459
  The prospect of a sizeable income 
prompts women to choose prostitution over low-paying, monotonous labour.
460
  Prostitution 
also offers several other benefits, which might not be available in low-paying jobs.
461
  These 
benefits include immediate financial relief and flexible working-hours.
462
 
Undue influence as an alternative to coercion is examined in a Discussion Paper by the South 
African Law Reform Commission (SALRC).  In this discussion paper it is contended that 
although prostitutes may have been influenced by socio-economic circumstances, their 
individual autonomy still plays a part.  Their choices reflect their individual characteristics 
and personalities, for “[n]ot all persons who are poor or who seek to increase their income 
make the decision to work as prostitutes.”463 
The focus of this chapter will be on instances of consent to objectifying treatment due to 
economic necessity, i.e. the promise of a monetary reward as a means of coercion. 
5 3 Addressing the cause instead of the consequence 
A crucial question, in this context, is whether the protection against coercion would really be 
more beneficial to the individual, than the freedom to consent to the violation of his dignity in 
exchange for something that he deems more important.
464
  In an ideal world no form of 
coercion or undue influence would be allowed.  This is evident from the Kantian Kingdom of 
Ends, an example of such a world.  In this Kingdom no end can be coerced.
465
  As a matter of 
                                                     
458
 On undue influence in respect of prostitution, see South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: 
Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 167. 
459
 This is explained in Fritz N “Crossing Jordan: Constitutional Space for (UN) Civil Sex?” (2004) SAJHR 230 
240-241, 246; De Schutter O “Waiver of Rights and State Paternalism under the European Convention on 
Human Rights” (2000) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 481 494.  
460
 South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 
(2009) 32, 167, 168; Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 
217 232. 
461
 Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 217 238. 
462
 South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 
(2009) 27, 32, 185, 168; Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 
217 226.  For further benefits, see the discussion of the potential benefits of allowing objectification, in 6 3 6. 
463
 South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 
(2009) 28, 192. 
464
 This question is raised in De Schutter O “Waiver of Rights and State Paternalism under the European 
Convention on Human Rights” (2000) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 481 494. 
465
 See Wood AW “Human Dignity, Right and the Realm of Ends” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois 
F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 47 59, 64. 
Stellenbosch University   http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 88 
fact, it has been asserted that in an ideal world objectifying treatment would be against human 
flourishing, whether coerced or not, and the prohibition thereof freedom enhancing.
466
   
However, the reality remains that we live in a non-ideal world.
467
  In South Africa people do 
consent to objectifying treatment out of necessity or the belief that it is the “least worst 
alternative”.468  The only way of preventing this coerced consent is to address the 
circumstances that foster it, as would be the case in an ideal world.
469
    
Economic coercion due to necessity would not occur in such a world, as the socio-economic 
needs of each individual would be fulfilled.  The lack of such fulfilment is a primary reason 
for economic coercion in South Africa.  A large-scale redistribution of wealth would be 
necessary in order to fulfil these needs in our world.
470
  Although dignity and freedom oblige 
the state to grant socio-economic rights and provide the necessary conditions for its exercise, 
this is impossible to achieve in our non-ideal world.
471
     
Therefore, the current solution to the problem cannot be the prohibition of consent. To simply 
prohibit the individual from consenting, without providing her with the monetary 
compensation she would have received and so desperately needs, would just be 
hypocritical.
472
   
                                                     
466
 For the idea limitations on freedom might be freedom enhancing, see Fritz N “Crossing Jordan: 
Constitutional Space for (UN) Civil Sex?” (2004) SAJHR 230 24.  Radin discusses the fact that the prohibition 
of such consent may be against human flourishing.  Radin MJ “Market-inalienability” (1987) Harvard Law 
Review 1849 1903. 
467
 Fritz explains that South Africa has a “non-ideal circumstances”.  Fritz N “Crossing Jordan: Constitutional 
Space for (UN) Civil Sex?” (2004) SAJHR 230 241. 
468
 230.  For the notion that people consent due to economic necessity, see Bhana D & Pieterse M “Towards a 
Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and Afrox Revisited” (2005) SALJ 865 885.   
469
 See Radin MJ “Market-inalienability” (1987) Harvard Law Review 1849 1917. 
470
 Radin MJ “Market-inalienability” (1987) Harvard Law Review 1849 1910, 1911; South African Law Reform 
Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 26, 31, 150, 161.  The 
fact that a redistribution of wealth will be necessary is mention in 3 3. 
471
 With reference to the duty dignity places on the state, see 2 4 2.  McCrudden explains this duty with specific 
reference to unemployment.  McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” 
(2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 700.  See also Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice 
Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 217 247.  For the idea that the right to freedom places a duty on 
the state to assist with socio-economic needs, see Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-
Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 118.  
Radin explains that the fulfilment of each individual’s socio-economic rights is unachievable.  Radin MJ 
“Market-inalienability” (1987) Harvard Law Review 1849 1911.  See also South African Law Reform 
Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 26, 31, 226.  The 
SALRC refers to a Statistics South Africa Labour Force survey that records the staggering unemployment rate 
in South Africa. 
472
 Radin introduces this concept of “transitional measures” in Radin MJ “Market-inalienability” (1987) 
Harvard Law Review 1849 1877, 1911, 1917.  See below for a comprehensive explanation of her example of the 
transitional measures with regard to monetary damages in tort law.  For criticism of prohibition in non-ideal 
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Radin provides an example to illustrate this.  She refers to a mother who works as a prostitute 
in order to feed her children.  It cannot be reasonable to prohibit her from commodifying her 
sexuality without providing her with the means to support her children.  This would force the 
mother “to endure a devastating loss in her primary relationship (with her children) rather 
than in the secondary one (with the personal thing) she is willing to sacrifice to protect the 
primary one.”473 
At the moment the state cannot fulfil the socio-economic needs of each individual.  The state 
is, therefore, not in the position to address the root of the coercion.
474
  The ideal measures that 
would have been taken in an ideal world to avoid coercion cannot be implemented in our 
current non-ideal circumstances.  Until such time as the ideal measures can be implemented, 
transitional measures are necessary.  These transitional measures might be regarded as 
harmful in an ideal world, but it is the best alternative for the moment.
475
   
A popular example of how non-ideal transitional measures are already implemented in law is 
the granting of monetary compensation in the law of delict.  This structure is often criticised 
for its inability to actually compensate for the loss of the victim.  It is however necessary to 
apply these measures during the transition to an improved system, since denying money 
damages in the absence of an alternative system would compound the injury of the victim.
476
 
5 4 Transitional measures 
Transitional measures in this regard would include permitting economically coerced consent 
to objectifying treatment.  I will explain this measure and the suggested implementation 
thereof in the context of prostitution.
477
  The example of prostitution is used, because some 
countries have already implemented this non-ideal transitional measure in terms of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
circumstances, see in Fritz N “Crossing Jordan: Constitutional Space for (UN) Civil Sex?” (2004) SAJHR 
230 240-241. 
473
 Radin MJ “Market-inalienability” (1987) Harvard Law Review 1849 1911. 
474
 South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 
(2009) 26, 31. 
475
 Radin MJ “Market-inalienability” (1987) Harvard Law Review 1849 1915.  
476
 1877. 
477
 The SALRC refers to two forms of prostitution: Indoor and Outdoor prostitution.  These two forms of 
prostitution will not be discussed separately, since this section serves merely as a broad overview of suggested 
transitional measures to be applied in general.  Furthermore it is not necessary to provide such a detailed 
analysis of the different forms of prostitution as this is not a thesis on prostitution as such.  For the difference 
between these two forms, see South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution 
Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 45-78. 
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prostitution.  Valuable insight can therefore be gained from their experience.  The 
Netherlands is most renowned for its tolerance and consequent acceptance of prostitution.
478
 
Paramount to the implementation of transitional measures is the concession that people will 
consent to objectification regardless of whether it is allowed. This has often been stressed in 
terms of prostitution.
479
   Prostitution is dubbed the world’s oldest profession and, despite its 
illegality, remains accessible to, and practised by, many.
480
  This is evident from a Dutch 
statistical analysis performed in 1999 indicating that an estimated one in four men 
occasionally or regularly visits prostitutes.
481
 
However, the transitional measures regarding prostitution do not merely involve the 
decriminalisation thereof, but also include some critical regulatory measures.
482
  The purpose 
of these basic measures is to set certain perimeters for allowing coerced consent.
483
   In this 
way the prostitute can receive the money she needs and still be protected by strict regulations 
from further harm or infringement.  Regulations therefore serve to restrict the extent of the 
violation.
484
  
As established in Makwanyane, a person does not lose his right to human dignity when he 
consents to the violation thereof.
485
  A mother desperate to feed her family should not be 
condemned for her subsequent consent to objectification.  Instead, her rights should be 
                                                     
478
 Prostitution was legalised in terms of art 250a of the Dutch Penal code as amended in 2000.  Another country 
which has applied this concept of regulated tolerance is Germany, see South African Law Reform Commission 
Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 125-126, 176. 
479
 Brants argues that prostitution should be accepted as a social fact and regulated.  Brants C “The Fine Art of 
Regulated Tolerance: Prostitution in Amsterdam” (1998) Journal of Law and Society 621 622. 
480
 This idea is reflected in the Dutch policy as set out in the Penal Code as amended in 2000, see South African 
Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 125.   
481
 This statistic is quoted by Dutch politician, Halsema, as referred to in Pakes F “Tolerance and Pragmatism in 
the Netherlands: Euthanasia, Coffeeshops and Prostitution in the ‘Purple Years’, 1994-2002” (2003) 
International Journal of Police Science & Management 217 225. 
482
 Interestingly, various human rights groups support this decriminalisation and regulation of prostitution, i.e. 
the Centre for Applied legal Studies (CALS), Sex Worker Education & Advocacy Taskforce (SWEAT), the 
Women’s Legal Centre (WLC), People opposing Women Abuse (POWA), the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), 
Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre to End Violence Against Women (TLAC), the Commission on Gender 
Equality (CGE), the Gay and Lesbian Coalition and Sexual Harassment Education Project (SHEP); see South 
African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 
188. 
483
 Fritz calls this “incomplete commodification”, in Fritz N “Crossing Jordan: Constitutional Space for (UN) 
Civil Sex?” (2004) SAJHR 230 241.   
484
 For the idea that legalisation and regulation will protect the prostitute from degradation and danger, see 
Radin MJ “Market-inalienability” (1987) Harvard Law Review 1849 1924. This will limit exploitation, see Fritz 
N “Crossing Jordan: Constitutional Space for (UN) Civil Sex?” (2004) SAJHR 230 245.  See also South African 
Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 192. 
485
 Paras 137, 142-143. 
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respected nonetheless and the extent of the violation limited in such non-ideal circumstances, 
where the prohibition of the violation itself does not constitute a solution.
486
 
Through the regulation of prostitution the state gains more control over it and is able to better 
address the dangers thereof.
487
  Regulation can also ensure the safety of prostitutes. In The 
Netherlands brothels are monitored by the police, as well as the building authority and fire 
service.  Brothels are regularly inspected to ensure that they comply with various building 
and safety regulations.
488
  Street prostitutes, on the other hand, are protected by police in 
plainclothes, as well as fellow prostitutes.  These policemen keep watch in the streets where 
the prostitutes are stationed.  As soon as a prostitute gets into the car of a potential client a 
fellow prostitute takes down the car’s registration number.  If the prostitute stays away for too 
long, she hands the number over to the authorities.
489
  These and other safety regulations 
ensure a low crime incidence committed against prostitutes.
490
 
By allowing prostitution the fear of stigmatisation and prosecution is removed.
491
  This 
provides prostitutes with the prerogative to report violence and corruption.
492
  In countries 
where prostitution is a criminal offence prostitutes have no such opportunity.  When a client 
refuses to pay, they are exploited or molested on the job.
493
  As explained in Jordan, even the 
actions of policemen are sometimes reprehensible: “[b]eing a so-called victimless crime, 
                                                     
486
 See Jordan para 74. 
487
 Fritz N “Crossing Jordan: Constitutional Space for (UN) Civil Sex?” (2004) SAJHR 230 231.  For the idea of 
control through legalisation, see Brants C “The Fine Art of Regulated Tolerance: Prostitution in Amsterdam” 
(1998) Journal of Law and Society 621 629. In Jordan para 87 the appellants argued that legalisation helps 
identify dangers.  See also South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution 
Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 196, 198, 205. 
488
 See, Brants C “The Fine Art of Regulated Tolerance: Prostitution in Amsterdam” (1998) Journal of Law and 
Society 621 631. 
489
 This is explained in Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 
217 245. 
490
 This is true for Nevada, see Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law 
Reporter 217 242.  Thompson refers to the Nevada Revised Statutes (1997) and the Nevada Administrative 
Code (1998).  Brothel owners might also be held liable if a client is infected with HIV after a prostitute has 
tested positive for the virus. 
491
 This is said with regard to the decriminalisation of sodomy in NCGLE 28, 109.  The justice system will also 
be relieved of policing and penalising all these prostitutes.  South African Law Reform Commission Sexual 
offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 179, 188, 194.  Those who criticise this 
opinion are of the view that the stigma against prostitution is not dependent on the criminalisation thereof, see 
the discussion in 6 3 6. 
492
 South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 
(2009) 22. 
493
 Jordan para 32; Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 
217 240.  This increases the abuse and violation toward prostitutes, see South African Law Reform Commission 
Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 21-22, 26, 192. 
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evidence can usually only be obtained by egregious forms of entrapment, which fosters 
corruption.”494 
By eliminating this fear for prosecution and stigmatisation prostitutes can work in safer areas, 
since they are not forced to work in remote and dangerous places in order to avoid the 
authorities.
495
  They also have better access to rights and services as they do not fear the 
disclosure of their identities.
496
 
Regulations could also ensure safety in terms of health.  Health regulations in Nevada include 
regular mandatory testing for HIV and other Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STD's).  A 
person may not continue working as a prostitute if she tests positive for HIV; a disregard of 
this rule may result in a $10 000 fine or a ten year imprisonment.  The customer must always 
use a condom and brothel owners are required to put up health notices and report any diseases 
to the health authorities.  These regulations have ensured a zero percent HIV or STD 
infection rate for legal prostitutes in Nevada.
497
 
Regulations can protect vulnerable children and illegal immigrants by demanding that brothel 
owners check the prostitutes’ ID papers and working permits.498  A brothel owner who 
employs an illegal immigrant or a minor would be forced to close down.
499
  The SALRC 
explains that the allowance of prostitution does not involve the decriminalisation of other 
                                                     
494
 On these dire circumstances that prostitutes have to endure, see Jordan para 87. Thomson explains the many 
ways in which criminalisation ensures exploitation.  Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) 
Women’s Rights Law Reporter 217 240-241.  Thompson explains that due to the nature of the prostitution the 
prosecution thereof is very expensive.  These funds could rather be spent more productively.  See also South 
African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 
21-22, 179, 205; Brants C “The Fine Art of Regulated Tolerance: Prostitution in Amsterdam” (1998) Journal of 
Law and Society 621 630. 
495
 The fact that prostitutes are forces underground increases the risk of abuse, violence and corruption by the 
police, clients, pimps etc.  Allowing prostitution will therefore lower the crime incidence against prostitutes.  
South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 
(2009) 20, 21-22, 132, 179, 193, 196. 
496
 South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 
(2009) 20, 130, 179, 188, 189, 194, 214.  The SALRC provides a number of examples in this regard, i.e. the 
right to health care, “the right to legal protection against crimes” and social services. 
497
 See Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 217 242.  See 
also South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 
107 (2009) 81, 116, 127, 135, 198, 199, 205.  Thompson refers to the Nevada Revised Statutes (1997) and the 
Nevada Administrative Code (1998).  Brothel owners might also be held liable if a client is infected with HIV 
after a prostitute has tested positive for the virus. 
498
 These examples are provided in Brants C “The Fine Art of Regulated Tolerance: Prostitution in Amsterdam” 
(1998) Journal of Law and Society 621, 631. 
499
 631-632.  This would be the case if the employment was intentional.  See also South African Law Reform 
Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 127, 194.   
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related crimes such as abuse, forced prostitution, human trafficking and under-aged 
employment.
500
 
Regulations may also serve to protect public safety, by specifying designated areas where 
prostitutes may operate.  These areas may, for example, not be within 400 yards of any 
schools or churches.
501
  It is however contended that such zoning would violate a prostitute’s 
freedom of movement and induce stigma and social rejection.  The counterargument is that if 
prostitution is regarded as a vocation or a business, zoning would not constitute an unusual 
measure.
502
  An additional means of protecting the public might be to monitor or ban the 
advertisement thereof.
503
   
Another possible regulation is to criminalise the actions of the subsidiary role-players 
involved in prostitution, such as the clients, pimps, brothel owners and human traffickers. 
This suggestion is founded upon the notion that persons would only consent to prostitution as 
a result of force, coercion or undue influence and can therefore not be held accountable for 
their actions.   Subsequently, prostitution itself cannot be criminalised.  Instead, those who 
force, coerce or unduly influence the prostitutes are held responsible.  This kind of 
criminalisation also indicates an attempt to minimise demand for prostitution and reduce the 
said force, coercion or undue influence.
 504
 
A different approach to the regulation of prostitution might be to regard it as an ordinary job 
and regulate it accordingly.
505
  This would require that prostitutes receive certain rights, for 
                                                     
500
 South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 
(2009) 155, 186.  This argument is confirmed in the context of sodomy, where it is said that under-aged and 
non-consensual sodomy would still be criminalised.  NCGLE para 66. 
501
 See Brants C “The Fine Art of Regulated Tolerance: Prostitution in Amsterdam” (1998) Journal of Law and 
Society 621 630; Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 
217 242.  According to the SALRC other conditions may also be stipulated, such as the number, size and type of 
the brothels in the area.  South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion 
Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 127, 198, 199, 203, 208.  
502
 The fact that businesses are subject to zoning regulations is mentioned in South African Law Reform 
Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 221.  It is also referred 
to later in this section. 
503
 Fritz N “Crossing Jordan: Constitutional Space for (UN) Civil Sex?” (2004) SAJHR 230 241; South African 
Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 189. 
504
 The SALRC suggests this regulation as a separate possible approach to the legalisation of prostitution.  
Sweden (The Act Prohibiting the Purchase of Sexual Services (1998:408)) and Canada (Criminal Code, RSC 
1985, c C-46 ss210-213) follow this approach.  South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult 
Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) xii, 13, 22-23, 120, 174-175, 176-186, 234-237. This 
decriminalisation of prostitution would also make it easier to leave the profession, since they would not have a 
criminal record hindering their prospects of securing alternative employment. 
505
 Fritz compares prostitution with regulated legalised labour.  Fritz N “Crossing Jordan: Constitutional Space 
for (UN) Civil Sex?” (2004) SAJHR 230 245.  This is the situation in The Netherlands, see Brants C “The Fine 
Art of Regulated Tolerance: Prostitution in Amsterdam” (1998) Journal of Law and Society 621 629, 630.  The 
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example the right to belong to a union and the right to collective bargaining.  These rights 
would afford them the bargaining power that they presently lack.  The right to protection 
from sexual harassment would also apply to prostitution, as well as the right to fair labour 
practices.
506
  Labour legislation such as the Basic Conditions of Employment Act would 
prescribe basic conditions such as maximum hours, paid sick leave and paid maternity 
leave.
507
  While prostitution is prohibited this Act does not apply and prostitutes have no legal 
protection against unfair employment conditions.
508
   
If prostitution were treated akin to other vocations, all prostitutes would be able to obtain 
private health, disability and unemployment insurance.  They might also claim tax relief.
509
  
Specialised training courses could teach them money management and self-defence.
510
  
Another advantage would be that employment contracts, as well as legal contracts with 
clients, would be acknowledged.
511
 
Similarly, prostitution-related businesses, such as brothels, would be regulated like all other 
businesses.
512
  Areas of regulation would include planning and zoning, occupational health 
and safety and advertising.
513
  
Prostitutes and brothel owners may also be respectively required to register and apply for 
licenses.
514
  Circumstances in which brothel owners may be prohibited from applying for or 
                                                                                                                                                                     
SALRC refers to a number of countries that have in fact adopted this stance, such as Germany.  Reference is 
also made to an ECJ ruling that determines that “prostitution is labour in the full juridical sense.”  South African 
Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 84, 131, 
171, 189.  See also Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 
217 244. 
506
 South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 
(2009) 189. 
507
 75 of 1997.  Fritz N “Crossing Jordan: Constitutional Space for (UN) Civil Sex?” (2004) SAJHR 230 244-
245. Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 217 245. 
508
 Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 217 245.   
509
 These examples are mentioned in Thomson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights 
Law Reporter 127 217, 245; Fritz N “Crossing Jordan: Constitutional Space for (UN) Civil Sex?” (2004) SAJHR 
230 245.  See also South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion 
Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 155, 205; Brants C “The Fine Art of Regulated Tolerance: Prostitution in 
Amsterdam” (1998) Journal of Law and Society 621 629. 
510
 See Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 217 245.  
Prostitutes in The Netherlands, for example, have a financial consultancy organisation called Prosex, see Brants 
C “The Fine Art of Regulated Tolerance: Prostitution in Amsterdam” (1998) Journal of Law and Society 
621 629. 
511
 South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 
(2009) 155. 
512
 126. 
513
 189-190, 194, 221. 
514
 132, 198. 
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retaining a license may also be determined.
515
  Registration and licensing fees may be 
charged, as well as income tax.
516
   One objection to the registration of prostitutes is that it 
strips them of their anonymity, making them more prone to stigmatisation.
517
  The 
confidentiality of information regarding registered members is therefore crucial.  A 
counterargument to this objection, as referred to by the SALRC, is that “if a prostitute can 
enjoy the same advantages and disadvantages of a normal job by law and prostitution is 
recognised as a legal profession or job then there is no need to protect their privacy.”518 
This proposal that prostitution be regulated like any other job, suggests that simple vocational 
regulation constitutes a sufficient transitional system.  Every trade or industry has rules and 
regulations that are unique to its demands; this is referred to as self-regulation.
519
  
In The Netherlands, this decriminalisation of an action, in conjunction with the 
implementation of transitional measures, is called “regulated tolerance”.  Such tolerance is 
applied to matters in which dignity and freedom are in conflict and no consensus as to the 
solution to the problem can be reached.
520
  Brants explains that when the principle of 
“regulated tolerance” is applied to a situation, legalisation often follows since the moral 
attitude of the public is influenced by the non-intervention of the state.
521
  The legalisation of 
prostitution in The Netherlands could be attributed to this tendency.  However, this does not 
mean that the tolerance of something necessarily represents its legalisation.  Nonetheless, 
whether a tolerated action is legalised or not, the regulation thereof remains crucial.
522
   
There is of course much criticism against the regulation approach and its effectiveness in 
realising the anticipated benefits.  One objection is that the stigma relating to prostitution is 
                                                     
515
 127, 203, 204. Such as when a brothel owner has a criminal record or if a certain number of prostitutes in his 
employ are found to be on illegal substances. 
516
 132, 135, 142, 167, 205.  Countries can benefit from the tax received, as well as the money generated for the 
economy.  It is suggested that Thailand is so dependent on the money generated from prostitution that they 
tolerate its practise despite its illegality. 
517
 221. 
518
 206. Ackermann J confirms this idea that personal space and the application of the right to privacy shrinks in 
a working environment.  Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others 1996 (2) SA 751 para 67. 
519
 South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 
(2009) 186. 
520
 See Brants C “The Fine Art of Regulated Tolerance: Prostitution in Amsterdam” (1998) Journal of Law and 
Society 621 624, 625.  See also Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law 
Reporter 217 244.   
521
 Brants C “The Fine Art of Regulated Tolerance: Prostitution in Amsterdam” (1998) Journal of Law and 
Society 621 625. 
522
 629-630.  Brants remarks that the distinction between these two situations has become academic.  Tolerance 
without legalisation is merely a “symbol of moral disapproval”.  The terms legalisation and decriminalisation 
are also distinguished on that ground. 
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not diminished in countries where it is decriminalised and regulated.
523
  Another is that, in 
such countries many prostitutes still operate outside the regulations.
524
  There are three 
explanations for the latter occurrence.  The first is that prostitutes want to escape the controls 
that regulation imposes.  The second is that they do not want to be known as prostitutes and 
therefore prefer to stay underground and unregistered.
525
  Thirdly, they operate outside the 
regulations as the regulations are “incompatible with the coercive and abusive nature of 
prostitution”.526  The counterargument to these objections regards the notion of transitional 
measures.  Although imperfect, these measures beat the alternative, which is to simply 
prohibit prostitution, since there is no evidence that any law criminalising prostitution has 
ever deterred anyone from entering the profession.
527
  The New Zealand Government Report 
of the Prostitution Review Committee concluded: 
“[A]lthough many prostitutes are still vulnerable to exploitative employment practices, 
during the period of operation of the Act prostitution did not increase in size and many of 
the social evils predicted by those opposed to the decriminalisation of prostitution have 
not been experienced. On the whole the Act has been effective in achieving its purpose, 
and the Committee is confident that the vast majority of people involved in the sex 
industry are better off under the PRA than they were previously.”528 
As mentioned above, similar regulatory measures can be applied to other forms of 
economically coerced consent to objectification.  Often the most demeaning aspects of 
objectification can be addressed by way of tolerance and regulation, especially where the 
criminalisation thereof causes stigmatisation.  Dwarf-tossing can be used as an example of 
how these measures can be applied to other situations.  This pub sport is often played by 
drunken men.  Without regulation the sport will continue in private, unrestricted.  By 
allowing and regulating it safety measures can be implemented regarding, for example, 
protective wear, landing surfaces and the manner in which the dwarves are thrown. 
                                                     
523
 South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 
(2009) 166, 170, 222.  This is said in connection with the regulated tolerance in the Netherlands and the Cote 
d’Ivoire. 
524
 133-134, 206, 214. 
525
 206. 
526
 196. 
527
 The Western Cape Network on Violence Against Women supports this notion.  South African Law Reform 
Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 26, 189. 
528
 New Zealand Government Report of the Prostitution Review Committee (2008) 168.  The opinions of this 
Committee are discussed in South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution 
Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 159.  Prostitution was decriminalised in New Zealand by the 
Prostitution Reform Act of 2003. 
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5 5 Constitutional freedom 
When economically coerced consent to objectification is regulated properly, it might even be 
regarded as an act of freedom.
529
  Although her consent is coerced, a prostitute still makes a 
choice.
530
  She chooses the money.  She chooses to survive.  She chooses the higher salary 
above the low-paying monotonous job.  This is an act of freedom.  The individual is free 
when she can develop her own personality and skills.  However, development often requires 
money.  Skills are developed through education and training, which can be very expensive.  
Even books and equipment cost a fortune.  This makes it nearly impossible for a person to 
develop without choosing to earn money.   
Money can also offer independence and autonomy.
 531
  A person who is able to fulfil his own 
socio-economic needs is not bound to others for support.  To have money opens up a world of 
possibilities, because with money comes choice and power.  It is for this reason that receiving 
monetary reward for consent to objectification might be seen as a step toward freedom; the 
setting of an end. 
5 6 Conclusion 
In this chapter the tension between dignity and freedom has been approached from the 
perspective of socio-economic need. The argument has been advanced that consent to 
objectifying treatment should be allowed in certain instances in which the requirements for 
valid consent have not been met. It has been contended that invalid consent cannot be 
prevented without addressing the rationale behind it.  This is unachievable in our non-ideal 
world.  Transitional measures are therefore necessary.  This involves allowing and regulating 
invalid consent.  Moreover, when invalid consent is allowed and regulated as such it might 
even be regarded as a form of freedom. 
                                                     
529
 This section merely examines the correlation between economic coercion and freedom.  Consent to 
objectifying treatment might also be seen as freedom enhancing and beneficial on other grounds, especially 
where genuine consent is given.  This is examined in 6 3 6. 
530
 De Schutter O “Waiver of Rights and State Paternalism under the European Convention on Human Rights” 
(2000) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 481 493; Jordan para 17; South African Law Reform Commission 
Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 28, 192. 
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CHAPTER 6 
VALID CONSENT TO OBJECTIFYING TREATMENT SHOULD BE 
ALLOWED 
6 1 Dignity should not be regarded as supreme 
6 1 1 Counterarguments to the idea of a supreme dignity 
The third approach to the tension between dignity and freedom holds that individuals should 
be allowed to consent to objectifying treatment.  Since this approach stands in direct 
opposition to the approach examined in Chapter 4, it can be explained by reviewing the 
arguments in favour of the Chapter 4 approach and elaborating on its counterarguments.   
First of all, the perspective in this chapter supports a more expansive understanding of 
freedom and rejects the idea of a supreme dignity, as advocated in Chapter 4.
532
 In order to 
explain the grounds for this rejection, it is therefore necessary to review the arguments and 
counterarguments regarding a supreme dignity.  One of these grounds is that human dignity’s 
supremacy is partly based on its functions as a constitutional value.  As a value dignity is said 
to be the basis for all human rights, giving them weight and content and stipulating their 
limits.
533
  Dignity is also used to interpret these human rights.
534
  These functions are often 
cited to illustrate the supremacy of dignity over other rights. However, from a different view 
they simply demonstrate the relationship between all constitutional values and human rights.  
This is because these functions are not unique to the value of dignity; they are inherent to 
constitutional values in general.  They not only apply to human dignity in the Constitution but 
to all the constitutional values.
535
  This view thus emphasises the equality of all constitutional 
values.   
One function that has nonetheless been solely ascribed to dignity and is referred to in support 
of a supreme dignity is that it is applied as an objective normative value in the mediation of 
value conflicts.  The criticism of attributing this role to human dignity relates to the risks in 
giving dignity too much content.  As explained in Chapter 2, dignity can easily be 
                                                     
532
 See 4 1. 
533
 Ss7, 39, 36 of the Constitution. 
534
 S39. 
535
 See ss7, 36 & 39.  See also, the discussion on this topic in 3 4 2 1. 
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manipulated into a variety of meanings.
536
  This creates the risk that the state may use dignity 
as a paternalistic tool in pursuit of its own idea of dignity; consequently restricting 
freedom.
537
  The mere fact that dignity can be found on both sides of a dispute, in conflict 
with itself, is a clear indication of its manipulability. 
Such cases where dignity is found on both sides of a dispute point to another deficiency in 
using dignity in the mediation of value conflicts.
538
  In such circumstances dignity is in 
conflict with itself and can therefore not be used as mediator.  A more objective standard is 
needed to resolve the conflict.  
Should this unique function accordingly not be accredited to dignity, its functions would be 
identical to those of the other constitutional values.  As a result, freedom as a value cannot be 
subordinate to human dignity.
539
  
Another reason provided for the supreme status of dignity is that the Constitutional Court has 
conferred great value onto it by adopting a dignity-based jurisprudence.  There have been 
numerous attempts at explaining the Court’s preference for human dignity. These 
explanations include: firstly, that the Court borrowed its interpretation from one or more 
foreign countries.  Secondly, that the court based its interpretation on philosophical notions 
such as those of Kant.  Thirdly, that dignity is advanced due to its denial in the past.  The 
final explanation is that the Court’s preference reflects nothing more than a choice.  
Closer examination suggests that only this final explanation holds water.  With regard to the 
first explanation it is submitted in Chapter 2 that South African courts cannot simply adopt 
foreign interpretations of dignity, as each country has a unique manner of entrenching 
dignity. Our Constitution, for example, allows for the limitation of dignity as a right.  Dignity 
does not receive any special treatment, since its entrenchment is identical to that of the other 
rights and values.
540
 
The second explanation for the court’s dignity based jurisprudence, that the court based its 
interpretation on philosophical notions, does not necessarily place dignity on a higher level 
than freedom either.  The supreme status of dignity is largely derived from Kantian 
                                                     
536
 See 2 1. 
537
 Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-69. 
538
 See the discussion in 3 4 2 1. 
539
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540
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philosophy. Although Kant supports dignity, his notion thereof is largely libertarian.
541
  Kant 
suggests that freedom should be laid at the basis of any Constitution and all laws.
542
  It might 
even be argued that Kant supports the limitation of dignity rather than that of freedom.  He 
does describe an inviolable dignity, while limiting the idea of freedom by saying that it 
should be “consonant with a similar breadth of freedom to others”.543  However, when this 
‘limitation’ is considered logically it is evident that all rights are granted consonant with a 
similar breadth thereof for others.  This ‘limitation’, if at all regarded as such, therefore 
applies to all rights; including the right to human dignity. 
If dignity is advanced because of its past denial, as suggested by the third explanation, then 
freedom should likewise be advanced.  Ackermann J supports this idea, when he points out 
that a denial of dignity by the Apartheid state inevitably led to a similar denial of freedom.
544
 
The fourth explanation for the court’s dignity-based jurisprudence is that it simply reflects a 
choice.  The decision in Harksen v Lane NO and Others
545
 is a clear example of this choice.  
In his criticism of this case, Davis argues that due to this ‘choice’ dignity is used to determine 
the content of other values, instead of assigning to those values the substantive interpretation 
they demand.  Such an interpretation effectively renders these other constitutional values 
empty and redundant.  Davis points out that had this been the intention of the legislature, 
there would only have been one constitutional value.  In the context of equality he asks 
whether we are “now to conclude that when the Constitution spoke of three values it actually 
meant two.”546  Accordingly this ‘choice’ is not only unsubstantiated, it is also inconsistent 
with the Constitution. The Constitutional Court’s emphasis on dignity can therefore not 
justify its supreme status. 
Another contention in support of a supreme dignity is that dignity features prominently 
throughout the Constitution.  As mentioned in Chapter 3, so does freedom.
547
  In fact, in the 
                                                     
541
 See the discussion hereof in 3 1 2.  See also McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of 
Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 669. 
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 Davis D “Equality: The Majesty of Legoland Jurisprudence” (1999) SALJ 398 412. 
547
 See 3 4 2 1.  Freedom is given equal prominence in all the general provisions in support of dignity.  Du Bois 
F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom 
and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 112. 
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Bill of Rights, freedom appears more frequently than dignity.
548
  It has however been 
contended that freedom should not “play a prominent role [simply] because of its formalistic 
presence in the Constitution”.549  If this reasoning were to be applied, it should likewise apply 
to dignity.  Therefore, dignity should not gain prominence due to its abundant presence in the 
Constitution. 
The notion that dignity is inherent to all persons cannot be used in support of a supreme 
dignity either, as the same is said with regard to freedom.
550
  
As noted numerous times throughout this thesis, freedom can be found within human dignity.  
This is another critical counterargument against a supreme dignity.  Part of the definition of 
dignity reflects the definition of freedom.  In Ferreira Ackermann J states: 
“Human dignity has little value without freedom; for without freedom personal 
development and fulfilment are not possible. Without freedom, human dignity is little 
more than an abstraction. Freedom and dignity are inseparably linked. To deny people 
their freedom is to deny them their dignity.”551  
If freedom plays such a prominent role within dignity, it is improbable that dignity would 
play a more prominent role than freedom in the Constitution.  
Based on the above arguments, it could be contended that dignity is best seen as one 
important constitutional value amongst others, which should not be regarded as supreme in 
relation to other values like equality and freedom. 
6 1 2 Dignity can be waived 
In Chapter 4 the term ‘waiver’ was defined as consent to the disposal of a right.552  In terms 
of this definition dignity cannot be waived.  The disposal of something suggests that it is lost 
altogether and fundamental rights cannot be lost, even when violated.  Yet, waiver might also 
be defined as merely:  consent to the violation of a right.
553
  If dignity is not considered 
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 Currie & De Waal Define a waiver of a right as an agreement not to claim the benefits thereof, in Currie I & 
De Waal J “Application of the Bill of Rights” in The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2005) 39 39-40.  They 
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supreme and therefore inviolable, a person might actually be capable of waiving his own 
right to dignity in terms of this alternative definition.   
Another definition of waiver that would not result in the loss of the right altogether, involves 
the idea that it is merely the “right to exercise the fundamental right” which is waived.554 
These two alternatives definitions of waiver correspond with De Schutter’s reasoning that if a 
person has the right to be protected against the violation of his right, then he should also be 
free from the paternalistic imposition of its unwanted benefits.
555
  He nonetheless 
acknowledges the fact that no such specific right to waiver exists, but suggests three possible 
areas in which such a right might be found.
556
 
The first area is that of property law.  In this field a human right could be deemed the 
property of the right holder, with which he may do as he wishes.
557
  The second sphere in 
which the right to waiver may be situated is in the exercise of another right.  Here a person 
may waive his right “if the exercise of right x comes down to a renunciation of right y”.558  In 
this regard a person’s exercise of his right to freedom might come down to a renunciation of 
his right to human dignity.  This relates to the third possibility that the principle of freedom 
accommodates such a right to waiver.
559
 
The European Court of Human Rights has already acknowledged the fact that rights can be 
waived.
560
  This acknowledgement is made in reference to the right to have one’s case heard 
in public.  If one considers this decision, it becomes clear that some rights are in fact waived 
without any objection. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
concepts seems to lie in the fact that the former impacts upon the future exercise of a right, whereas the latter 
refers to action taken which negates the exercise of a right.  An example of the latter would be where an accused 
confesses to a crime, negating his right to remain silent.  Consent to objectification would more readily fall 
within the scope of a waiver.  One might however willingly participate in sadomasochism, subsequently 
negating one’s right to exercise one’s right to dignity.  This decision to participate could be seen as a decision 
not to exercise a right. 
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 De Schutter O “Waiver of Rights and State Paternalism under the European Convention on Human Rights” 
(2000) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 481 494. 
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The counterargument is that, even though some rights are waived without objection, other 
rights are too fundamental to waive.
561
  This is confirmed in the German peepshow case in 
which it was decided that despite their broad right to act, persons cannot act contrary to their 
own fundamental right to dignity.
562
  This argument is clearly based on the idea of a supreme 
human dignity. Currie and De Waal confirm this contention by averring that “many of the 
freedom rights may be waived as long as the subject does so clearly and freely and without 
being placed under duress or labouring under a misapprehension.” 563  In fact, one of the only 
rights that they do regard as ‘fundamental enough’ to prohibit its waiver is dignity.564  Such 
an argument, based solely on the idea of a supreme dignity, cannot hold water in a milieu 
where dignity and freedom are considered equal. 
6 2 Society is plural 
6 2 1 Plurality of morals 
In opposition to the argument in Chapter 4 that freedom should yield to communitarian 
dignity, it is contended that society is plural.  In Chapter 4 it is asserted that the individual’s 
notion of dignity should succumb to the community’s notion thereof.565  In this section it is 
however argued that where a person does not subjectively regard treatment as a violation of 
his human dignity, the treatment should not constitute a violation thereof.
566
 Consequently, 
the concerns surrounding the balancing of dignity and freedom or the waiving of rights 
disappear.  The question is, can each person decide for himself what constitutes a violation of 
his own dignity?  If so a person's dignity would not be violated if he did not experience it as 
such.  The answer to this question depends primarily on whether dignity is interpreted 
objectively or subjectively.
567
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It is discussed in Chapter 4 that since moral law is associated with dignity, the popular moral 
views of society are often used to determine the content of human dignity.
568
  This is justified 
by the idea of a shared public morality.
569
  Such a notion is, however, contrary to the plurality 
of worldviews in modern societies.
570
  If a shared public morality does not exist, then the 
popular moral views which are used to inform dignity in fact only represent the convictions 
of the majority.  Nonetheless, it is asserted that dignity may still be informed by these moral 
perceptions, since a state needs to govern from a specific moral point of view.
571
    The effect 
of applying this concept is that certain treatment might amount to a violation of dignity, 
regardless of whether the individual experiences it as such.   
It is however argued that, despite its relation to moral law, the morals of the majority cannot 
be used to interpret dignity.  Since the Constitution is founded upon moral law, public 
morality is now found within and limited to the constitutional text and spirit.
572
 Although 
decisions were therefore previously based on the moral views of the majority it should now 
be based on constitutional values.
573
  Other interpretations of dignity advocate that, contrary 
to the idea of a shared public morality, dignity itself has been interpreted to demand tolerance 
of differences.
574
  Such an interpretation suggests an obligation to allow or at the very least 
tolerate different ideas or moral views on human dignity, regardless of whether the state 
governs from that same moral point of view.  In fact the legislature is encouraged “to enact 
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laws which foster morality, but that morality must be one which is founded on our 
constitutional values”.575  This contradicts the argument in Chapter 4 that morality should be 
founded on dominant societal convictions.
576
  Accordingly, should dignity be interpreted as 
tolerant of difference, the individual’s definition of his own dignity should only be limited by 
the fact that it cannot interfere with the dignity of others.
577
  Those who do in fact consider a 
certain treatment to be against their subjective idea of morality and dignity have an equal 
right not to consent thereto.
578
 
When the content of dignity is solely determined by the moral ideas of the majority, it causes 
stigmatisation of the practices of the minority.
579
  This is evident from prostitution.
580
  It is 
said that prostitutes are stigmatised because of the criminalization of their vocation, in line 
with the moral views of the majority.  Stigmatisation is in itself a violation of human dignity, 
as it results in marginalisation and degradation. Accordingly, the prohibition of consent to sex 
work itself, which is believed to protect human dignity by outlawing objectifying treatment, 
violates the dignity of prostitutes.
581
     
Moreover, the practice of prostitution was only regarded as immoral long after it came into 
existence.
582
  This indicates the ever-changing morals of society.
583
  Another example in this 
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regard is that of sodomy.
584
  Within a few years the attitude toward the prohibition of sodomy 
changed radically.  Where at first it was considered a protection of human dignity, it is now 
seen as a violation thereof.
585
 To base the interpretation of a constitutional right on the morals 
of the majority at a given time therefore seems quite absurd.   
In order to prevent a situation in which the minority is disadvantaged, the right to dignity 
should subsequently not be influenced by the ever-changing morals of the society.  This is of 
particular importance in South Africa, since our Constitution requires an interpretation that 
prevents a recurrence of the past and its gross violations of human rights.
586
  During 
Apartheid the morals of the white community dominated; stigmatising and suppressing black 
people.  Stigmatisation and marginalisation of the minority should therefore be avoided in 
pursuit of human dignity. 
Tolerating different ideas on human dignity might even be beneficial to the state, as well as 
the person consenting and the society as a whole.  One of the benefits is that, by allowing an 
objectionable practice that the individual himself does not regard as such, the state is able to 
regulate the practice.
587
   
This conception, which the Dutch call regulated tolerance, is introduced in the previous 
chapter.
588
  This kind of tolerance does not necessarily indicate an acceptance of the practice, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Code of 1886) and in the USA it was accepted until the end of the 19
th
 century (the White-slave Traffic Act of 
1910).  South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 
107 (2009) 113, 125, 142.  
583
 See Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-47; Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative 
Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 117;  Cornell D “Bridging the Span Toward Justice: Laurie Ackermann and 
the Ongoing Architectonic of Dignity Jurisprudence” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) 
Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 18 19.  This idea that morals are ever changing is 
evident from the Dutch practice where as soon as something is tolerated, it does not take long before it is 
accepted and completely legalised.  See also NGCLE para 42.  Ackermann J acknowledges this changing morals 
of society in the context of sodomy. 
584
 Woolman discusses how our ideas regarding sodomy have changed.  Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, 
Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-
1 36-49. 
585
 NCGLE paras 26, 28, 107. 
586
 See Makwanyane 329. 
587
 By prohibiting an objectionable practice all control is lost.  Precedence shows that certain practices do not 
cease merely because they are prohibited.  Prohibiting dwarf tossing and prostitution merely results in its 
practice outside of the rules and fosters foul play, such as under-aged prostitutes and human trafficking.   
588
 Brants specifically uses the term “regulated tolerance” in this regard, in Brants C “The Fine Art of Regulated 
Tolerance: Prostitution in Amsterdam” (1998) Journal of Law and Society 621 625.  For more on this concept, 
see Pakes F “Tolerance and Pragmatism in the Netherlands: Euthanasia, Coffeeshops and Prostitution in the 
‘Purple Years’, 1994-2002” (2003) International Journal of Police Science & Management 217 226; Thompson 
SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 217 226. 
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but merely a tolerance of differences.
589
  Although the reasons for tolerating consent to 
objectification in this regard differ from those in Chapter 5, regulation is still crucial.
590
  
Similar regulations are required in order to protect the person consenting, as well as those 
who might be affected and/or do not morally approve of such objectification. The benefits of 
such regulation likewise coincide with the benefits of regulating coerced consent to 
objectification.   
6 2 2 Plurality of preference 
Another matter, which relates to the plurality of modern societies, is that dignity allows each 
individual to choose his way of living and how he is treated.
591
  This contradicts the averment 
in Chapter 4 that the freedom of the individual should yield to the dignity of the 
community.
592
  Similar to the previous argument this element of dignity, which allows the 
individual to make his own choices, encompasses the idea that dignity demands tolerance of 
differences.  In the previous argument this idea was applied to the interpretation of dignity, 
by demanding that an individual’s different interpretation of dignity be tolerated.  The present 
topic relates more to the application of dignity to everyday situations, by demanding that an 
individual’s different choices be tolerated.593  The difference between these two concepts is 
that the previous argument results in a subjective interpretation of dignity, whereas the 
present argument requires an objective interpretation.  One solution to these two conflicting 
interpretations of dignity lies in the idea that individuals have subjective rights, whereas 
values are interpreted objectively.
594
  This justifies a subjective interpretation of the right to 
dignity and an objective interpretation of human dignity as a value. 
An objective interpretation of dignity is impervious to the moral convictions of society or 
personal preference.  This is crucial, since decisions on whether certain actions should be 
                                                     
589
 Regulated tolerance can be regarded as a compromise, see Pakes F “Tolerance and Pragmatism in the 
Netherlands: Euthanasia, Coffeeshops and Prostitution in the ‘Purple Years’, 1994-2002” (2003) International 
Journal of Police Science & Management 217 226.  In Jordan para 125 it is discussed that tolerating prostitution 
does not necessarily make the practice normal.  See also South African Law Reform Commission Sexual 
offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 154. 
590
 The main reason for tolerating consent in Chapter 5 (5 3) is that the state cannot fulfil the socio-economic 
needs of the consenter, whereas the reason for allowing consent in this regard relates to the belief that the morals 
of each individual should be tolerated. 
591
 This argument presupposes that some people do in fact choose objectifying treatment.  South African Law 
Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 28, 167, 185. 
592
 See 4 2 1. 
593
 This argument suggests that some might in fact desire objectifying treatment.  South African Law Reform 
Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 167. 
594
 On the notion of subjective rights and objective norms, see Kleyn D & Viljoen F “Aspekte van Privaatreg” 
Beginners Gids vir Regstudente 3ed (2002) 111 112-113. 
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allowed or not were previously and are often still based on moral ideas and personal 
preference.
595
  Our new Constitution aims to change this, by demanding that such decisions 
be based on constitutional values.
596
   
Due to this contention that dignity cannot be informed by the moral opinions of the majority, 
it is demanded that dignity not be used as a guise to base decisions on these moral opinions.  
The situation where courts base their decisions on their own moral perceptions or personal 
subjective preference and then reinforce their decisions by claiming that they are based on 
dignity has occurred in the past and still occurs today.  This type of decision-making is 
criticised in the context of sadomasochism, where it is asserted that a decision based on 
subjective moral ideas cannot be palmed off as one based on human dignity, simply to add 
strength thereto.
597
 As a result, precedent cannot always be relied upon.  As O’Regan J 
observes, “[a] Constitutional democracy that is based on objective express values needs to 
find other forms of reasoning (not rely on precedent) which might introduce ideas that are 
controversial and criticised.”598     
When applied to the present dispute, these objective express values do not necessarily 
proscribe consent to objectification.  This can be demonstrated by examining each value 
                                                     
595
 Woolman supports the idea that decisions were and are still made based on the notion of a shared public 
morality.  He refers specifically to Sachs J’s decision on prostitution in NCGLE para 228.  Woolman S 
“Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-14 n2.  Thompson indicates that decisions are based on morals and personal 
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Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 217 229.  For more on the courts’ narrow ideas on sexual 
conduct, see Fritz N “Crossing Jordan: Constitutional Space for (UN) Civil Sex?” (2004) SAJHR 230 234-235; 
Weait M “Harm, Consent and the Limits of Privacy” (2005) 13 Feminist Legal Studies 97 111, 113, 117.  This 
is also discussed in Laskey para 40; Adler L “The Dignity of Sex” (2008) 17:1 UCLA Women’s LJ 1 17.  See 
also Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 213-214. 
596
 Ackermann LWH “Equality and the South African Constitution: The Role of Dignity” (2000) Heidelberg 
Journal of International Law 537 554.  See also Bhana D & Pieterse M “Towards a Reconciliation of Contract 
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basing decisions on the constitutional value of dignity allows plurality.  Botha H “Human Dignity in 
Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 208, 213, 214.  On the argument that decisions should not be 
based on the moral majority, see Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law 
Reporter 217 237.  Radin shows the dangers of basing decisions on the moral majority.  Radin MJ “Market-
inalienability” (1987) Harvard Law Review 1849 1864-1866.  For more on this idea see Jordan para 102.   
597
 Michalowski S & Woods L German Constitutional Law: the Protection of Civil Liberties (1999) 106; Jordan 
paras 87, 107.   The SALRC indicates that South Africans who oppose prostitution do so mainly because they 
find the practice immoral.  They support the criminalisation thereof for fear that, should this moral opinion not 
be entrenched in law, it might change, resulting in the moral decay of society.  South African Law Reform 
Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 174, 177, 
178, 182, 191-192, 196.  See also Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson 
M & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-49. 
598
 O’Regan C “From Form to Substance: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Laurie Ackermann” in Barnard-
Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 6 16. 
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separately.  Accordingly, the components in favour of allowing such consent can be 
identified.  
Human dignity, as an objective express value, demands tolerance of difference and a sphere 
in which individuals are free to create their own identities.
599
  It supports a plurality of morals 
and the idea that each individual should be free to act as he deems fit, in accordance with his 
own morals.  The fact that each person has inherent, individual dignity suggests that the 
individual’s dignity and right to his own point of view cannot succumb to that of the group.600  
This objective interpretation of dignity implies that individuals should be allowed to make 
their own choices, regardless of whether the decision is to authorise objectifying treatment. 
The value of freedom, likewise, gives “legal credence to the choices other people make about 
alternate lifestyles”.601  People are free to act as they wish, as long as others enjoy an equal 
breadth of freedom.
602
  This idea corresponds with Kant’s definition of freedom and his 
Kingdom of Ends.  According to his philosophy, no person can be forced to act in accordance 
with this moral Kingdom.
603
  Subsequently, a person cannot be prohibited from acting 
contrary to the Kingdom and the moral ideas of the majority.  An individual is therefore free 
to consent to any treatment, regardless of whether such consent would be deemed immoral by 
others. 
Consenting to treatment that might be deemed immoral or objectifying by the majority is not 
necessarily prohibited by the value of equality either.  It is maintained that equality does not 
demand the elimination of differences; in fact it supports equal public recognition thereof.
604
  
People should enjoy equal dignity and freedom and their moral views on dignity and freedom 
should carry equal weight. 
                                                     
599
 See n541 on dignity and tolerance.  For the idea of a sphere in which to create personal identity, see Botha H 
“Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 205.  See also South African Law Reform 
Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 228. 
600
 For the contention that each person has individual dignity, see Makwanyane para 20 (per Chaskalson J). 
601
 Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-13 n4.  Woolman quotes from Volks NO and Others v 
Robinson and Another 2004 (6) SA 288 (CC) paras 154 and 156. 
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 Ferreira para 49. 
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 See Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F (eds) 
Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 129. 
604
 For the idea that it does not suggest eliminating differences, see NCGLE paras 22, 132.  Ackermann J quotes 
from Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 SCR 493 para 69. See also Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, 
Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-29. 
The fact that equality supports public recognition of differences is mentioned in Botha H “Human Dignity in 
Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 208; Barnard-Naude AJ “Beyond the Brother: Radical Freedom” 
in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order 
(2008) 273 280. 
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Therefore, by applying these objective express values to this dispute, it seems as though all 
three values could support the idea of deviating viewpoints and consent to treatment based on 
personal choice, not fear of prosecution.  The fact that our constitution celebrates difference 
and condemns decisions based on morality has often been emphasised in constitutional 
jurisprudence.
605
  As stated in NCGLE: 
“[O]ur future as a nation depends in large measure on how we manage difference. In the 
past difference has been experienced as a curse, today it can be seen as a source of 
interactive vitality. The Constitution acknowledges the variability of human beings 
(genetic and socio-cultural), affirms the right to be different, and celebrates the diversity 
of the nation.”606 
6 3 Requirements for valid consent 
6 3 1 Four elements 
In Chapter 4 it is argued that consent to objectification should not be allowed, since the 
consent was not valid.
607
  Accordingly, it can be argued that valid consent to objectifying 
treatment should be allowed.  From the Constitutional Court’s decision in NCGLE certain 
conditions for such consent have transpired.  These conditions are: that the objectification is 
done in private, that it is genuinely and unequivocally consented to by informed adults and 
that it does not harm others or interfere with their right to do the same.
608
  Four legal concepts 
relate to these conditions. Firstly, the condition that the treatment should be done in private 
relates to the right to privacy.  Secondly, the condition that the treatment should be genuinely 
and unequivocally consented to by informed adults relates to, and can be substantiated by, the 
common law principles of the consent defence and contractual autonomy. Finally, the 
condition that the treatment should not harm others or interfere with their right to do the same 
relates to the Kantian philosophy of an equal breadth of freedom (and dignity) for each 
individual. 
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 See for example Davis D “Equality: The Majesty of Legoland Jurisprudence” (1999) SALJ 398 399.  See also 
Jordan para 104. 
606
 Para 135. 
607
 See 4 5. 
608
NCGLE para 26 as referred to in Ackermann LWH “Equality and the South African Constitution: The Role of 
Dignity” (2000) Heidelberg Journal of International Law 537 548.  See also Michelman F “Freedom by any 
Other Name? A Comparative Note on Losing Battles While Winning Wars” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & 
Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 91 104; Thompson SE 
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6 3 2 Privacy 
Privacy is presented as a requirement for the consent to objectification due to the idea of a 
private sphere in which the outside world, including the state, should not interfere.  This 
private sphere, in turn, should not interfere with the outside world.
609
  Consequently, the idea 
evolved that practices within such a sphere should be tolerated as long as they do not harm 
the outside world, or interfere with the rights of others to do the same. 
This private sphere is often referred to in connection with sexual practices and private 
intimacy, yet De Schutter argues that it is “[t]oo restrictive to limit ‘private life’ to the inner 
circle in which the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude 
there from entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle”.610  This indicates a 
broader interpretation of privacy, which incorporates a right to autonomy.
611
  Such an 
interpretation of the right to privacy is discussed in Chapter 3 and is referred to as “decisional 
privacy”.612  In terms of decisional privacy the individual is entitled to make choices 
concerning significant matters and to have control over his own affairs.
613
  Sadomasochism, 
peepshows, prostitution and dwarf-tossing can all be regarded as significant matters as they 
relate to sexual preference and/or vocation.
614
  
Criticism against allowing consent to objectification within privacy is that this would not 
erase the stigma attached to such treatment.  Instead it portrays the treatment as a shameful 
                                                     
609
 See Davis D & Woolman S “The Last Laugh: Du Plessis v De Klerk, Classical Liberalism, Creole Liberalism 
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 See Michelman F “Freedom by any Other Name? A Comparative Note on Losing Battles While Winning 
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While Winning Wars” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-
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Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 192. 
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 For the idea that one should be able to decide over matters regarding sexual preference, see Weait M “Harm, 
Consent and the Limits of Privacy” (2005) 13 Feminist Legal Studies 97 101; Laskey paras 8, 30; Adler L “The 
Dignity of Sex” (2008) 17:1 UCLA Women’s LJ 1 17. 
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action, which should be hidden from the public.  It also “assumes a dual structure – public 
and private”.615   
This public/private divide has been the subject of much debate, especially among feminist 
theorists.  Firstly, it is unclear whether such a distinction is at all possible.
 616
  As Sachs J 
points out these two spheres seem quite inseparable: 
“[It] does not capture the complexity of lived life, in which public and private lives 
determine each other, with the mobile lines between them being constantly amenable to 
repressive definition.”617 
The effect of such inseparability in the context of objectification is that one cannot justify 
non-interference on the basis that the actions are performed in private and are therefore self-
regarding.
618
  Gavison discusses this contention in the context of pornography.  By allowing 
someone to watch pornography in private the permissibility and availability, as well as 
society’s tolerance thereof, is presupposed.  The fact that an activity causes controversy also 
indicates that the act is not self-regarding.  Accordingly, the violation of social norms in 
private leads to their eventual demise.
619
 
Although unstable it cannot be argued that this distinction is nonexistent.  There are too many 
fundamental differences between activities deemed to be ‘private’ and those deemed to be 
‘public’.620  Hence, it is sometimes contended that despite the existence of such a distinction 
no legal significance should be afforded thereto.  This stems from the notion that privacy 
harbours oppression, such as domestic violence.
621
  The distinction should therefore not be 
invoked to justify different treatment.
622
 
According to Gavison this distinction should however not be abolished completely as it may 
have some advantages if used appropriately.
623
  Even feminists concede that some acts should 
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618
 Gavison R “Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction” (1992) 45:1 Stanford Law Review 1 14. 
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620
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 1-3, 8.  See also the domestic violence case of S v Baloyi and Others 2000 (2) SA 425 (CC) para 16. 
622
 Gavison R “Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction” (1992) 45:1 Stanford Law Review 1 10. 
623
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be free from interference due to their intimate nature.
624
  Although the protection of privacy 
might aid oppression some private acts are consented to freely.  In such cases “privacy is 
necessary to limit interference without requiring that we publicly judge all behaviour on its 
moral merits.”625 
Another argument in favour of this distinction lies within the definition of privacy.  It is 
contended that the definition of privacy is often too restricted.  Privacy protects people and 
not places.  It is therefore not the actions that are performed behind closed doors that are 
protected, but actions that are private in nature, whether performed in private or public.  This 
suggests a more positive definition of privacy that supports personal identity and autonomous 
decision-making and demand that the state “promote conditions in which personal self-
realisation can take place”.626 
6 3 3 The consent defence 
The conditions, that consent to objectifying treatment should be genuine, unequivocal, 
informed and given by adult participants, coincide with the requirements for both contractual 
consensus and the consent defence.  The main difference between these two concepts is that 
consent in terms of the consent defence might be given unilaterally.  Boberg however argues 
that there is essentially no difference between the two ideas in this context.
 627
   
The defence of consent requires genuine consent, hence the following six requirements.  First 
of all, consent should be given freely.
628
  This requirement excludes coerced consent, but not 
consent to undesired treatment.
629
  The rationale behind this is that consent does not 
necessarily imply desire but merely willingness.
630
  Prostitutes may therefore consent to 
prostitution, regardless of whether they desire the treatment, as long as they are willing to 
endure it. 
                                                     
624
 33-34, 42. 
625
 37. 
626
 NCGLE paras 116-117. 
627
 Neethling J, Potgieter JM & Visser PJ Deliktereg 5ed (2006) 96-97.  His contention is based upon the fact 
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628
 For this requirement, see Neethling J, Potgieter JM & Visser PJ Deliktereg 5ed (2006) 95 98; Harrison KM 
“Law, Order, and the Consent Defense” 12 (1993) St Louis U Pub L Rev 477 478. 
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 The idea that coerced consent is excluded is apparent from Neethling J, Potgieter JM & Visser PJ Deliktereg 
5ed (2006) 98. 
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Secondly, consent should be given by a capable person.
631
  Capability entails the capacity to 
appreciate the implications of the said consent.
632
  This relates to the third requirement, that 
the consent should be informed.  In addition to having full knowledge of the nature and the 
extent of the possible harm and risks, the person consenting should also appreciate and 
understand it.
633
 
The fourth and fifth requirements for valid consent are that subjective consent should be 
given to the full extent of the treatment and that the harm should stay within the limits of the 
consent.
634
  It is asserted that should these requirements to valid consent be adhered to the 
treatment would be lawful, since the consenter waived or restricted his own rights to the 
extent to which he consented.
635
   
By applying these requirements to sadomasochism, as an example of objectifying treatment, 
it seems as though such treatment should be allowed.  This defence was raised in the case of 
Laskey.
636
  Here it was argued that consent to genital torture was given freely and that the 
said treatment was in fact desired.
637
  The persons consenting were mainly adult males who 
were capable of giving such consent.
638
  They were informed about the risks and understood 
the consequences of their consent.  The consent was subjective, for the full extent of the harm 
and the treatment stayed within the predetermined limits.
639
   
The only hindrance in this context is that lawful consent is more readily regarded as a defence 
in delict than in criminal law.
640
  Consent is usually not considered a defence in criminal law, 
unless non-consent is an element to the crime.
641
  This is because the state is deemed to be the 
victim in criminal cases and the harmed person merely an important witness.
642
  There are 
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nonetheless exceptions to this rule, for example where consent to bodily harm is allowed 
because the harm is less dangerous, inflicted during sport or due to surgery.
643
   
Professor Fitzgerald consults the English tax law in order to formulate a general principle for 
the availability of the consent defence in criminal law.
644
  He gathers there from that consent 
should be allowed as defence if it is reversible, done for the victim’s greater interest or the 
welfare of others.  He reasons that this set of principles explains why sadomasochism is 
prohibited whereas surgery is allowed:   
“[W]hile the pain of medical treatment may equal that of non-medical torture and while 
both treatments may produce ends desired by the victim – freedom from illness in the one 
case and freedom from psychological tension in the other – the former provides a cure and 
so a more enduring liberation from the victim’s condition, whereas the latter seems to 
afford no remedy but only temporary relief.”645   
This does not, however, explain the allowance of cosmetic surgery or surgery which only 
affords temporary relief.
646
  Fitzgerald’s comparison between sadomasochism and surgery 
rather confirms than rejects the idea that consent to objectifying treatment, such as 
sadomasochism, should be lawful. 
Harrison explores a more likely explanation for the criminalisation of consent to some forms 
of objectification and not others.  She argues that the consent defence is available only if it 
does not interfere with the “ownership, utility or paternal interests” of the dominant group.647  
This relates to the previous idea regarding the enforcement of dominant moral perceptions in 
a plural society. 
The idea that consent cannot interfere with the “ownership interests of the dominant group” 
suggests that the dominant group seeks to control the oppressed group by prohibiting consent 
to certain matters.
648
  An example of such prohibition is the historical prohibition of consent 
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to sex by unmarried women.
649
  The protection of a woman’s chastity was presented as 
justification for the prohibition, but the real reason was more likely to control them.
650
 
Alleging that consent cannot be in conflict with the “utility interests of the dominant group” 
means that the consent defence will only be available in circumstances where it can be used 
to the benefit of the dominant group.
651
  In this context the oppressed group would therefore 
be allowed to consent to certain treatment to which others may not.
652
  Again the idea of 
cosmetic surgery, as a form of physical harm that is not designed to extend life or ease pain, 
surfaces.
653
  Harrison asserts that consent to this type of surgery is allowed in order to fulfil 
the wants of the dominant group, i.e. men’s desire for more attractive women.654 
Boxing is advanced as another example in which the utility interests of the dominant group 
prevail.  This dangerous contact sport is allowed although it has “few virtues typically 
associated with competitive athletics” and “most major medical authorities have called for a 
ban of boxing events because of health risks”.655  Harrison argues that the dominant group 
allows consent to this type of bodily harm due to its significant financial benefits.
656
 
The understanding that the consent defence is only available if it is not against the “paternal 
interest of the dominant group” suggests that the dominant group enforces its interests and 
norms on society.
657
  This is clear from the fact that circumcision is allowed, whereas other 
forms of religious mutilation is not.  Similarly, although tattooing is allowed, decorative 
scarring does not receive the same approval.
658
  
Again the conclusion surfaces that legal principles such as the common law consent defence 
are not informed by constitutional values, but by the moral ideas of the majority.
659
  It is 
therefore asserted that if the constitutional values of dignity, freedom and equality, instead of 
the moral ideas of the dominant group, were used to determine the availability of this 
defence, it would be allowed in cases regarding sadomasochism or similar forms of 
objectification. 
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6 3 4 Contractual autonomy 
The alternative to the unilateral consent defence, as previously noted, is mutual agreement in 
terms of a contract.  As stated above, the requirements of a valid contract are similar to that of 
the consent defence. There are six basic requirements: there should be consensus between the 
parties in the form of an offer and an acceptance;
660
 there should be consideration, such as 
money; the parties should have the capacity to enter into a contract, i.e. be able to understand 
the consequences thereof;
661
 the parties should genuinely consent to the contract and its 
terms; the contract should have a lawful purpose;
662
 and the contract should comply with any 
prescribed formalities.
663
 
As most of the requirements resemble that of the consent defence, it will not be necessary to 
explain them all in detail.  The requirement that the contract should have a lawful purpose is 
however unique to the law of contract, since the sole purpose of the consent defence is to 
allow an otherwise unlawful action.   This requirement is clearly problematic in respect of 
consent to objectification. 
The effect of unlawfulness is that the contract is either void or unenforceable.
664
  A contract 
that is void is not a contract whatsoever and has no legal consequences.  The State may 
therefore interfere with contracts which are void.  An unenforceable contract, on the other 
hand, is binding between the two parties; yet one party cannot legally force the other to 
perform.  Where a person, therefore, genuinely agrees to objectification and does not wish to 
withdraw from the agreement, unenforceability would have no effect on the contract.  Should 
a contract therefore be void, the state may prevent a person from performing in terms thereof.  
Should the contract merely be unenforceable, the state would not be allowed to intervene 
with such performance.   
When deciding whether a contract is unlawful, particularly whether the state should be able 
to intervene or not, it should be kept in mind that contractual autonomy is the starting point of 
contract law.
665
  Contractual autonomy essentially means that parties can choose whether, 
                                                     
660
 For an in depth discussion of this requirement, see Van der Merwe S, Van Huyssteen LF, Reinecke MFB & 
Lubbe GF “Aanbod en  Aanname” in Kontraktereg Algemene Beginsels (2007) 57-107. 
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 215-219. 
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 11 20.  See also Bhana D & Pieterse M “Towards a Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional 
Values: Brisley and Afrox Revisited” (2005) SALJ 865 886; Jordaan DW “The Constitution’s Impact on the 
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with whom and on what terms to enter into a contract.
666
  This concept has been bolstered 
immensely in the past.
667
  At first it was expected that the new Constitution would limit 
contractual autonomy, yet it has had quite the opposite effect.
668
   
In two Constitutional Court cases, Brisley
669
 and Afrox,
670
 contractual freedom is seen as part 
of both freedom and human dignity.
671
  These cases were decided with reference to Kantian 
philosophy.  Kant was of the opinion that “to disregard contractual autonomy is to disregard 
dignity”.672  It is also due to contractual autonomy that Sasfin673 and Shifren674 endorse the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda.
675
  This principle stipulates that the terms of a contract 
should be enforced precisely.
676
 
Nonetheless, contractual freedom is not applied absolutely.
677
  A contract is entered into 
within an interdependent society and its specific law system; it is therefore not “allowed to 
function within its own juridical sphere”.678  The state may interfere with a contract, but not 
unduly so.
679
  Due to this supreme position of contractual autonomy in contract law, state 
intervention does not often occur in practice.
680
  This is of particular importance, as it 
indicates that freedom is regarded as the supreme value within the field of contract law.  This 
is probably one of the only spheres of law in which this is the case. 
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It is important to note that this idea of supreme contractual autonomy, as illustrated in 
Supreme Court of Appeal cases such as Afrox and Brisley, has been severely criticised by 
academics.   They argue that the court’s libertarian interpretation of contractual autonomy is 
based on the classic model of contract law, which ignores the reality of unequal bargaining 
power in South Africa.
681
  It should however be kept in mind that this chapter focuses on 
situations where no such unequal bargaining power exists. 
For a contract to be unlawful and therefore invalid or unenforceable, its purpose must be 
against public policy or contra bonos mores.
682
  There is uncertainty over the difference 
between public policy and boni mores.  It has been said that public policy relates more to the 
welfare of the state or the protection of freedom, whereas boni mores is associated with 
morality.
683
   
It is at this stage necessary to explain the relationship between these common law norms and 
constitutional values.  Previously these common law norms reflected the moral wishes of 
society.  These norms  have however not been abolished by the new constitutional values but 
are developed by them in order to now reflect the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.
684
  When examining the law of contract these common law norms should therefore 
still be applied. 
There are numerous factors that could be considered when determining whether a contract is 
in fact against public policy.  Two critical factors should be emphasised, namely the balance 
of the interest of the individual against that of society
685
 and whether the contract violates any 
statutory or constitutional provisions.
686
  It could however be argued that the former factor 
forms part of the pre-constitutional definition of public policy and that the latter factor is 
more in line with its post-constitutional definition. 
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The effect of balancing the interest of the individual against that of society is that the more 
the interest of the individual is at stake and the less the interests of the society are 
compromised, the less likely it is that such a contract would be unlawful.
687
  In terms of this 
factor a contract in favour of sadomasochism would probably be lawful since it does not 
affect the interests of the public.  For, although such a contract might be against the moral 
ideas of some individuals in the society, Jordaan notes that “one must be careful not to 
conclude that a contract is contrary to public policy merely because its terms (or some of 
them) offend one’s individual sense of propriety and fairness.”688   
A contract which is allegedly against human dignity because it allows for objectifying 
treatment might be regarded as an example of the second abovementioned factor; a violation 
of a statutory or constitutional provision.  However, since contractual autonomy forms part of 
dignity, the ever-present predicament of dignity on both sides of the scale surfaces yet again.  
The contract violates dignity by allowing for objectification, while simultaneously promoting 
it by endorsing the contractual freedom found within dignity.   
Human dignity is not only balanced against the freedom found within itself but also against 
freedom as a value in its own right.  This balance of dignity and freedom occurs on a 
different playing field than discussed in other chapters for, as mentioned above, this is one 
area in which freedom does in fact enjoy more prominence than dignity.   
Should a contract in favour of objectifying treatment however be found unlawful despite the 
above reasoning, it is necessary to examine the effect of such unlawfulness. It is difficult to 
determine whether an unlawful contract is to be void or merely unenforceable.  Where a 
statute specifically prohibits a certain contract, the act might stipulate whether such contracts 
would be void or unenforceable.  It is also suggested that one could consider the degree to 
which society disapproves thereof or to which degree it is in conflict with the interests of 
society.
689
 
Since the interests of society and its degree of disapproval is associated with public policy, it 
has been argued that public policy is simply “an expression of changing values” and that in 
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order to determine whether a contract is against public policy, one has to “look at the moment 
it was attempted to enforce the contract”.  Due to this portrayal of public policy as fickle, it is 
contended that agreements that are considered against public policy should be unenforceable 
rather than void.
690
   
It might however be asserted that public policy should be less fickle now that it is based on 
constitutional values, such as human dignity.  This assertion is however negated by the 
allegation that dignity is also informed by the changing moral perceptions of society.  
Furthermore, it could be argued that should dignity not be informed by the moral attitude of 
the majority, but rather be interpreted as a value which demands tolerance for difference, 
such a dignity would also favour the unenforceability of invalid contracts.  
6 3 5 Equal breadth to others 
In NCGLE it was decided that “the private conduct of consenting adults which causes no 
harm to anyone else” should not be criminalised.691 This idea of allowing actions because 
they do not affect others features prominently throughout this whole thesis and is one of the 
conditions for allowing consent to objectification.  It was first introduced in Ackermann’s 
reference to the Kantian theory that a person should be free insofar as his freedom is 
consistent with a similar degree of freedom for others.   
The question is, when is objectifying treatment between two people considered harmful to 
anyone else?  A reasonable answer might be that a third party is harmed if he did not consent 
to the said treatment, yet is similarly objectified.  Furthermore, if the objectification of one 
person interferes with the rights of a third party to do the same, or with any other rights of a 
third party, it might also be considered harmful.
692
  Similarly, actions that are against the 
public interest might also be harmful to others.
693
  In Brown it was however submitted that 
consent to sadomasochism, as an example of objectification, would not per se be injurious to 
public interest and would therefore not be harmful to others.
694
  This logic is of particular 
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relevance where the objectification is performed in private, beyond the knowledge of the 
public.  Similarly, activities that offend the moral convictions of the majority cannot be 
perceived as ‘harm’ in this sense.  This relates to the theory that decisions should not be 
based on the moral views of the majority.  According to the above reasoning objectification 
between two consenting parties would not harm anyone else.
695
 
6 4 Allowing objectifying treatment could be beneficial 
Not only would some forms of objectifying treatment not harm others, they might actually be 
beneficial to the objectified person.  From a literature study on the subject three main benefits 
transpire.  Consent to objectifying treatment could lead to empowerment, erase social stigma 
and address the dangers of the said treatment.   
Prostitution can be used to illustrate how permitting consent to objectification might be 
empowering.  Being allowed to decide for oneself and control one’s own life is personally 
liberating.
696
  Jobs that involve objectification, like prostitution, often allow for more flexible 
hours and free time.
697
  This type of control over one’s life can be beneficial, especially 
where the individual has family obligations.  The opposite might, nonetheless, also be true.  
Especially with prostitution, individuals are often forced into objectifying vocations and lead 
very restricted lives.  Individuals might, for example, be forced to work in a brothel as a 
result of human trafficking.  These situations are however not relevant to this discussion, as 
the focus of this chapter is on objectification that has been freely and genuinely consented to. 
Jobs involving objectification also provide for empowerment by way of economic 
freedom.
698
  Due to the fact that these jobs are stigmatised and the treatment is regarded as 
humiliating and degrading, people who do consent thereto often receive generous 
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compensation.
699
  Thompson notes that: “[w]omen choose prostitution as an economic 
alternative to low-paying, monotonous labour”.700  Usually these kinds of jobs do not require 
a certain level of education.  Uneducated people are therefore afforded the chance to earn 
much more than they would have been able to earn anywhere else.
701
  Similarly, jobs like 
prostitution and dwarf tossing help to alleviate unemployment.  In Wackenheim it was argued 
that dwarf tossing was the only job that the appellant could secure.
702
 
It is asserted, with respect to prostitution specifically, that it affords sexual autonomy.
703
  A 
free space is provided in which women are able to act on their desires.
704
  By acknowledging 
that women have property rights to their own sexuality, women are given the power to set the 
terms and demand payment for their time and skills.
705
   
The permission to consent to objectification and the legalisation thereof could furthermore 
aid in the erasure of social stigma.
706
  As discussed in Chapter 5, the tolerance of 
objectionable conduct often results in the acceptance and legalisation thereof.  The ever-
changing moral perceptions of the majority might be responsible for this occurrence.  Social 
stigma is a barrier that restricts freedom.
707
  Individuals are unable to express their freedom 
for fear of social rejection.  The stigmatisation of prostitution prevents women from acting on 
their sexual desires.  This stigma affects the way all sexual interaction is seen.  Sexual 
interaction that does not conform to society’s idea of morally acceptable sex is likened to 
prostitution.  As a matter of fact, it seems as though the only sexual interaction that is not 
morally apprehended by society is sex within a long-term heterosexual relationship, 
preferably not out of wedlock.
708
  Allowing prostitution and sadomasochism as forms of 
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“uncivil” sex might therefore aid in the recognition of feminine desire and the erasure of 
social stigma.
709
 
It is however contended that the moral attitude of society does not always conform to the 
current legal position, as is suggested above.  According to the SALRC, prostitutes remain 
stigmatised in the Netherlands and the Cote d’Ivoire, regardless of the decriminalisation of 
the profession.
710
 
The final benefit of permitting consent is that the dangers of objectifying treatment might be 
addressed more effectively.  The theory that the dangers of objectification are primarily 
functions of its criminalisation is discussed in Chapter 5; another discussion thereof would 
therefore result in unnecessary duplication.
711
 
6 5 Responsibility, property and a broad definition of freedom 
Responsibility, property and a broad definition of freedom are often offered as justification 
for allowing consent to objectification.  Although these are complex ideas, a brief overview 
of each concept would be sufficient for present purposes. 
In the context of freedom of choice, responsibility is a key concept.  Valid choices, 
contractual terms and the consent defence are recognised by law due to the principle that 
people, who are capable of making and understanding their own choices, should be held 
responsible for the consequences thereof.
712
  This is evident from a criminal law perspective, 
where individuals are obliged to take responsibility for their wrong choices and bear the 
punishment.  
In opposition to the argument in Chapter 4 that the commodification of one's personal 
attributes amounts to a violation of dignity, the second abovementioned concept contends that 
                                                     
709
 Fritz discusses these effects of stigmatisation and refers to the term “uncivil sex” in Fritz N “Crossing Jordan: 
Constitutional Space for (UN) Civil Sex?” (2004) SAJHR 230 238-239.  See also NCGLE para 28. 
710
 See South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 
107 (2009) 19-20, 166, 196, 221, 222 
711
 This discussion in 5 4 refers to Fritz N “Crossing Jordan: Constitutional Space for (UN) Civil Sex?” (2004) 
SAJHR 230 231.  In Chapter 5 (5 4 & 5 5) this benefit is discussed in relation to the regulation of objectifying 
treatment.  It is however also relevant in this regard, as objectification may still be regulated where it is allowed 
due to genuine consent. 
712
 The idea that people are responsible for their actions are mentioned in McCrudden C “Human Dignity and 
Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 716; Woolman 
S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-50.  This idea that allowing objectification fosters responsibility is mentioned 
in connection with prostitution in South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution 
Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 194. 
Stellenbosch University   http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 125 
such commodification could actually be beneficial.
713
  John Locke introduced the theory that 
an individual has property rights in her own person.
714
 This theory can be applied to 
prostitution and peepshows.  A property right denotes control.  The individual is able to 
control herself and can alienate or commodify aspects of her own person, such as her own 
sexuality.  The owner can use this property to her own benefit, as she would any other 
property.  As personal property, sexuality can therefore serve either as a tool in nurturing a 
relationship or in running a successful business.  
Finally, freedom, as portrayed in this chapter, is only possible if it is interpreted as widely as 
possible.
715
 In Chapter 3 this is discussed in the context of Ackermann J’s decision in 
Ferreira.  This kind of freedom is not limited to actions that are morally acceptable by 
society, but includes the freedom to do wrong.
716
  It corresponds with the Kantian idea that a 
person cannot be forced to comply with the Kingdom of Ends or the morals of the 
majority.
717
  
6 6 Objectification is allowed 
6 6 1 Individuals are objectified 
Human interaction is instrumental, despite the purest of intentions.
718
  Individuals regularly 
objectify one another and in turn allow such treatment.  It can therefore not be the 
objectification per se that is objectionable.
719
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717
 The Kingdom of Ends is an ethical ideal where each person is free to make their own choices, yet their 
choices do not conflict with those of others.  Du Bois therefore argues that such freedom can only truly be 
achieved if everyone lives according to ethics.  This suggests that a Kingdom of Ends, in which each person is 
free to make the choices they desire, is only attainable if everyone truly desires to make “acceptable” choices; 
which corresponds with the idea of a shared morality.  Yet since there is no such thing as shared morality the 
closest we can get to a Kingdom of Ends is if all choices are made in accordance with the morals of the 
majority.  See Du Bois F “Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D &Du Bois F 
(eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 112 120.   
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 Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-8.  See also Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative 
Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 184. 
719
 Woolman makes this observation in Woolman S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, 
Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-49. 
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In the remainder of this chapter a few key examples of accepted objectifying treatment will 
be discussed.  This discussion opposes the claim in Chapter 4 that no forms of objectification 
may be allowed, since that would have an 'opening of the floodgates' effect.
720
  The aim of 
this discussion will be to determine the rationale behind permitting these specific examples 
while prohibiting others.   
6 6 2 Sexual objectification 
6 6 2 1 Strip shows 
There are three instances where sexual objectification is currently accepted.  The use of the 
word “currently” is deliberate, as it emphasises the fact that what is and is not allowed 
changes so frequently that examples thereof have to be captured within a specific time frame.   
Firstly, in some countries, such as Germany, strip shows are allowed whereas peepshows are 
prohibited.  The difference between these two shows is discussed in the German peepshow 
case.  It is decided that “the mere display of naked bodies does not violate dignity”.  
Performers are objectified in peepshows, whereas they are not during strip shows.  The 
court’s justification for this decision is that strip shows resemble stage and dance shows since 
dancers strip in front of a live audience.  Due to this resemblance the show does not detract 
from the personal individuality of the stripper.
721
   
This conclusion seems quite absurd.  These two types of shows are essentially the same.  In 
both instances the performers expose their naked bodies to strangers who derive sexual 
pleasure there from.  The only difference is that the one performer cannot see the audience 
whereas the other can.  The fact that a performer witnesses the objectification should 
rationally enhance its objectifying effect, rather than diminish it. Asserting that a strip show is 
akin to a stage and dance show merely because the stripping is done on a stage is in any case 
not feasible.  Often strip shows are not done on stage, in front of a large audience.  As a 
matter of fact, all strip shows do not necessarily involve dancing.  Take for example a 
bachelor’s party.  Here a stripper takes off her clothes in a living room in front of a few men.  
Can the fact that she shakes her derriere, while exposing herself, be the only reason why the 
stripping is not prohibited?  Why then do peepshow performers not just add a bit more 
rhythm to their routine? 
                                                     
720
 See 4 3. 
721
 This paragraph refers to and quotes from the German peepshow case, BVerfGE 27, 1, 6 (1969), as translated 
in Michalowski S & Woods L German Constitutional Law: the Protection of Civil Liberties (1999) 105. 
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Another difference between these two shows is that stripping sometimes involves more than 
merely exposing naked bodies to an audience.  Due to the absence of a barrier between the 
stripper and the audience touching regularly occurs.  Surely this would worsen the 
objectification?  What is more, strippers can be ‘bought’ for a private lap dance.  This 
emphasises the notion that a physical barrier between the performer and the audience, as is 
the case with peepshows, would actually diminish any objectifying effect. 
6 6 2 2 Pornography 
This idea, that the objectifying effect might be diminished because the performer cannot 
experience the live reaction of audience, corresponds to pornography.  Similar to peepshows, 
porn stars expose themselves and the audience can react as they please in private.  The only 
difference is that pornographic actors or models are often expected to do a lot ‘more’ than 
peepshow performers.  Pornographic actors or models are paid to have sex with strangers.
722
  
Although similar to prostitution, the objectification is enhanced by the fact that third parties 
can watch them in the act.  Pornography is recorded, whether on camera or film; the 
objectification therefore occurs every time someone opens a pornographic magazine or turns 
on a blue film. 
So why is pornography and stripping allowed, whereas peepshows and prostitution are 
not?
723
  Is it because stripping and pornography seem more glamorous?  To be a porn ‘star’ or 
a hot topless girl at a bachelor’s party just seems more acceptable.  What is the rationale 
behind this perception?  Might it have something to do with the fact that Jenna Jameson hosts 
a TV show called “Jenna’s American Sex Star”, making porn seem exciting?724  Or is it 
because of the new exercise craze called ‘pole dancing’, which convinces women that it is 
desirable to wrap themselves around a pole and seduce their man by installing a pole in the 
bedroom? 
6 6 2 3 Long term heterosexual relationships 
The final instance in which sexual objectification is currently accepted is within heterosexual, 
monogamous, long-term relationships; preferably within wedlock.  This is apparent from 
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 I.e. other pornographic actors or models. 
723
 This question is asked by the SALRC in South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult 
Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009).  The aim of this paper is to determine whether prostitution 
should be legalised in South Africa. 
724
 Anonymous “Jenna’s American Sex Star” (11-08-2011) Wikipedia 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jenna%27s_American_Sex_Star> (accessed 06-11-2011).  This television show 
will also be discussed in 6 4 4. 
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cases regarding sadomasochism.  Where the participants were heterosexual married couples, 
as was the case in Wilson, the treatment was permitted under the pretext of private autonomy.  
The court’s excuse for not relying on precedent regarding (homosexual) sadomasochism was 
that, in Wilson, the wife instigated the said treatment.
725
  
Where sadomasochism was performed within a long term, monogamous, heterosexual 
relationship, out of wedlock, the treatment was prohibited.  However, the sentence itself was 
suspended which was not the case with homosexual and/or polygamous instances of 
sadomasochism.
726
     
Weait provides an apt conclusion: 
“The analysis provided here indicates – unsurprisingly perhaps – that where injury is 
sustained in the context of heterosexual marriage, behind closed doors in the matrimonial 
home, and where the injury itself manifests traditional gender relations (as in Wilson), the 
courts may be prepared to treat it as private unless it is the consequence of infidelity 
(which, as suggested by Dica, renders the relationship public). But where the injury is 
sustained in the context of non-institutionalised relationships, whether hetero- or 
homosexual, pursued for the principal purpose of sexual gratification, the courts will treat 
such injury as a harm justifying punishment – unless, that is, both parties to the 
relationship can properly be said to have consented to risks incidental (rather than integral) 
to such gratification.”727 
Another instance where married couples alone are permitted to objectify one another is where 
the participant is compensated for her consent to objectification.  It would be perfectly 
acceptable for a husband to pay his wife for sexual favours, especially where payment is 
made in kind, whereas similar acts out of wedlock, such as prostitution, are proscribed.
728
 
6 6 3 Payment in kind  
Section 20(1)(aA) of the Sexual Offences Act defines a prostitute as “[a]ny person who…has 
unlawful carnal intercourse, or commits an act of indecency, with any other person for 
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 R. v Wilson [1996] Cr App R 241 (CA); hereinafter referred to as ‘Wilson’.  In this case a women asked a 
man to carve his initials into her buttocks with a hot knife. 
726
 Weait discusses the facts and outcome of R v Emmet [1999] All ER (D) 641.  Weait M “Harm, Consent and 
the Limits of Privacy” (2005) 13 Feminist Legal Studies 97 112, 113. The facts of this case involved the 
asphyxiation of a woman by her boyfriend. He then poured lighter fuel over her breasts and set fire to it. 
727
 Weait M “Harm, Consent and the Limits of Privacy” (2005) 13 Feminist Legal Studies 97 117.  Weait refers 
to R v Dica [2004] All ER (D) 45.   
728
 See Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 217 246. 
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reward”.729  This is a very wide definition and was cause for speculation in Jordan.  The 
court a quo invalidated the criminalisation of prostitution for a number of reasons, including 
that the definition thereof was too wide and therefore uncertain.  Defining prostitution as sex 
for reward includes not only sex for money, but also payment in kind:  
“In principle there is no difference between a prostitute who receives money for her 
favours and her sister who receives, for rendering a similar service, a benefit or reward of 
a different kind, such as a paid-for weekend, a free holiday, board and lodging for a 
shorter or longer period, a night at the opera, or any other form of quid pro quo.”13 
By ruling invalid a provision that criminalises sex for payment in kind, the court suggests that 
such actions are acceptable.  As quoted above, the High Court equates sex for payment in 
kind with sex for money.  Hence, this acceptance of sex for payment in kind, signifies the 
tolerance of sex for money. 
The Constitutional Court rejects this reasoning.  It considers the heading of section 20 and 
decides that the provision should have a narrow interpretation.
730
  Yet, by excluding sex for 
payment in kind, this court also suggests that such actions are acceptable.   
The courts have therefore concurred that sex for payment in kind is acceptable.  A woman 
who feels obliged to have sex with a man because he buys her dinner or an expensive 
necklace will not be prosecuted.  Yet, if he offers her the value of the dinner or the jewellery 
in cash she becomes a criminal.  However, the outcome is essentially the same, the woman 
feels obliged to perform in terms of the reward.  So how can her reaction to the reward be 
condemned based solely on the type of reward she receives?  It cannot be due to the romantic 
idea that sex with someone other than a prostitute is somehow more special, as even sex 
within marriage is often loveless.  Men have repeatedly showered women with gifts in order 
to sleep with them and women in turn have made a living off such gifts.  How can this be 
different from high-class prostitution?
731
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 23 of 1957. 
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 S v Jordan and Others 2002 (1) SA 797 (T) para 800H-I. 
730
 Jordan para 49. 
731
 It is important to note that the SALRC supports this line of reasoning and defines prostitution as sex for 
payment in kind or money.  South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution 
Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) (x). 
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6 6 4 Entertainment 
Individuals are also objectified for entertainment purposes.  This is evident from various 
popular TV shows.  These shows involve the degradation of individuals.  Such degradation 
would normally be prohibited.  It is nonetheless permitted in circumstances where individuals 
are used as objects for the purpose of entertainment.   
No one considers the feelings of the poor mother who finds out her husband is sleeping with 
her teenage daughter on the Jerry Springer show.
732
  Shows such as Fear Factor, Survivor and 
I Bet You Will thrive on coercing people to do humiliating and degrading deeds.
733
  This 
includes eating live bugs or dog faeces.  The coercion is economic by nature, for participants 
are promised potential large monetary rewards.  How is this more acceptable than the 
humiliation of dwarf tossing, where the reward is at least guaranteed?  The main aim of I Bet 
You Will is to demonstrate how everyone has a price.  People are asked to do humiliating 
things for a certain amount of money.  If a participant refuses, the amount is increased until 
he accepts.  This is blatant coercion.   
In the Jackass television series and movies individuals consent to treatment that is in direct 
conflict with their right to human dignity.   They are allowed to hurt, degrade and humiliate 
each other.   
All the abovementioned examples indicate the infringement of dignity for the purpose of 
entertainment, due to the deliberate degradation and humiliation of individuals.  People are 
not treated as means in themselves, but as objects; as means to an end. That end is 
entertainment. 
The Jenna Jameson show is no exception and neither is the employment of ‘circus freaks’, 
people who perform in a circus merely because they are different and look ridiculous.  These 
circus performers are degraded and objectified, since the audience pays to ridicule their 
disabilities and deformities.   
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 For information on the Jerry Springer Show, see Anonymous “The Jerry Springer Show” (20-10-2011) 
Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Jerry_Springer_Show> (accessed 06-11-2011). 
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 For information on these shows see the following websites: Anonymous “Fear Factor” (31-10-2011) 
Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fear_Factor> (accessed 06-11-2011); Anonymous “Survivor” (TV 
Series) (06-11-2011) Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Survivor_(TV_series)> (accessed 06-11-2011); 
Anonymous “I Bet You Will” (31-08-2011) <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_Bet_You_Will> (accessed 06-11-
2011). 
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Why are people allowed to consent to objectification in the name of entertainment?  Is it 
because show business is glamorous?  People want to be objectified on television or on stage 
simply to have their fifteen minutes of fame.  Does this mean that objectification is 
acceptable if people really want to be objectified; if the consent is real?  Or is it allowed 
whenever the individual does not subjectively experience the treatment as objectifying? 
6 6 5 Sport 
Although sport could be addressed under the heading of entertainment, it justifies a separate 
category.   Labuschagne analyses the role of the consent defence in competitive athletics and 
sport.  By participating in sport, athletes are deemed to consent to the possible harm ensuing 
there from.  Such ‘consent’ is recognised as a legal defence.734   
Nevertheless, athletes are only assumed to waive their rights to a certain extent.  They are not 
simply stripped of their rights and reduced to objects.
735
  This is a significant development as 
it recognises that the objectifying effect of the consent might be mitigated or avoided 
altogether.  It also confirms that a person does not lose his right to human dignity when he 
consents to its violation.  
The reasons for the criminalisation of sadomasochism include the risk that someone might be 
injured (or objectified) beyond the scope of his consent.  The effect of such a risk might be 
that, regardless of whether consent to objectification is accepted in theory, it is too dangerous 
to allow it in practice.  This resembles the logic behind Radin’s “best possible coercion-
avoidance mechanism”, where consent to objectification is wholly prohibited due to the risk 
of inadvertently allowing coerced consent.  
The risk of injury beyond consent does not, however, interfere with the practise of sport.  
This is because requiring a player to constantly evaluate the dangerousness of each action 
“would drastically alter the manner in which the game is played”.736  Surely the same applies 
to sadomasochism?  If participants were to evaluate the dangerousness of each action it 
would detract from their sexual gratification.   
                                                     
734
 Labuschagne quotes McCutcheon in Labuschagne JMT “Fundamentele Regte van Sportlui en die Vraagstuk 
van Noodweer by Kontaksportsoorte” (2004) 37:1 De Jure 41 44.  See McCutcheon JP “Sports violence, 
consent and the criminal law” (1994) Northern Ireland LQ 267 267. 
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 Labuschagne JMT “Fundamentele Regte van Sportlui en die Vraagstuk van Noodweer by 
Kontaksportsoorte” (2004) 37:1 De Jure 41 44. 
736
 49.  Labuschagne includes this English quote from Gardiner S “The law and the sports field” (1994) Crim LR 
513 515.  
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Furthermore, Labuschagne argues that consent can only be given sensibly in respect of a 
specific injury or a certain type of injury.  Neither in the context of sport nor in that of 
sadomasochism can this be predetermined.
737
  Yet in the former case it is allowed and in the 
latter it is not. 
One of the reasons provided for the approval of consent to sport is that the advantages thereof 
outweigh the harm.  Can this not suffice as a reason for allowing prostitution, where the 
benefits include the ability to provide for one’s family?   
Moreover, sport’s main benefit is that it promotes physical health.  However, this is not 
always the case.  Take for instance boxing or cage fighting.  The object of these sports is 
physical violence.  Contrary to other sports, these sports pose a major health risk.  Their only 
benefit is financial.
738
  How is this different from dwarf tossing? 
6 6 6 Punishment 
Punishment is the best example of holding someone responsible for his choices, despite the 
undesirable consequences.
739
  Botha observes that punishment does not per se indicate a 
violation of human dignity.  Rather than reducing someone to an object, he is treated as an 
autonomous person who must take responsibility for his actions.
740
  This emphasises the 
aforementioned notion that denying someone the freedom of choice might be just as 
objectifying as the treatment he is choosing.
741
   
6 6 7 Labour 
Dwarf tossing, prostitution and peepshows all share one attribute, namely that individuals are 
paid to be objectified.  Although regarded as implicit coercion due to financial desperation, 
this feature nevertheless applies to most jobs.
742
    Employees are compensated for being 
objectified.  They are instrumental to the achievement of certain ends, which includes 
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 Labuschagne JMT “Fundamentele Regte van Sportlui en die Vraagstuk van Noodweer by 
Kontaksportsoorte” (2004) 37:1 De Jure 41 54.  
738
 Harrison KM “Law, Order, and the Consent Defense” 12 (1993) St Louis U Pub L Rev 477 498.  According 
to Harrison most major medical authorities have called for the ban thereof.   
739
 This idea that people are responsible for their actions is mentioned in McCrudden C “Human Dignity and 
Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) The European Journal of International Law 655 716; Woolman 
S “Dignity” in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 2ed (2005) 36-1 36-50. 
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 See Botha H “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) Stell LR 171 185. 
741
 For this idea that the denial of freedom leads to objectification, see Michalowski S & Woods L German 
Constitutional Law: the Protection of Civil Liberties (1999) 106. 
742
 See Thompson SE “Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 217 233. 
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generating money for the employer.  Nonetheless, individuals have the right to employment, 
regardless of whether they only value their jobs in terms of the monetary compensation it 
affords them.
743
   
Some jobs are extremely degrading, such as cleaning vomit off the floor of a nightclub or 
cleaning up after a murder scene.  Such jobs are usually done by people who are desperate for 
money.  Indeed, jobs involving high risk or degradation often pay more than similar, less 
dangerous or degrading, jobs. When someone is paid for allowing doctors to test unapproved 
medicine on him, his human worth is ignored completely.  Such products are not allowed on 
the market because they are not ready for human consumption, yet someone who willingly 
takes the risk in order to receive compensation, is allowed to consent thereto.  This 
corresponds with Harrison’s theory that individuals are allowed to consent to objectification 
provided that the objectification serves the utility interests of the dominant group. 
As with other jobs, it is better to allow and regulate objectifying treatment, than to prohibit 
it.
744
  Affording prostitutes, peepshow performers and dwarf-tossing participants with the 
same rights and protections as other workers, would be in line with their right to human 
dignity.
745
  This approach has been adopted by other countries, as well as the European Court 
of Justice, especially with regard to prostitution.
746
 
6 6 8 Acts that were prohibited 
The above examples illustrate how two similar types of treatment might be approached 
entirely differently.  One might be considered objectifying and the other not.  This could be 
due to the fickleness of the moral convictions of society.  The fact that actions that were once 
prohibited, are currently acceptable also points to the fickle and ever-changing moral ideas of 
the majority.
747
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 For the idea that work is sometimes valued solely in terms of its monetary compensation, see Fritz N 
“Crossing Jordan: Constitutional Space for (UN) Civil Sex?” (2004) SAJHR 230 244. See also Wackenheim 5 in 
which it is argued that employment is part of the right to human dignity. 
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 This is discussed in detail in 5 4.  
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 On the idea that such employees deserve similar rights and protections to other employees, see Thompson SE 
“Prostitution – A Choice Ignored” (2000) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 217 238.  See also South African Law 
Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 186 189. 
746
 South African Law Reform Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 
(2009) 171. 
747
 Laws are often changed because they are regarded as “out-dated”. See South African Law Reform 
Commission Sexual offences: Adult Prostitution Discussion Paper 1, Project 107 (2009) 188 193. 
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Sodomy is an excellent example in this regard.  As explained above, sodomy was at first 
considered a violation of human dignity.  However, with the enactment of the new 
Constitution the attitude toward sodomy changed to such an extent, that the prohibition 
thereof is now regarded as the violation.
748
  This is an astounding illustration of how dignity 
can be used on either side of a dispute.  First the self-worth aspect of dignity was used to 
prohibit sodomy and then the freedom component was used to prohibit its criminalisation. 
This change of approach suggests that it is just a matter of time before the dominant moral 
attitude changes toward other, currently prohibited acts.  Sooner or later prostitution and 
dwarf tossing might not seem so inhumane.  This outlook that an action should be allowed 
merely because similar actions are not banned is however disputed in Wackenheim.  Here the 
committee ruled that “the mere fact that there may be other activities liable to be banned is 
not in itself sufficient to confer a discriminatory character on the ban on dwarf tossing.” 749  
The objection to this reasoning is that some countries have already started allowing some of 
these seemingly immoral forms of consent to objectification that are currently prohibited in 
South Africa.  The moral attitude toward prostitution, for example, has been changing 
worldwide.
750
  In Germany specifically it was contended that prostitution “should not be 
considered to be immoral anymore”.751  The legal position and moral attitude toward 
prostitution have even been questioned in South Africa.  The SALRC has been investigating 
the possibility of legalising prostitution in South Africa since 2009.
752
   
6 7 Conclusion 
The various reasons why objectifying treatment should be permitted have been addressed in 
this chapter.  It is contended that dignity should not be regarded as supreme to freedom; 
resulting in the idea that dignity can be waived in favour of the freedom to consent.  The 
plurality of society’s moral perceptions and preferences also supports the freedom to consent 
to treatment which the consenter does not regard as contrary to his dignity or which he 
desires.   
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 Barnard-Naude AJ “Beyond the Brother: Radical Freedom” in Barnard-Naude AJ, Cornell D & Du Bois F 
(eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2008) 273 279. 
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With reference to NCGLE it has further been argued that consent to objectifying treatment 
should be allowed; provided that it is private, genuine, unequivocal, given by capable and 
informed adults, and does not harm others or interfere with their rights to do the same.  This 
corresponds with the consent defence, as well as contractual autonomy.  Such consent might 
even be beneficial to the consenter. 
The principles of responsibility, property and a broad definition of freedom have also been 
examined as part of the argument in favour of consenting to objectification.  Furthermore the 
notion that consent should be allowed on the basis that there are instances in which it is 
already permitted, has been explained by way of various examples. 
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CHAPTER  7 
CAN AND/OR SHOULD A PERSON BE ALLOWED TO CONSENT TO 
OBJECTIFYING TREATMENT? 
7 1 Three approaches 
7 1 1 Defining dignity and freedom 
The research question posed in this thesis is whether a person can and/or should be allowed to 
consent to objectifying treatment.  This raises questions over the meaning of dignity, the 
meaning of freedom and the relationship between dignity and freedom. 
In Chapter 2 I attempted to define dignity.  Though notoriously difficult to define, it was 
found that dignity could be defined to a certain extent.  This is achieved by determining a 
minimum core definition of human dignity, while keeping in mind past instances of its 
violation and, where theory is inadequate, establishing the effect or function of human 
dignity.  Through the identification of dignity’s functions, its unique function as an objective 
normative value was highlighted. The two main components that form dignity’s minimum 
core were also identified, namely that of ‘inherent worth’ and ‘autonomy’.   The tension 
between these components were explained, in that the right not to be objectified can be found 
within the ‘inherent worth’ component, whereas the right to consent to such objectification 
can be found within the ‘autonomy’ part. 
Freedom is defined in relation to dignity in Chapter 3.  In South African law freedom can 
take on various different forms.  The common law embraces a classical libertarian freedom, 
which is almost idealistic in its breadth.  This form of freedom is often criticised for failing to 
take account of deeply entrenched inequality and disadvantage.  In the Constitution freedom 
is first and foremost entrenched as a value.  Unlike the broad right to human dignity, no 
residual right to freedom is expressly entrenched in the Constitution.  It might however be 
found within one of the specific freedom rights, such as the right to freedom and bodily 
integrity, or within the ‘autonomy’ part of the right to human dignity. 
Although both freedom and dignity are entrenched as values, dignity is ascribed the unique 
function of mediator in value conflicts. Dignity is thus interpreted as superior to freedom.  On 
the contrary, should freedom be seen as part of dignity it would hold equal status. It could 
accordingly be argued that freedom, as incorporated within the ‘autonomy’ part of human 
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dignity, would not disregard dignity’s ‘inherent worth’ component, but would accommodate 
it, and vice versa. 
7 1 2 Integrating the approaches 
7 1 2 1 Is dignity supreme? 
Three different approaches to consent to objectifying treatment are examined in Chapters 4 to 
6.  This is done to provide a complete and detailed illustration of each approach.  In order to 
analyse the arguments that are formulated within these approaches a complete integration of 
these chapters is however necessary. 
In Chapter 4 it is argued that consent to objectification should be prohibited, because dignity 
is a supreme right and value that cannot be violated or waived.  This claim is based on four 
grounds.  Firstly, it is asserted that dignity derives its supreme status from its functions.  The 
critique against this assertion is that all constitutional values share the same functions.  
Although courts have assigned dignity with the unique function of mediator in value 
conflicts, this practice has been criticised on the basis that dignity is too manipulable and can 
be used as a tool in the hands of the state.  Another objection to assigning this function to 
dignity is that dignity often appears on both sides of a dispute.   
The second justification for dignity’s supreme status is attributed to the dignity-based 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court.  One possible explanation for this preference for 
dignity is that the court adopted its interpretation of dignity from foreign jurisdictions.  Yet 
our constitutional entrenchment of dignity differs from those countries that confer supreme 
status upon dignity.  Our constitution does not present dignity with supreme status but 
provides for its limitation where justified.  Another explanation for the dignity-jurisprudence 
relates to the understanding that the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of dignity was 
influenced by Kantian philosophy.    This justification is challenged on the basis that Kant’s 
definition of dignity is largely libertarian and would therefore not justify an interpretation of 
dignity that dominates freedom.  A further averment is that the court’s dignity jurisprudence 
was implemented to prevent a recurrence of the past.  In opposition hereto it is contended that 
this does not justify the court’s favouring of dignity, since freedom should also be advanced 
for the same reason.  The final explanation for the court's dignity jurisprudence is that it 
simply reflects a choice.  A mere choice is however insufficient to warrant dignity’s supreme 
status. 
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The third rationale behind granting dignity supreme status relates to the fact that dignity 
features prominently throughout the Constitution.  However, the same can be said for 
freedom, which features more frequently in the Constitution.  
The final contention in favour of a supreme dignity is that dignity is inherent to all persons.  
This contention cannot explain dignity’s supremacy to freedom, as freedom is similarly 
inherent to all.   
Another objection to a supreme dignity is that freedom can be found within human dignity.  It 
has been maintained that although freedom is part of dignity it cannot receive the same 
absolute status.  This argument is however unsubstantiated. 
7 1 2 2 Can dignity be waived? 
The question whether or not consent to objectification can be justified on the ground that it 
amounts to a waiver of human dignity is controversial.  Arguments in support of the 
contention that dignity cannot be waived are set out in Chapter 4, while counter-arguments 
are formulated in Chapter 6.  The main dispute lies in the definition of a waiver.  The term 
‘waiver’ in this context can have at least three different meanings.   
The first meaning is formulated in Chapter 4.  In terms of this meaning the term ‘waiver’ 
indicates consent to the disposal of a right.  Since dignity can never be lost, the right thereto 
cannot be disposed of.  The right to human dignity can therefore not be waived in terms of 
the first definition of ‘waiver’. 
The second meaning of ‘waiver’ is found in Chapter 6. In terms of this meaning the term 
‘waiver’ indicates consent to the violation of a right.  Unlike the previous definition of 
waiver, the waived right is not lost in terms of this definition.  Should dignity be considered a 
supreme and inviolable right, such consent to its violation would be impermissible.  The right 
to human dignity can therefore only be waived in terms of the second definition of ‘waiver’ if 
a supreme status is not conferred upon dignity.   
Similarly, should the term ‘waiver’ merely refer to a waiver of the right to exercise the 
particular right this definition of waiver would also not result in the loss of the right 
altogether.   
Criticism against allowing any form of waiver is that some rights are too fundamental to 
waive.  Yet, this protest is unconvincing if dignity does not hold a supreme status.  It could 
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also be argued that the fundamental status of a right should only be one factor in deciding 
whether a waiver should be allowed.  Other factors might include the severity and the extent 
of the infringement.  From this perspective the permissibility of each waiver should be 
decided ad hoc.  
7 1 2 3 The individual vs. the community  
Another argument in favour of prohibiting consent to objectifying treatment is that individual 
freedom should yield to communitarian dignity.  From this point of view, the single right of 
the individual is balanced against numerous rights of the community’s members.  A 
utilitarian balancing process would favour the rights of the majority.  This type of balancing 
is however inconsistent with our new constitutional order, since both freedom and dignity are 
inherent to each and every individual and should not simply be overridden by the greater 
good of the majority. 
A corresponding assertion is that the individual’s notion of dignity should yield to that of the 
community.  This dismisses the claim that a person should be allowed to consent to treatment 
that he does not perceive to be a violation of his dignity.  In addressing these conflicting 
opinions one should determine whether dignity should be interpreted objectively or 
subjectively.   
In chapter 4 the argument is put forth that dignity should be interpreted objectively and is 
therefore violated irrespective of the individual's own perceptions.  Dignity can nevertheless 
only be interpreted objectively if an objective definition of dignity exists.  In practice the 
popular moral perceptions are often used to interpret dignity.  This might be due to the fact 
that decisions regarding the permissibility of certain actions were previously based on moral 
law.  The idea of a shared public morality is presented as justification for consulting such 
moral perceptions.  The critique against this is that, due to the plurality of society, no such 
shared public morality exists.  Subsequently, these popular moral perceptions do not 
represent a shared public opinion, but the moral ideas of the majority.  Yet, the practice of 
interpreting dignity in terms of the moral ideas of the majority is inconsistent with other 
qualities that have been attributed to dignity.  This includes the understanding that dignity 
presupposes the right of every individual to choose his own ends, and is therefore tolerant of 
differences.  Furthermore, by supporting the morality of the majority the minority will be 
suppressed and stigmatised, results that are directly in conflict with the Constitution.  
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This indicates that dignity should not be informed by the moral views of society.  It is argued 
that the Constitution is founded upon moral law.  This means that moral law is now found 
within and limited to the constitutional text and spirit.  Although decisions were therefore 
previously based on the moral views of the majority they should now be based on 
constitutional values. 
This suggests new ways of interpreting dignity, by which, instead of supporting the morality 
of the majority, differences are tolerated.  Such an interpretation might acknowledge different 
subjective understandings of dignity.  
It is further contended that, since dignity tolerates difference, it allows each person to choose 
his way of living and how he is to be treated.  This does not however imply that anything 
goes.  Each person is still a member of society and the state is still permitted to govern from a 
specific moral point of view.  Yet, this point of view should be dictated and limited by the 
Constitution which in a sense ‘codified’ moral law.  Accordingly, a state may limit these 
different choices provided that such limitation can be justified in terms of the limitation 
clause. 
Since the moral ideas of the majority should not inform dignity, dignity cannot be used as a 
guise to base decisions thereon.  Unfortunately this often occurs in practice. 
7 1 2 4 Some forms of objectification are acceptable 
Dignity is often regarded as fickle and ever changing.  This might be attributed to the fact that 
it is sometimes informed by the moral opinions of the majority.   Due to its ever-changing 
nature some forms of objectifying treatment might start to seem acceptable.  It is insisted that 
despite this occurrence no forms of objectification should be allowed, since this would have 
an ‘opening the floodgates’ effect.  The counterargument is that numerous forms of 
objectification are already allowed, examples of which are listed in Chapter 6. 
7 1 2 5 Does constitutional freedom allow objectification? 
In Chapter 4 it is averred that constitutional freedom itself does not allow consent to 
objectification.  The first ground for this averment is that no specific residual right to freedom 
can be found within the Constitution.  This is countered by the claim that such a right to 
freedom can be found within dignity.  Freedom as a constitutional value may also provide a 
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space for such consent by developing the common law principles of the consent defence and 
contractual autonomy.   
Despite the above entrenchment of freedom, it is alleged that constitutional freedom would 
not allow consent to objectifying treatment.  If constitutional freedom is to be interpreted 
positively, as is suggested it should, then one would have to live according to moral law and 
ethics to be truly free.  Yet, according to Kantian philosophy one cannot be forced to live in 
accordance with moral law.  Kantian philosophy is however based on an ideal world, referred 
to as the Kingdom of Ends.  The reality is that in a non-ideal world where people have to 
function as part of a society the state needs to enforce moral law in order to at least ensure 
external freedom.  This is supported by the idea that moral law is now found within the 
Constitution and people should act in accordance therewith. 
Regardless of whether an individual’s choices comply with moral law, it is contended that the 
type of choices that are in conflict with human dignity, such as consent to objectification, 
would similarly conflict with constitutional freedom.  This is based on the idea that dignity 
and freedom share the same goal, namely the development of one’s talents and personality.  
This contention is opposed on the grounds that when a person consents to objectifying 
treatment, such consent might actually be in pursuit of personal development and therefore in 
line with constitutional freedom.  Even when the individual is remunerated for such consent it 
might still allow self-development, since money is often needed for such development.  
Although money might therefore be regarded as a form of undue influence, it could still be an 
act of freedom.  This corresponds with the insistence that despite any undue influence an 
element of autonomy is still present in such choices. 
7 1 2 6 Invalid consent 
This reference to remuneration relates to the conviction that consent cannot be allowed if it is 
invalid.  It is averred that consent cannot be an act of freedom if not given freely.  In the 
context of prostitution, for example, people consent due to economic coercion or undue 
influence.  Radin argues that, as precaution consent should always be prohibited if the 
surrounding circumstances cause suspicion as to the validity of such consent. 
Chapter 5 is a response to this notion that invalid consent cannot be allowed.  It is averred 
that in an ideal world such consent would not be given, let alone be allowed.  Nevertheless, in 
reality invalid consent is given due to necessity or the belief that it would be the “least worst 
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alternative”.753  In an ideal world people would be provided with the necessary socio-
economic needs in order to eliminate the cause of such consent.  Since this is impossible in 
our world, it is argued that people cannot be prohibited to consent.  Furthermore, in a non-
ideal world people will give such invalid consent, despite the prohibition thereof. 
Transitional measures are therefore necessary.  This includes allowing the consent and 
regulating it appropriately.  The critique against allowing and regulating economically 
coerced consent is that the stigmatisation of the activities consented to is not erased thereby 
and that people still operate outside the regulations.  The best response to this critique is that, 
although these measures are imperfect, they still surpass the alternative. 
7 1 2 7 Genuine consent 
It is maintained that valid consent to objectification should be allowed.  From the 
Constitutional Court’s decision in NCGLE certain conditions for such consent have 
transpired.  These conditions are: that the treatment in question is performed in private, is 
freely consented to by informed adults and is not harmful to others.   
The idea that treatment performed in private should be free from public interference is 
criticised on several grounds.  Firstly, by only allowing such consent in private the stigma 
would not be erased, since the impression is endorsed that these activities are shameful and 
should be kept hidden.  Secondly, the reliance on the public/private divide is criticised for 
being unstable.  Finally it is alleged that although such a divide exists it should not be 
awarded any legal credence as it promotes oppression.  These allegations are disputed on the 
premises that although unstable, this divide does exist and can in fact be beneficial in some 
instances.  In this context, for example, privacy creates a space in which the individual may 
consent to treatment which the majority finds morally reprehensible.  
Two common law principles, the consent defence and contractual autonomy, are offered as 
justification for consent to objectification.  In opposition to applying the consent defence in 
this regard it is put forth that this defence is not available in criminal matters.  Contrary to 
this, instances where the consent defence has been available in criminal law are examined in 
Chapter 6.   
One of the conditions for a valid contract is that the purpose thereof should be lawful.  This 
causes difficulty in justifying consent to objectification on the basis of contractual autonomy.  
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The purpose of a contract is unlawful when it is against public policy or contra bonos mores.  
Although previously informed by moral law, these norms are now interpreted in terms of 
constitutional values.  Two of the factors that should be considered when determining 
whether a contract is against public policy or contra bonos mores are of particular relevance 
in this context.   
The first requires a balance of the interest of the individual and the interest of society.  It is 
contended that, where a contract deals with treatment which is performed in private and does 
not hurt others, societal interests would be minimal.  Societal interests would only be affected 
in so far as the knowledge thereof offends the moral views of the majority and as mentioned 
before, the moral views of the majority should not dictate the acceptability of choices.     
The second factor is that a contract should not be in conflict with either legislation or the 
Constitution.  This implies that contracts that are contrary to human dignity are unlawful.  
Again the argument is raised that freedom is part of dignity.  Freedom as a value might even 
develop contract law to enforce contractual autonomy.  In light of the Constitutional Court’s 
preference for contractual freedom it could be argued that contract law is one of the only 
areas where freedom has trumped dignity or at least where the ‘autonomy’ element of dignity 
has trumped the ‘self-worth’ part. 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, the Court’s preference for an almost classical liberal contractual 
autonomy is severely criticised on the basis that it ignores the possibility of unequal 
bargaining power.   
Should it however be decided that, contrary to this preference, a contract that allows for 
objectifying treatment is against public policy and therefore unlawful, it should be 
determined whether the effect thereof would be that the contract is void or merely 
unenforceable.  Public policy has frequently been described as fickle, since it used to be 
interpreted in terms of moral opinion.  Although public policy should now be interpreted in 
terms of constitutional values, its fickle nature will remain as long as the court implements a 
dignity-based jurisprudence informed by popular moral convictions.  Based on this 
understanding of public policy as an ever-changing concept, it could be contended that 
unlawful contracts should rather be unenforceable than void. 
The final condition for valid consent is that the consent should not harm others.  Contrary to 
the claim that consent to objectification causes no harm to others, it can be contended that the 
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moral offence of some members of society could constitute ‘harm’ in this sense.  Again the 
counter-argument is raised that decisions should not be based on the moral views of the 
majority. 
7 1 2 8 Responsibility and property 
Similar to the common law consent defence and contractual autonomy, the principles of 
responsibility and property are also offered as justification for allowing consent to 
objectifying treatment.  In terms of responsibility it is asserted that each person should be 
held responsible for his own choices.  In practice this principle is already applied to justify 
the punishment of criminals in the sphere of criminal law. 
The principle of property justifies consent to objectification by insisting that each person has 
property rights in their own human dignity or personal attributes and may therefore deal with 
them as they please.  This is criticised on the ground that viewing one’s personal attributes in 
such a way leads to commodification and the violation of dignity. 
7 2 Should consent be allowed? 
7 2 1 Two situations 
Throughout this thesis two situations have unfolded.  One situation involves consent that does 
not comply with all the requirements for valid consent.  The other situation involves genuine 
consent, where the person consenting genuinely desires the treatment that is consented to.  
Due to the disparity between these two situations they should be dealt with separately. 
7 2 2 Invalid consent 
The starting point is that invalid consent to objectifying treatment should not be allowed.    
Yet, in our non-ideal world instances exist where prohibition is unwarranted and transitional 
measures are needed to allow and regulate invalid consent.  Nevertheless such measures 
should only be implemented where absolutely necessary.  Even in a non-ideal world, 
allowing forced consent or consent which is given by someone incapable of understanding 
the nature and extent thereof will be unjustifiable.  However, when a person is economically 
coerced or unduly influenced to consent because the state has not yet succeeded in fulfilling 
his basic needs, transitional measures might be merited.   
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Similar to objectification, the denial of basic necessities is a violation of human dignity.  A 
government can therefore not prohibit a person’s only means of fulfilling these needs without 
providing an acceptable alternative or fulfilling the needs itself.  A desperate person might 
prefer the dignity violation of objectification to the dignity violation emanating from a lack of 
basic necessities. 
Until such time that our socio-economic situation enables us to fulfil these needs it would be 
hypocritical to prohibit economically coerced or unduly influenced consent.  Governments 
should rather regulate the situation in order to mitigate the damage. 
7 2 3 Genuine consent 
Contrary to the previous situation, genuine consent creates undeniable tension between 
dignity and freedom.  Although it might be argued that freedom is advanced since the consent 
to objectification is allowed, the previous situation actually places dignity on either side of 
the dispute.  In fact it does not even involve the balancing of dignity's seemingly 
contradicting elements of ‘autonomy’ and ‘self-worth’.  It is simply a ‘self-worth’ versus 
‘self-worth’ scenario; the right not to be objectified versus the right to have one’s basic needs 
fulfilled.  In terms of the previous situation it is therefore unnecessary to determine whether 
dignity should trump freedom. 
Genuine consent to objectification does however raise this question, since it involves the 
balance of dignity and freedom, or ‘self-worth’ and ‘autonomy’.  Genuine consent is given 
when a person, capable of understanding the nature and extent of the objectifying treatment, 
freely consents thereto.  In such situations the person consenting might not experience the 
treatment as a violation of his dignity and might even desire it.     
This leads to the discussion on whether dignity should be interpreted objectively or 
subjectively.  If defined subjectively, a person will be allowed to consent to treatment that he 
does not consider being a violation of his dignity.  The complication lies in defining dignity 
objectively, since dignity is notoriously difficult to define.  Although it may be justified to 
define the right to human dignity subjectively, dignity as a value is generally described as an 
objective legal norm to be used in the mediation of value conflicts.  The unwarranted use of 
popular moral ideas in defining the concept discredits this objectivity, due to the fickle nature 
of these moral perceptions.   Consequently, dignity is deprived of the one function that 
separates it from other values; which could really afford it supreme status.   
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Should a supreme status not be conferred upon dignity, the court needs to consider all values 
to an equal extent when deciding whether a person may consent to objectification.  As 
discussed the constitutional values of equality and freedom could be interpreted to permit 
consent to objectification.  Therefore, regardless of whether such consent conflicts with the 
value of dignity, the consent may be allowed.  This is because equality and freedom may 
trump dignity in a balance of values if dignity is not regarded as supreme.  This balancing 
procedure would have to be administered on a case-by case basis and would presumably 
favour freedom where a person genuinely consents to the violation of his dignity.   
On the other hand, should dignity reserve its supreme status it might nevertheless allow 
consent to treatment that is currently prohibited due to its objectifying nature.  There are two 
reasons for this assertion.  The first is that if it is not informed by the moral opinions of the 
majority, dignity could be interpreted as a concept that is tolerant of different choices.  The 
second reason, which relates to this understanding that dignity tolerates different choices, is 
founded upon the theory that dignity incorporates freedom. Within dignity these two concepts 
would therefore receive equal status.  It would then be unfounded to allege that one facet of 
dignity would always trump the other without having regard to the surrounding circumstances 
of each matter. 
Consent would however only be permitted if it does not harm others and affords them the 
same breadth to exercise their rights.  As discussed earlier, the fact that someone is morally 
affronted by the decisions of another or that the tolerance of different moral perspectives 
might lead to an over-all change in the morals of the majority, cannot be regarded as ‘harm’ 
in this sense, as the moral opinions of the majority should not dictate decisions. 
While theoretically sound, the approach of allowing genuine consent might be less acceptable 
in practice.  As Radin remarks, it is often difficult to believe that anyone would consent to 
treatment that is regarded as a violation of dignity by the majority of society.
754
  This theory, 
together with the fact that so many people are coerced or forced to consent to objectification, 
makes it difficult to determine whether a person has in fact provided genuine consent.   
As argued in Chapter 5, by allowing genuine consent the risk of invalid consent might 
increase.  Moral opinions tend to conform to changing laws, which could slacken the scrutiny 
of the consent given.  The difficulty in determining whether consent was genuine before the 
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treatment occurs is illustrated in the McDowell case.
755
  This case involves the latest trend of 
advertising one’s desire for sadomasochistic treatment on the internet.  In 2009 McDowell 
was convicted of rape after responding to an advertisement from a woman who desired to be 
raped and physically assaulted.  He was unaware that she had not posted the advertisement 
herself and was under the impression that he was acting with her consent.  Only by 
sufficiently regulating consent to objectification can such occurrences be prevented.   
7 3 Conclusion 
This thesis revolves around the question of whether a person can and/or should be allowed to 
consent to objectification.  The answer to whether a person can give genuine consent to 
objectification is positive.  Although there are situations in which genuine consent is not 
possible, it can be given under certain circumstances.   
On whether a person should be allowed to consent the following conclusion can be made.  An 
individual who cannot give genuine consent to objectification should not be allowed to do so, 
unless transitional measures dictate otherwise.  Furthermore, an individual who is capable of 
giving valid consent to objectification should be allowed to do so.  Finally, regardless of 
whether such consent is genuine or not, strict regulation thereof is required. 
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